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Abstract: The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) caused by the 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) represents one of the greatest challenges facing 
today‘s globalized world. While state face increasing demands from their citizens to 
provide care and treatment, transnational drug companies have strengthened their market 
positions as a result of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(or TRIPS). Patent protection provided by TRIPS has led to higher prices and reduced 
access to essential medicines, especially in low- and middle-income countries which are 
under increased pressure to provide expensive life-saving medicines to their citizens. 
Brazil‘s AIDS program is deemed successful in reducing morbidity and mortality rates 
through universal provision of free AIDS medicines. The program‘s sustainability came 
under threat as the result of TRIPS, pressures by transnational corporations, and trade 
threats by the US government. The research question that drove my dissertation centered 
on the impact of these threats on policy space available to Brazilian government to 
 viii 
sustain its universal social program. How has the incorporation of patent protections for 
drugs affected the ability of local firms to develop pharmaceutical technology and 
challenged states like Brazil to fulfill social democratic obligations? How has Brazil 
withstood challenges from transnational drug companies? In order to answer these 
questions, I employ mixed methods for gathering and analyzing data. These methods 
included ethnographic field techniques, content analysis, key informant interviews, and 
archival research. My findings are threefold. First, TRIPS has increased the power of 
foreign firms to secure monopoly positions in Brazil‘s drug markets and weakened 
Brazil‘s labs to quickly make generic copies of essential medicines. Second, policy space, 
though curtailed due to external pressures and treaty obligations, expanded through the 
development of symbolic power, or what I call ―reputational dividends,‖ based on a 
successful social program. Third, by adroitly marketing its banner AIDS program by 
employing human rights principles, health officials constructed a triple alliance between 
the state, local private drug manufacturers, and domestic activists tied into transnational 
advocacy networks.  I employ institutional and power analyses to examine the changing 
sources of power for transnational capital, social movements, and state actors, as well as 
to analyze the impact patent protection has on the ability of Brazilian firms to produce 
medicines locally. I posit that globalization results in the formation of strong domestic 
coalitions who are capable of exploiting the ―reputational dividends‖ of a successful 
social program in order to contest transnational corporate power. This symbolic form of 
power appears particularly well-disposed for ―middle-income‖ countries that lack the 
material forms of power held by a global hegemon or transnational corporations. 
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CHAPTER ONE – GLOBALIZATION, THE STATE, AND AIDS 
 
AIDS requires a different logic.        
AIDS has come to change the world  
and has a pedagogical role.  
-Rosali Tardelli, journalist and founder of AIDS News Agency [Agência 
de Notícias da Aids] 
 
In 2001, at the first-ever Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
on HIV/AIDS, the leaders of 189 nations claimed that the epidemic Acquired Immune 
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) caused by the Human Inmmunodeficiency Virus (HIV)  
constitutes a ―global emergency and one of the most formidable challenges to human life 
and dignity.‖ In 2007, the Joint United Nations Agency on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS 2008) 
estimates there were 33 million people who were living with the disease, 2.7 million new 
infections and 2 million AIDS-related deaths.  
Of the total world population living with the disease, 95% are from the 
developing countries, which suffer chronic institutional weaknesses and lack of sufficient 
resources. Despite the large amounts of aid and support from international organizations, 
governments in the developing world are viewed as the main hope for an adequate 
response to the disease that involves prevention, treatment, and care (Barnett and 
Whiteside 2003a). 
Most countries adhere to the notion that health care is a fundamental right for 
their citizens. At the time low and middle-income countries confront a crippling disease, 
they are called upon to fulfill human right commitments. The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (United Nations 1966) asserts ―the right of 
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everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health.‖ Many states are signatories of this agreement and have incorporated its principles 
into their constitutions.  
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that a core 
obligation to ensuring the right to health is providing access to biomedical innovations. 
Central to the provision of adequate health care for patients of HIV/AIDS is access to 
anti-retroviral treatments (ARVs), which has drastically reduced mortality and morbidity 
from the disease (United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights 2001).  
The extent and severity of the HIV/AIDS crisis has galvanized global responses, 
but unfortunately these attempts have fallen short of stated goals. The United Nations‘ 
―3-by-5‖ initiative had a target to provide three million HIV/AIDS patients with ARV 
treatment by 2005. However by the end of 2005, only 1.3 million people in low- and 
middle-income countries were receiving treatment—up from 400,000 in December 2003.  
Achieving the goal of universal access depends on continued political 
commitment and available resources. Neither item is guaranteed for people living with 
HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) in developing countries. UNAIDS (2006:5-6) sums up the 
following dilemma: 
Prices of medicines have decreased dramatically, but cost still is an impediment in 
the context of per capita income and health expenditures, particularly but not 
exclusively in least developed countries. Prices of second-line antiretroviral are 
substantially higher than first-line, and not proportionate to local purchasing 
power; the prices of some HIV medicines in middle income countries remain 
higher than what would be expected in the context of per capita income.  
Expensive drugs draw attention to the promise of globalization—the diffusion of 
technology comes at a price. There is no guarantee to access first-world products 
enshrined in the discourse of globalization. 
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In order to participate in the global economy and access the fruits of modern 
science, states are required to adhere to the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), one of the pillars of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The 
accord universalizes a vision of how innovations are produced, distributed and 
compensated, as well as stipulates the rights and obligations between inventors and 
consumers. While states must provide minimum standards for protecting intellectual 
property, such as a twenty-year period for patents, TRIPS and subsequent declarations 
provide a number of flexibilities governments may employ to incentivize industry and 
protect their citizens. 
The case of Brazil encompasses the conflicting demands due to AIDS and 
globalization. In fighting the epidemic, South American‘s largest country has stood out in 
its commitment to providing free, universal access to treatment. Its Constitution 
recognizes the right to health care based on principals of universal access and equity for 
its population of 200 million. To guarantee access to affordable medicines for HIV/AIDS 
patients, Brazil has decided to invest in local production of medicines by public (or state-
owned) labs and has confronted transnational corporations (TNCs) that market patented 
ARVs. These initiatives, however, are structured by Brazil‘s obligations to respect 
intellectual property and work within the global division of labor in pharmaceutical 
production.  
Brazil‘s AIDS program is unique, not only for low- and middle-income countries, 
but also compared to the rest of the Brazilian health system, which suffers from lack of 
resources. Due to the First World standards of care and the treatment Brazil‘s program 
offers, it is worthy of study in light of globalization. In so far as the TRIPS accord and 
rhetoric concerning openness to global flows of technology, capital, and information 
presuppose improving the quality of life, Brazil‘s program reveals the challenges that 
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other countries will face in ratcheting up their AIDS or other health care programs to 
First World levels of care.  
Theoretically, the case of Brazil allows us to explore some of the postulations 
related to globalization and state autonomy. Political leadership and civil society 
mobilization have remained constant throughout the development and execution of AIDS 
policies. But the inclusion of patents on medicines allows us to examine the before and 
after effects of new global institutional structures and the impact they have on local 
production of essential medicines and a cash-strapped public health system. Brazil‘s 
experiences in walking a fine line between globalizing pressures and national rights-
demands are summed up in the following research questions: 
 
1.  What is the impact that intellectual property laws on pharmaceuticals, enshrined 
in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), 
have had on Brazil‘s ability to respond to national crises, develop local 
capabilities, and challenge the interests of the transnational drug companies?  
 
2.  How was Brazil able to confront transnational drug companies to ensure the 
sustainability of its treatment program, and how has Brazilian state society 
collaboration in addressing the AIDS epidemic affected state autonomy when 
confronting transnational companies? 
 
The dissertation seeks to understand how actors respond to new structural forms 
of power wrought by globalization. Instead of re-working macro-sociological theories of 
change, I use a variety of conceptual tools drawn from different schools of social theory. 
By doing so, I avoid the problem of endogeneity; that is, studying a subject matter such 
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as transnational corporations or states in their own terms. Instead, I construct a relational 
sociology that focuses on the material and symbolic interactions between states, 
transnational corporations, and social movements. 
Theoretically, my dissertation draws from three dominant schools of thought. 
First, I employ concepts from neo-Weberian perspectives that conceptualize the state as 
an actor capable of developing its interests beyond the particularitistic interest of groups 
from society. State autonomy, however, remains contingent on its internal organization 
and forms of embeddedness to other groups of society. Next, I employ the concepts of 
mobilizing structures, political opportunities, framing and identities from social 
movement literature to explain how forms of embeddedness change over time. The 
mediating links between society and state are constructed by ―social movement insiders‖ 
(Santoro and McGuire 1997) under a rubric of citizenship and human rights. Lastly, 
analyzing the subject of the AIDS epidemic requires the concepts of stigma and 
exceptionalism that are so intertwined with the disease. Stigma helps us understand the 
internal coherence and transnational outreach of those affected by the disease, while 
exceptionalism draws our attention to the international and national forms of state-
building to address the pandemic. 
I employ institutional and power analyses to examine the changing sources of 
power for transnational capital, social movements, and state actors to analyze the impact 
patent protection has on the ability of Brazilian firms to produce medicines locally. I 
posit that globalization results in the formation of strong domestic coalitions who are 
capable of exploiting the ―reputational dividends‖ of a successful social program in order 
to contest transnational corporate power. This symbolic form of power appears 
particularly well-disposed for ―middle-income‖ countries that lack the material forms of 
power held by a global hegemon or transnational corporations. 
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My account draws from the comprehensive studies carried out by Amy Nunn 
(2007) and João Biehl (2007). Nunn shows how treatment policies became 
institutionalized across several different government administrations. Political leaders 
who questioned the program saw their political career cut short while other politicians 
were able to make political gains by expanding the program. Biehl emphasizes the role of 
an ―activist state‖ in taking a pro-active role to combat the disease, initiating partnerships 
with NGOs for carrying out prevention and care projects, and organizing government 
efforts in response to congressional and presidential mandates. My work delves deeper 
into the pressures of transnational drug companies, industrial policies, and activism 
around intellectual property. I enter the black box of pharmaceutical value chains and the 
roles market power and patent power play in the pendulum between autonomy and 
dependency. 
 
CASE STUDY SELECTION 
 
Middle Income Countries with AIDS Crises  
 
Why was Brazil able to scale up its AIDS program to the global level? The South 
American country is not unlike other middle-income countries with comparable initial 
conditions. Thailand, South Africa, and India also suffer AIDS epidemics and enjoy a 
strong pharmaceutical base. All these countries face comparable global forces, pressuring 
them to conform to an international intellectual rights regime and compete in the global 
knowledge-based economy. Besides India‘s established democratic tradition, all the 
countries have witnessed recent transitions to democracy driven by social movements 
fighting for citizenship rights. (Thailand, however, has experienced continued military 
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intervention in its politics.) And all these countries have become flashpoints in the 
struggle between transnational drug companies and the state. 
Table 1 provides a brief comparison of these four countries‘ indicators in terms of 
wealth, poverty, inequality, the AIDS epidemic, and government effectiveness. Brazil‘s 
GDP per capita is comparable to South Africa and Thailand, while India, the country with 
the largest population, trails in per capita income. In terms of social indicators, Brazil lies 
towards the higher end of inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. Brazil‘s 
poverty levels are comparable to India and between the extremes of South Africa‘s 
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$1,849 $468 $522 $2,966 
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PPP) 
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% of PLWHA with access to 
ARVs (2007 est.)* 
80% 28% 61% (7%)*** 
Year Recognized Product 
Patents 
1997 1978 1992 2005 
Government effectiveness 
(percentile rank 0-100)** 
55.0 75.6 66.0 54.0 
Sources: CIA Factbook (2008); *UNAIDS (2008); and **Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay, 
and Massimo Mastruzzi (2006). ***Estimates being updated. 
 
Every country faces an AIDS epidemic, but South Africa‘s situation has reached 
genocidal proportions with close to one-in-five adults affected by the disease. South 
Africa and India are comparable given the slow state response to the disease, despite 
capable governments and a strong pharmaceutical sector. India, due in part from its late 
adherence to TRIPS, now has one of the strongest generic pharmaceutical industries in 
the world, but it has been slow to roll out treatments to its own population.  
                                                 
1 All monetary values are in US dollars unless specified otherwise. 
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Thailand has followed Brazil‘s path in aggressively rolling-out ARV treatment, 
and faces similar challenges in producing medicines locally due to changes in its patent 
law that allow for protection of product patents in 1992. Thailand also has a public lab, 
the Governmental Pharmaceutical Organization, which is comparable to Brazil‘s federal 
drug maker, the Medicines and Drugs Technology Institute (Instituto de Tecnologia em 
Fármacos—Farmanguinhos). Both state-owned companies specialize in drug 
formulations, and their managers lobby for compulsory licenses to produce patent-
protected medicines. Despite their similar approaches to dealing with AIDS, Brazil and 
Thailand have distinct political cultures and experience in institutional building. 
 In terms of government effectiveness, (understood as the quality of public service 
provision, quality of bureaucracy and civil servants, and the independence of the civil 
service from political pressures), there appears to be no connection in this small sample 
between government effectiveness and the number of People Living with HIV/AIDS 
(PLWHA) receiving treatment (Kaufmann et al. 2006). But ratings on government 
effectiveness take a holistic view of government structures, whereas individual state 
organizations may prove to be exceptions. In this respect, Brazil, more than any other 
country in Table 1, has exhibited the most dedicated and extensive state action to combat 
AIDS. 
 
Understanding Brazil‟s Uniqueness  
 
Brazil‘s AIDS policies in general and treatment program in particular is 
acknowledged as one of the best, if not the best, in the developing world (Hass 2003; 
Cruz, Kowalski, and McPake 2004). In fact, contrary to the belief of most experts at the 
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time, Brazil demonstrated that it was possible for a developing country to implement a 
treatment program comparable to First World standards. This fact rules out diffusion and 
increases the purity of the Brazilian case. The success of the Brazilian AIDS model has 
resulted in numerous studies and an extensive bibliography. While these materials are 
used as sources and checks on validity, my contribution is to analyze the changes in the 
internal reorganization of the state and varied forms of social embeddedness in the 
context of globalization.  
A response as to why Brazil provided universal treatment to its citizen who had 
contracted AIDS and confronted the United States and transnational drug companies is 
quietly simply because it could. Indeed, Brazil enjoys a pharmaceutical base and was able 
to mobilize public (or state-sector) pharmaceutical laboratories for the public health crisis 
(Flynn 2008). In total, these public labs are capable of producing over 10 billion 
pharmaceutical units/year in 195 formulations using 107 active ingredients (Egléubia 
Andrade de Oliveira, Maria Eliana Labra, and Bermudez 2006).  
Furthermore, Brazil is a rising economic power (Flynn 2007; Brainard 2009) and 
has a significant consumer market. For example, 37 million people own private health 
insurance. But the country‘s pharmaceutical sector, like many other aspects of its 
economy, remains dependent on imported technology and finance capital. Given the size 
of its middle class, why did the country institute a universal treatment policy as opposed 
to means-tested programs implemented in other countries, including the US?  
Much of the literature on the Brazilian case highlights a certain aspect of the 
policymaking process and/or purports an essentialist argument about the country‘s 
uniqueness. Policy makers, be they politicians or civil servants, emphasize their role and 
perspective in the development of Brazil‘s AIDS policies. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 
who was Brazil‘s president from 1995 to 2002, declared that his aim was to make 
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government more transparent and increase partnerships between state and society when 
many of the policies were enacted. In the case of AIDS, this reached its maximum 
potential so much so that ―state and the social movement practically fused‖ (Biehl 2004: 
115).  
Jose Serra (2004), who was Minister of Health under Cardoso and attempted 
succeed him, also emphasizes the important partnerships with civil society in AIDS 
programs. In his view, if politicians and policy makers had known ahead of time the 
challenges and difficulties, they probably would have shied away from the extensive 
efforts that were required when facing down pressure from the United States and 
powerful pharmaceutical companies. These declarations from the top levels of power 
reveal how democratic change resulted in increased attention by politicians on citizens‘ 
demands. Their actions seem rational, but their reflections sidestep the question of why 
government leadership and commitment occurred in AIDS as opposed to other rights 
claims from mobilized constituencies such as in the areas of land reform or racism. 
Another reason given for Brazil‘s uniqueness is the historical legacies of strong 
central government action in fighting threats to public health especially when compared 
to other countries (Gauri and Lieberman 2006; Gomez 2006). Brazilian public health 
authorities have a more collective approach to infectious disease as a national problem 
and have developed strong autonomous health agencies.   
Guari and Lieberman (2006) argue that in South Africa, strong boundaries 
between social groups have reinforced distinct racial identities that resulted in increased 
stigma, on the one hand, and reduced perceptions of the risk of contagion across racial 
boundaries, on the other. For one, Brazilian social boundaries in which racial identities 
are dismissed tend to be more fluid. Since neither an identifiable group can be blamed for 
spreading the disease nor are members of a group forced into denying responsibility for 
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the epidemic on behalf of their collective identity as in the case of South Africa, Brazilian 
perceptions of collective risk and susceptibility are more encompassing. Consequently, 
Brazilian policy makers were able to define AIDS as a collective problem for which they 
were able to develop a unique and successful program of prevention and treatment. 
Brazil‘s does have a capable public health complex, especially compared to other 
developing countries. Historically, health policies have been based on a corporatist model 
where benefits have been tied to formal employment. Important changes occurred during 
the 1990s after the country returned to democracy (detailed in Chapter Two). Despite 
recent efforts to provide universal access to care, Brazil‘s public health system continues 
to face problems of adequate financial resources and reforms to ensure equity across 
social classes. AIDS, however, has received special attention compared to other (perhaps 
more problematic) infectious diseases like tuberculosis and dengue fever.
2
 
Brazilian policy makers and scholars also highlight the country‘s open sexual 
attitudes as reasons for its successful program. The country‘s carnival celebrations are 
world renowned. Compared to Russian conservative attitudes towards sexuality and 
homosexuality, Brazil has never embraced dark Victorian taboos against open 
expressions of one‘s sexual orientation (Gomez 2006). Such a depiction veers toward an 
essentialist view of Brazilian sexuality. Brazilian promiscuity could be seen as the myth 
of the sexual prowess of African males applied to an entire country, but in fact, Brazil‘s 
initial policies towards the disease were warped by denial and blame. Only ten years after 
the first diagnosis of AIDS did the country ramp up efforts to fight it. 
Lastly, scholars and policy makers also explain the importance of Brazilian civil 
society in the program‘s evolution and success. Many of the depictions, however, tend to 
                                                 
2 See Rich and Gomez (2009) for a comparison of policies addresses AIDS versus tuberculosis. 
 13 
fetishize the role of social movements. ―The rich social movement responding to AIDS in 
Brazil from 1985 to 1995 cannot be understood without reference to the international 
movement and to the historical moment lived then by Brazilian society, which was 
overcoming two decades of military rule‖ (Cristiana Bastos 1999: 149). Parker  (1997, 
2003), similar to Bastos, describes how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were 
organized not as part of a gay movement such as in the US but as part of human rights 
movements that sprouted in the transition to democracy.  
 Throughout most of Latin America, the norm is for government to outsource its 
responsibilities and duties to NGOs (Roberts 2005). But in the case of AIDS in Brazil, 
this relationship evolved differently. One important distinction is the middle class AIDS 
activists who know their rights and were able to press their claims against the state (Rich 
2009; Serra 2004). The middle class origins of those affected by the disease are 
important, especially when compared to the spread of the epidemic in South Africa where 
it has spread rapidly through a racially distinct and disadvantaged underclass. Brazil‘s 
activists groups painstakingly undertook court actions to guarantee government 
protection against discrimination and secure care and treatment from the state (Passarelli 
and Júnior 2003).  
There are many elements that contributed to the success of Brazil‘s program. Any 
factors highlighted in the aforementioned accounts leads to reductionism (and many of 
these scholars do highlight more than one important factor). My own description of the 
construction of Brazilian pharmaceutical citizenship in Chapter Two emphasizes some of 
these factors, but does not attempt to make a conclusive statement or add much new 
material.
3
 This review, nonetheless, touches about a number of theoretical debates and 
                                                 
3 In fact, Brazil‘s success has important limitations due to historical inequalities and structural marginality 
(Biehl 2007). Perhaps the construction of Brazil‘s success is more the result of strategic marketing than 
concrete reality. 
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concepts in sociology concerning globalization, state autonomy, social movements, and 
AIDS, which will explain Brazil‘s success. 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS   
 
Debates about State Autonomy 
 
 Explaining Brazil‘s uniqueness and ability to confront transnational capital begs 
the sociological imagination to unravel the mysteries of state power. The history of the 
country‘s economic and institutional development, like much of the rest of the 
developing world, has been contingent on its relations to the larger world system 
(Wallerstein 1974; Cardoso 1972). Its experience with capitalist development has 
resulted in a high degree of structural inequality, but at certain times, especially the 
decades during and after World War II, state elites have pursued a national development 
project that appears to transcend class boundaries.  
Brazil‘s institutional development provides fodder for classic sociological debates 
about the nature of state. The point of departure in Marxist thought is the idea that the 
state is merely the ―executive committee of the bourgeoisie‖ (Marx and Engels 2002). 
Apart from Bonapartist formulations in which a dictatorial figure assumes control, 
scholars from this perspective have developed structuralist and instrumentalist versions of 
Marx‘s original formulation. The structuralist version argues that the state operates in the 
long term political interests of capitalists (Poulantzas 1976), while the instrumentalist 
account views state action as driven by an elite who share the same values, interests, and 
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background of capitalists and for this reason tend to develop institutions and policies in 
their favor (Miliband 1969). 
Theoretical attempts at synthesizing the two views argue that structural 
components have developed to support long-term capitalist accumulation, but the 
construction of new institutions in the governing apparatus favors instrumentalist 
accounts, albeit based on class struggle, so that the structuralist bias towards capitalist 
interests is not a foregone conclusion (Block 1977).  
The Weberian perspective of the modern bureaucratic state argues that it is not 
necessarily reducible to class analysis. Rather, the state is a potentially autonomous actor 
in society based on its central rule-making ability over a geographically defined area. 
Once created, bureaucratic states develop their own rationality, which tends to be more 
instrumental and universal than the varied rationalities and interests found in society 
(Weber 1946). The state can be defined as a conglomeration of bureaucratic agencies and 
institutional structures ―charged with administrating policies, maintaining order, 
enforcing the law, securing political legitimacy, and collecting the revenues necessary for 
the functioning of the state apparatus and the implementation of state polices‖ (Itzigsohn 
2000: 13).  
From this Weberian perspective, Mann (1986) argues the state is ultimately an 
―arena‖ and it is from this fact that it derives its autonomy. The four elements of state 
power include a set of differentiated institutions whose power emanates from its 
centrality over a territorially demarcated area. The monopoly of ―authoritative binding 
rule-making‖ is backed by its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Given the space it 
occupies in modern society and the multiplicity of functions that affect different interest 
groups, states can gain autonomy by practicing a ―divide and rule‖ strategy (Mann 1986). 
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The state‘s power, nonetheless, remains tied to its interplay with other social forces in 
society. 
The idea of state autonomy has played an important role in the study of Third 
World countries. This approach matured during the 1980s and 1990s with various forms 
of comparative institutional analysis (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985). The 
underlying assumption is that, since state structures develop variably through time and 
differently across countries, we can expect to observe different social and economic 
outcomes. The economy is embedded in state institutions just as uneven development 
conditions the growth of the state (Polanyi 1944; Block and Evans 2005).  In 
development studies, especially those seeking to understand the economic development 
of Japan and other fast-growing East Asian countries, scholars argue that an autonomous 
developmental state could rise above particularistic interests and effectively govern the 
market (Wade 1990; Amsden 2001).   
The concept of embedded autonomy, developed by Evans (1995), seeks to 
understand the varied institutionalized channels of state and societal relations by 
uncovering the social bases of a successful developmental state. Embedded autonomy 
derives from the internal organization of state agencies and the forms of social ties 
between civil servants and civil society actors. Where bureaucrats have clear career paths 
and strong forms of solidarity, states have the potential for becoming autonomous and 
work towards a self-defined national interest. But just as important, Evans asserts, are the 
formal and informal institutionalized channels between bureaucrats and society in order 
to exchange information about each others‘ capabilities. The concept of embedded 
autonomy represents a refinement of Evan‘s idea of the ―triple alliance‖ (Evans 1979). 
The latter concept, derived from dependency analysis, conceives of the state as mere 
arbiter of the relations between TNCs and the local bourgeoisie. 
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The neo-Weberian view of state autonomy formulated by Evans and others is 
challenged by scholars of globalization. Marxists inspired by the instrumentalist version 
of the state argue that the social ties binding the state to society have become global in 
nature, and that these networks are stronger between policy makers and executives of 
transnational corporations than between state elites and their citizens (Sklair 2001; 
Robinson 2004). Globalization, especially with the rise of global capitalist institutions 
like the World Trade Organization, has reduced the autonomy of the developmental state 
to enact policies that have been successful in the past (Wade 2003). This perspective 
emphasizes that globalization has increased dependency. 
Neo-institutionalists come to a similar but more nuanced version of state 
autonomy in the age of globalization (Meyer, Boli, and Thomas 1997). As a result of 
increasing emulation and transmission of institutional models across national boundaries, 
they argue that globalization has resulted in a state that is stronger organizationally, but at 
the same time more disciplined and tame. The state‘s infrastructural capacity to act has 
increased, but so have global norms and pressures that inhibit independent action (Meyer 
et al. 1997). 
Theories of globalization and state-centric perspectives from the neo-institutional 
schools suffer from the problem of studying a social phenomena within its own terms, 
often times, at a macro-level. Sassen (2006: 4) correctly identifies the problem with most 
theories of globalization as suffering from the ―endogeneity trap‖:  ―we cannot 
understand the x—in this case globalization—by confining our study to the 
characteristics of the x—i.e., global processes and institutions.‖ In other words, analyzing 
globalization as new telecommunication technologies, growing interdependence, 
establishment of global institutions, the decline of the national state, and increasing 
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power of transnational corporations (TNCs) to override borders and national governments 
amounts to a description of globalization—not an explanation. 
The same criticism of endogeniety can be laid out against state centric accounts 
that allege nothing has changed as a result of global processes, or that globalization 
merely places new constraints on policymaking without explaining their nature, impact, 
and outcome of these policy constraints. At one extreme, Campbell (2004) argues that 
globalization has had a minimal impact on national institutions. His view downgrades the 
alleged impact of new global institutions such as the WTO and the increasing power of 
international capital on domestic economies. The problem becomes acute when analyzing 
the forces behind the ability of states to protect social rights. 
Globalization is perceived as affecting the ability of developing countries to 
pursue social-democratic goals. Studies on social expenditures in developing countries 
confirm globalization‘s negative impact on the ability of these countries to maintain 
safety nets (Rudra 2002), but this is not a foregone conclusion. As a close study of the 
success of social democracy in the global periphery argues, ―both state capacity and 
grass-roots pressures become essential for preserving social conquests: the former as the 
locus of strategic innovation and planning, and the latter as a constant political 
counterbalance to the pressures of globalization‖ (Sandbrook 2007:226). Historical 
institutionalists adopt a similar argument.
4
 But what are the mechanisms involved to 
counterbalance globalizing pressures and norms?   
                                                 
4 Skocpol, for example, explains the inertia of successful state actions in the following terms: ―a policy is 
‗successful‘ if it enhances the kinds of state capacities that can promote its future development, and 
especially if it stimulates groups and political alliances to defend the policy's continuation and expansion‖ 
(Skocpol 1992: 59). The ‗lock-in‘ mechanism, in the case of successful AIDS policies, is the effective roll-
out of treatment to all those requiring medicines. It is not just the de jure or legal mandate to provide 
medicines; it is also the de facto achievement that transforms the fulfillment of a social right into a 
powerful mobilizing force. 
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While many states in the developing world – especially middle-income countries 
– enjoy a degree of infrastructural capacity, the development of stronger ties between 
their elites and global corporate elites as a result of global capitalism is not a foregone 
conclusion. Instead, strong ties may develop between civil servants and local ―grass-
roots‖ organizations and/or transnational advocacy networks. How state-society ties are 
based more on conceptions of citizenship and social rights in the latter case, as opposed 
to corporate material interests in the former, becomes a theoretical and empirical 
question. 
 
States and Social Movements  
 
 Brazil is a hotbed of social movements. In fact, it is home to one of the 
largest social movements in the world—the Landless Workers‘ Movement (Movimento 
dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra). But no other social movement in Brazil has achieved the 
same success in institutionalizing citizenship claims domestically, nor had to scale up its 
struggle to the global level to maintain its achievements, than Brazil‘s grassroots 
mobilization around AIDS.  
Just as in the case of sociological debates about the state, Brazil provides useful 
fodder for competing theoretical ideas about social movements. In the first camp are 
structuralist accounts of contenders versus state elites, while a second culturalist 
perspective concerning the rise of new social movements emphasizes post-industrial 
concerns, subaltern identities, and emotional underpinnings. Scholars of the first school 
are political process theorists and argue that social movements include rational planning 
and balance of power calculations. The main concepts of the political process model used 
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to understand the ―dynamics of contention‖ are mobilizing structures, political 
opportunities and framing (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; McAdam, McCarthy, and 
Zald 1996). 
The concept of mobilizing structures comes from resource mobilization theory. 
The framework, criticizing previous accounts of social movements as irrational forms of 
collective behavior resulting from relative deprivation or strain, argues that sustained 
collective action requires organizational structures and a constant stream of resources in 
terms of labor, people, and money (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Mobilizing structures are 
defined as ―those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people 
mobilize and engage in collective action‖ (McAdam 1996: 3). The use of mobilizing 
structures in this dissertation looks beyond the actions of social movement outsiders and 
considers the interactions of social movement organizations with state actors. 
Political opportunities are the set of political constraints and opportunities unique 
to a particular context and are embedded in the broader processes of society (McAdam et 
al. 1996). They involve shifts of power in democracies, as well as the openness of strong 
and weak states to societal forces. The concept draws attention to the elite reactions and 
splits that result from pressures arrising below (McAdam 1982, 1996). The mobilization 
of resources does not happen in a political vacuum. Rather, the rise and fall of social 
movements is related to political objectives. Confrontations between TNCs and state 
elites, for example, reveal the breakdown of global consensus about the legitimacy of 
patent monopolies.  
In the political process model, framing processes are ―conscious strategic efforts 
by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that 
legitimate and motivate collective action‖ (McAdam et al. 1996: 6). Framing processes 
seek to undermine an institutional structure‘s legitimacy and encourage mobilization as 
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people seek to organize and act on growing awareness of a system‘s vulnerability, such 
as global patent regime. Collective action frames ―underscore and embellish the 
seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust or immoral what was 
previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable (Snow and Benford 1988: 137).  
Political process theory employs the concept of framing in a rational, calculative 
manner. However, the term provides a useful bridge to the other culturalist perspectives 
that seek to explain the rise of new social movements concerned with identity and 
dominant values of a system (Jasper 1997; Melluci 1996). This school argues that social 
movements cannot be reduced to accounts based on rational-choice theory or to 
structuralist perspectives of the state. This perspective underscores the importance of 
solidarity based around a common identity, such as a sexual orientation or a stigmatizing 
disease. 
The two paradigms of social movement theory—political process model and the 
new social movement theory—require theoretical adjustments when applied to 
developing countries in a globalizing world. Davis (1999), for example, argues that 
neither perspective applies to the Latin American experience; instead, the uneven 
development of the state must take center stage. Indeed, scholars of social movements in 
wealthy countries argue that underprofessionalized state bureaucracies will discourage 
challengers, while ―[c]oherent state bureaucracies with social policy missions will 
encourage challengers targeting those issues,‖ (Amenta and Young 1999: 161). 
Consequently, we should see stronger social movements in countries with stronger 
resource capabilities and probably weaker or more violent movements in poorer, 
undeveloped states.  
A criticism specific to the political process model is that scholars have focused 
more on explaining the rise in social movements than in accounting for successful 
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outcomes. This becomes even more problematic when applied to developing countries, 
many of which are new to democratic politics and have varied degrees of institutional 
development. Democratic openings allow for new political possibilities for rights claims 
to be translated into reality (Jelin 1996), while the substantial fulfillment of rights 
obligations by states only results from increasing managerial improvements in public 
administration (Roberts 2005). The question then revolves around the nature of the social 
ties across the state-society divide and how they feed into mobilizing structures. 
There are both apolitical and politicized ties that can bind civil servants and 
grassroots organizations. Evans‘ (1996) concept of synergy identifies the importance of 
complimentary state structures and society organizations as well as their embeddedness 
for the development of trust. Another view emphasizes the politicized nature of these 
alliances that lead to alternative paths of development (Hickey and Mohan 2005). The 
former foresees the gradual diffusion of development successes where we find high levels 
of social capital are found, whereas the latter underscores the social struggles that result 
in novel progressive achievements. 
Brazil‘s AIDS program is the consequence of a politicized base in alliance with 
committed public health activists who have achieved managerial roles in the state 
bureaucracy. The concept of ―social movement insiders‖ (Santoro and McGuire 1997) 
used in this dissertation refers to the professional managers in the state who are activists 
themselves are interested in achieving social movement goals. The concept allows us to 
view the state in an instrumentalist fashion not necessarily working at the behest of 
capitalist interests, but open to capture by social movement forces. Under the rubric of 
human rights, these institutional insiders play key roles in funneling information and 
resources to social movement organizations on the outside, especially during political 
opportunities that result from confrontations with TNCs. 
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Globalization provides another dynamic to the nature of state-society ties. Many 
of today‘s sustained collective actions are organized into transnational advocacy 
networks and not reducible to groups located in a national state (Tarrow 2005; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998). These organizations coalesce around a transnational symbolic code of 
human rights embodied by declarations made by international government organizations.
5
 
The global diffusion of human rights does not occur apolitically by experts providing 
rational models for emulation according to world polity paradigm; rather, the process 
remains highly political (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
 Unlike the ―boomerang‖ model of Keck and Sikkink (1998), whereby activists in 
developing countries seek support of transnational networks to put pressure on their own 
countries, this analysis of Brazil reveals coalitions from middle income countries 
reaching out to transnational networks to mobilize support against corporate-led 
globalization. Through ―frame extension‖ facilitated by global communication circuits, 
activists are able to connect ―two or more ideologically congruent but structurally 
unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem‖ (Snow and Benford 1988).  
The ―human rights frame‖ provides the backdrop for several diverse groups and 
actors, such as gay rights groups, the access to medicines movement, and consumer 
advocacy groups, to coalesce into a large movement that can defend social rights states 
and blame corporate-led globalization for social injustice. The frame is even more 
empowering when backed by the visible success of a social program. The concept 
―reputational dividends‖ developed throughout this dissertation draws attention to social 
mobilization in defense of a program based on human rights principles. 
                                                 
5 The United Nations Development Program (2003), for example, explains that ―in a human rights-based 
approach to development, human rights determine the relationship between individuals and groups with 
valid claims (rights-holders) and State and non-state actors with correlative obligations (dutybearers). It 
works towards strengthening the capacities of rights-holders to make their claims, and of dutybearers to 
meet their obligations.‖ 
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AIDS and Social Theory 
 
AIDS is a relatively new disease. Social scientific research into understanding the 
virus‘ effect on society has a short but prolific history. There is no comprehensive theory 
about AIDS and society; however, there are important social characteristics about the 
disease. The two most important concepts are stigma and exceptionalism. 
Stigma is the social definition of individuals and groups who possess undesirable 
traits or attributes and, in the extreme, involves classifications of certain social groups as 
dangerous and harmful to the rest of society (Goffman 1986). The ways in which AIDS is 
transmitted, the cultural definitions of immoral behavior, and the deadly consequences of 
infection (at least initially) combine to increase the stigma of identifiable groups and 
vitiate public efforts to cope with the disease (Deacon et al. 2005). Stigma attached to 
AIDS is compounded by the fact that public awareness of the virus occurred with its 
spread amongst the gay male community in the United States (Shilts and Greider 1987).  
Gay communities in the United States and Europe spearheaded efforts–along with 
other stigmatized groups such as intravenous drug users, Haitian immigrants, and 
hemophiliacs–to change public perception of AIDS and pressure governments to initiate 
public policies addressing issues of discrimination and access to health care. The stigma 
attached to the disease combined with the identity politics of the gay rights movement 
created the conditions for powerful collective mobilization and empowerment towards 
social change (Parker and Aggleton 2003). Depending on social structures, sexual mores, 
and public institutions, the development of collective action around AIDS varies in 
different social contexts, but apart from issues of outright denial by government officials, 
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public policy towards AIDS has been marked by a high degree of exceptionalism. The 
concept of exceptionalism, originally specified by Bayer (1991), is used in this text to 
refer to the willingness of public officials to try innovative approaches and disburse large 
amounts of money to fight the disease (Rosenbrock et al. 2000). 
The exceptionalism of AIDS as a disease becomes even more apparent when we 
move from the national to the global scale. The pandemic highlights the social 
contradictions inherent in the contested concept of globalization (Altman 1999). The 
increase of cross border mobility and instantaneous communication provides the social 
spaces for mutual accusations of blame and neglect as well as the possibility for globally 
coordinated efforts. Indeed, AIDS is the first disease that has been classified by the 
United Nations Security Council as a threat to human security. No other public health 
concern has been able to mobilize such substantial resources from the global community. 
The degree of AIDS exceptionalism is apparent in UN declarations, the establishment of 
a specific UN body to coordinate international efforts, and creation of dedicated funding 
bodies to direct resources to fight the disease.  
The compression of space-time associated with the globalization also encourages 
the rapid dissemination of successful (or unsuccessful) institutional models in the fight 
against the pandemic and facilitates actions by transnational advocacy movements, either 
through the identity politics of affected groups affected or human rights organizations 
supporting their cause. While HIV/AIDS is global in nature, national governments 
remain the primary institutional actor for implementing comprehensive programs to 
combat it (Barnett and Whiteside 2003b). Countries that fail to develop adequate policies 
and programs become the target of global public condemnation, while successful 
programs garner global praise and become models for others to adapt. States, 
furthermore, can reap what we can here call reputational dividends of a successful social 
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program when confronting global capitalist pressures. When doing so, states can increase 
their ability for autonomous action, both at the national and international arena. 
 
DATA COLLECTION AND ORGANIZATION 
 
Data collection for my dissertation included policy documents, news reports, 
descriptive statistics and ethnographic techniques. Policy documents came from online 
resources provided by the Ministry of Health and related government agencies, as well as 
any documents not available online but delivered directly by government agencies. 
Government documents also involved archival research of US diplomatic cables 
concerning Brazil‘s use of compulsory licenses that were obtained through requests under 
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). News reports came from leading Brazilian 
business press such as Valor Econômico, online websites specializing in reporting access 
to medicines Boletin Farmacos, as well as government agencies that regularly report 
issues such as Brazil‘s National AIDS Programme website.  
Quantitative data included the evolution of drug prices, government budgets, and 
the number of patients on ARVs. Secondary statistics were obtained from the Ministry of 
Health, especially the National AIDS Program website, and additional sources of 
quantitative data include other government agencies involved in industrial policies as 
well as industry associations that collect market information. 
 
Key Informant Interviews 
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Ethnography was the main research technique to acquire new empirical material 
in the natural social setting (Fielding 2001). The key ethnographic techniques were semi-
structured and open-ended interviews, observations of industry conferences and AIDS 
congresses, and visits to pharmaceutical production facilities. Visiting production sites 
provided an opportunity to learn about the intricacies and challenges of the drug-making 
process. Observing meetings about the development of the local drug industry and 
conferences about AIDS policies provided me with the opportunity to make new 
contacts, witness who gathered to share information, and note the value-orientations of 
their social interactions. Specifically, employing ethnographic techniques allowed me to 
observe and interrogate the ideological conflicts between defenders of strong forms of 
intellectual property and human rights activists.  
Key informant interviews were the main vehicle for obtaining in-depth knowledge 
of Brazil‘s policy-making process and understanding the social ties across the state-
society interface. Sampling was not random but directed towards those individuals who 
have played a role in lobbying, formulating, and implementing pharmaceutical policies or 
who have been directly affected by the policies, such as industry and patient groups, as 
well as those who have insider knowledge concerning the process, such as policy and 
industry experts. Sampling strategies included the following: 
 
1.  Convenience Sampling: This sampling strategy involves engaging my social 
network to establish contact with target interviewees. Concerning access issues 
during my pre-dissertation research June-August 2005, I developed an extensive 
network of contacts in government, non-governmental, and policy experts during 
my pre-dissertation research June-August 2005. Through this initial period, I was 
able to gain institutional support at the Center for Pharmaceutical Policies 
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(Núcleo de Assistência Farmacêutica—NAF), which is part of the Sergio Arouca 
National School of Public Health (Escola Nacional de Saúde Pública Sergio 
Arouca—ENSP) and provided additional contacts. 
 
2.  Snowball Sampling: The use of snowballing techniques was my main strategy to 
gain access to restricted groups. For example, I sampled executives by first 
contacting industry associations that represent these groups. 
 
3.  Quota Sampling: Interviews with individuals who have participated or directly 
witnessed the evolution of Brazil‘s pharmaceutical sector over the past twenty 
years were especially helpful. These sub-groupings included representatives from 
advocacy organizations, policy makers at the National AIDS Program and 
Ministry of Health, managers from transnational drug companies, public (state-
owned) labs, and private Brazilian drug companies as well as specialists from law, 
academia, and journalism. 
 
I was flexible in the sampling so that I could include any individuals for 
interviews based on snowballing techniques. Interviewing began in October 2007 and 
concluded in September 2008 while I was in the field. Interviews also included pre-
research and follow-up interviews. Appendix Two lists all the interviews, conferences 
attended, and manufacturing facilities visited
6
. In total, I interviewed 60 people. I 
conducted most of the interviews in Portuguese by digitally recording and translated them 
into English. I was not able to interview everyone I desired. Some executives at 
                                                 
6 In some cases, interviewees spoke off the record. When this occurred, no personal identifiers were 
associated with them. 
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transnational pharmaceutical companies and some current and past high-level policy 
makers at the Ministry of Health denied my interview requests out of lack of interest, 
busy schedules, or perhaps out of fear.   
One obstacle I encountered while in the field was that I had to discontinue my 
interviews until I received the approval of the Ethic Committee in Research (Comitê de 
Ética em Pesquisa—CEP) at the National School of Public Health, which provided me 
with institutional affiliation. I had received approval from the Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) at the University of Texas at Austin before entering the field. I only encountered 
difficulties with Brazil‘s version of the IRB when attempting to make contacts and set up 
interviews with high level policy makers at the Ministry of Health. I had to stop the 
interviews for three months to complete the bureaucratic process.
7
 
While institutional support from the National School of Public Health presented 
certain obstacles with research ethics committees, its Center for Pharmaceutical Policies 
(Núcleo de Assistência Farmacêutica—NAF) provided other forms of invaluable support. 
NAF colleagues (or Nafinhos) had accumulated extensive knowledge of Brazil‘s health 
system and pharmaceutical realities that they liberally shared with me. As mentioned 
above, Nafinhos had an extensive network of contacts in government, civil society, and 
industry. At various conferences and events, some would introduce me jokingly as a 
researcher from the US‘ Central Intelligence Agency, but ―of the good kind.‖ This 
naturally leads to the issue of positionality.  
Conducting my research at the ENSP, one of the institutional homes of the 
country‘s sanitary reform movement, undoubtedly influenced my views about Brazil‘s 
pharmaceutical governance. Nonetheless, during my interviews, I maintained an 
                                                 




inquisitive disposition that employed techniques ranging from devil‘s advocate to 
empathy—albeit towards understanding the concerns of AIDS patients or the realities 
faced by executives operating in a capitalist economic system. I also maintained that I 
was interested in learning about outcomes concerning state intervention in the economy 
and evolution of intellectual property laws. Despite jocular references that I worked for 
the CIA, I found most interviewees interested in expressing their views and describing 
their experiences to an outsider. 
Interview strategies included a blend of semi-structured and open-ended 
techniques. Questions varied depending on each sub-group within the quota-sample. I 
developed a semi-structured questionnaire to guide the interview but included additional 
questions depending on the specific role of the individual in order to achieve depth into 
specific policy-making and production processes. After describing my research project 
and obtaining informed consent from the participants, I began the interview by asking the 
interviewees to describe their biography and then segued into specific questions. The 
interviews sought to elicit responses from participants about their perceived role in the 
policy-making process, the different social forces structuring social action, and the 




The novelty of Brazil‘s response to the AIDS crisis lends itself to what Stake 
(1995) calls an ―intrinsic case study.‖ The case is not intended to be representative of all 
phenomena but is of particular interest to policy makers due to its achievements and to 
public sociology in terms of understanding a unique and successful outcome.  
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A case study allows for a close examination of contemporary phenomena in order 
to draw conclusions about the influence of current and past social structures (Stake 1995; 
Yin 1989). Applying ethnographic techniques in a case study allows a researcher to 
understand the cognitive dimensions and value orientations of actors as they challenge 
and reproduce structural forces. Case studies lend themselves to the ―doubly-engaged 
social science‖ (Skocpol 2003:409) that allows the researcher to invalidate or confirm 
previous theories with empirical evidence while also generating new theoretical insights. 
Analysis of ethnographic data followed straightforward procedures of organizing field 
notes and transcripts into categories and common patterns and then re-ordering that the 
data into an outline (Fielding 2001). 
Ethnography can be combined with power analysis, which focuses on the 
resources actors have at their command in order to achieve their objectives. These 
resources can be understood as economic, political, military, or ideological (Mann 1986). 
Power analysis has a long history in its application to developing countries, especially for 
those researchers working in the dependency paradigm (Gereffi 1983; Evans 1979).  
Exploring the relations of power between groups in order to understand the causal 
factors leading to a particular outcome includes counter-factual analysis. Gereffi (1983: 
70-71) describes this technique in the following way: ―What is involved in this or any 
weighting procedure is a mental exercise in which the analyst removes the relevant casual 
factors one at a time in order to speculate what the world would have been like in their 
absence.‖ The objective is to interrogate feasible alternatives derived from theory in the 
causal analysis of events in order to establish probabilistic generalizations. The method 
allows for the exploration of power relations between groups in society and external 
pressures exercised by foreign governments or corporations. 
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One caveat when using counter-factual analysis is to consider each situation in 
terms of rational choice theory. At each crucial juncture, actors make choices based on 
what they consider to be optimal outcomes given a certain set of conditions. While this 
approach may prove useful when considering negotiations between government officials 
and representatives of drug companies, it lends itself to overly deterministic explanations 
that underplay contest, contingency, and uncertainty (Goldstone 1998).  
 
Validity and Reliability 
 
Several strategies are used to enhance reliability and internal validity of my 
research. Since the investigator in qualitative research is the main research instrument 
and the filter on claims of reality, strategies to improve reliability and internal validity 
included peer review, member checks, declarations of researcher bias, and triangulation. 
Interviews with different sets of groups were used to increase the validity of how 
institutional connections are established and evolve through time. Findings derived from 
ethnographic techniques were triangulated with content analysis of previous scholarly 
and journalistic accounts. 
External validity, or the generalizability of the findings, is restricted due to the 
limitations of a single case study. Additional research is required to assess the 
applicability of the findings to other cases. Brazil is considered as only the first case in a 
research project that includes India, South Africa, and Thailand. 
 
PERIODIZATION AND DISSERTATION OUTLINE 
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My case study begins with a brief overview of the origins of Brazil‘s 
pharmaceutical industry prior to World War II in order to provide background to the 
changes in the country‘s political economy during the 1980s and 1990s. The next chapter 
provides this brief history of the Brazilian context in terms of the changes wrought by 
neoliberal policies and expansion of social rights. I detail the construction of 
―pharmaceutical citizenship‖ amidst efforts to establish a universal public health care 
system. The chapter identifies the actors involved in AIDS treatment policies and their 
roles in the political battles over intellectual property regimes in subsequent sections. 
Most of the new empirical data I have gathered is divided into three periods. The 
first phase, from 1990 to 2001 (Chapter Three), begins with the local production of 
zidovudine (AZT) by the local private firm Microbiologica in the early 1990s. The period 
is characterized by the construction of treatment policies, especially the scale-up of the 
production of the first generation of ARVs in public labs. This period ends with the first 
confrontations between Brazil and transnational drugs companies (TNCs) over high 
prices. The first phase details the expansion of state capacity in response to the AIDS 
crisis. It also introduces the concept of ―reputational dividends‖ to explain social 
alliances between state and social movements to contest corporate power. 
The second phase, from 2002 to 2005 (Chapter Four), details problems in 
sourcing the key ingredients for producing second generation ARVs along with Brazil‘s 
aggressive negotiation strategy with TNCs. Despite several threats to issue a compulsory 
license, government officials do reach negotiated settlements. Domestic production of 
AIDS medicines, however, suffers setbacks due to increased dependency on imported 
and patent-protected medicines. This phase demonstrates the limits of civil society 
pressures to force state action due, in part, to weakened local production capabilities.  
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The third phase, 2006 to 2009 (Chapter Five), traces changes enacted during the 
second term of Luiz Inácio ‗Lula‘ da Silva‘s presidency. The period is marked by the use 
of compulsory licenses and implementation of industrial policies in the health sector. 
State autonomy is strengthened through the implementation of industrial policies to 
support local production of strategic medicines. Chapter Five therefore details the 
institutionalization of the triple alliance between officials in the health ministry, local 
NGOs tied into transnational advocacy networks, and local private-sector drug 
companies.  
Chapter Six summarizes my findings and their theoretical import. My hope is that 
that the reader will understand that the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (or TRIPS) has increased the structural power of transnational drug 
corporations to secure monopoly positions and weakened Brazil‘s public labs to quickly 
reverse engineer essential medicines. Pressures from global capital and US trade threats, 
however, did not lead to the demise of state autonomy. Rather, Brazil was able to contest 
TNCs by developing symbolic power, or ―reputational dividends,‖ based on successful 
social policies. By adroitly marketing its banner AIDS program under the discourse of 
human rights, health officials constructed a triple alliance between the state, the local 
bourgeoisie composed of national drug manufacturers, and local activist NGOs tied into 
transnational advocacy networks in order to contest global norms and pressures. 
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CHAPTER TWO – CONSTRUCTING PHARMACEUTICAL 
CITIZENSHIP AMIDST BRAZILIAN NEOLIBERALISM 
Democracia serve para todos  
ou não serve para nada.8  
 --Heberto  ―Betinho‖ de Souza, sociologist and activist 
 
This chapter describes the transformation of the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry 
and its mixed successes in constructing universal health care policies during the 1990s. I 
argue that neoliberal reforms hail the dissolution of the development alliance between the 
state, local bourgeoisie, and transnational corporations. This ―triple alliance‖ no longer 
serves the interests of transnational drug companies due to the end of activist industrial 
policy in the pharmaceutical sector, falling tariff barriers, and new protections on drug 
patents. As a consequence, state autonomy is constrained due to fewer policy tools 
available for market intervention, and the ideological commitment to market 
fundamentalism on behalf of the country‘s leaders.  
While neoliberal reforms resulted in increased dependency in the pharmaceutical 
sector, problems associated with under-regulated drug markets and efforts to construct a 
universal health care system provide rationales for stronger state intervention. Toward the 
end of the 1990s, Brazil passed important laws to better police the drug market and 
support local generic production. The construction of a universal health care system, 
nonetheless, faltered because of a paucity of resources and a mobilized citizenry. One 
exception, however, is Brazil‘s AIDS program. Due to a strong coalition between health 
reformers and grassroots AIDS organizations, pharmaceutical citizenship is constructed 
along the lines of collective rights. 
                                                 
8 ―Democracy works for everyone, or it works for nothing at all.‖ 
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Before detailing these changes, I will first describe how the global pharmaceutical 
industry operates. The objective of the review is to outline the incentive structure for 
policies geared towards the capitalistic production of pharmaceuticals and the origins of 
its power. Next, I provide a brief history of the pharmaceutical industry in Brazil, 
focusing primarily on policy changes during the 1990s such as trade liberalization, new 
laws protecting intellectual property, and the creation of a new regulatory body.  
 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
   
The pharmaceutical industry is unique in terms of its production, consumption, 
and regulatory oversight. Public authorities are responsible for regulatory oversight to 
assure efficacy, safety, and proper marketing of pharmacological agents. Few industries 
are subject to as many government regulations, ranging from overseeing clinical testing 
to end-user consumption. 
The development and production of pharmaceuticals can be divided into three 
distinct stages outlined in Figure 1. They include: 1) discovery research, 2) 
manufacturing of the active principal ingredient (API), and 3) pharmaceutical 
formulation. The first phase involves the basic science necessary to discover new 
pharmaceutical interventions up to the point of clinical testing. Basic research into a 
disease or ailment seeks to unveil its progression and causal mechanisms. By identifying 
therapeutic targets, researchers search for new chemical and biological compounds 
capable of arresting disease, endeavor provide relief from suffering, and/or cure a 
sickness.  
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To determine efficacy and safety, new drugs are tested in clinical trials that are 
divided into a number of phases with an increasing number of test subjects in each phase. 
After obtaining product approval by regulatory officials, clinical trials continue to 
identify adverse reactions through large-scale use by a diversified population. Research 
and development of new drug interventions is the most expensive, time-consuming, and 
the riskiest step in the pharmaceutical production process. It is also at this stage that an 
inventor applies for a patent. 
The second stage in the production cycle is the mass production of the API and 
other raw materials, also known as pharmo-chemical production. ―The synthesis of an 
API usually requires several chemical processing steps in which new chemical bonds are 
formed and molecular complexity increases,‖ explains Pinheiro, Antunes, and Fortunak 
(2008), who review the cost structures of some of the most expensive and commonly 
used ARVs. The cost of the API represents between 55 to 90 percent of the direct 
manufacturing costs of formulated drugs (Pinheiro et al. 2005).  
Manufacturing of the API also has the largest environmental impact. Producers 
begin with large quantities of chemicals. At each step of the production process, which 
may include fermentation, distillation, crystallization, among other techniques, chemicals 
are transformed and synthesized, and output becomes smaller and smaller until the active 
principal is obtained. Brazilian API manufacturers require about six months to scale-up 
production from laboratory to industrial level.  
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Figure 1: The Pharmaceutical Production Cycle 
   
The third stage in the process is the development of the finished dosage form, or 
pharmaceutical formulation. This involves the mixture of the API with inactive 
ingredients in the form of capsules, pills, serums, and creams. The dosage of the API may 
vary to make a pill more or less potent, which determines the number of pills a patient is 
required per day. Improvements were made with the antiretroviral efavirenz, for example, 
with the dosage increasing from 200mg to 600mg so that, instead of three pills per day, 
patients need take only one. The fewer pills required, the better the adherence to 
treatment protocols.  
Formulations with more than one API, called fixed-dose combinations, also 
reduce the number of pills required and improve treatment compliance. One of the first 
fixed-dose combinations of ARVs made available in Brazil was zidovudine (AZT) with 
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lamivudine. The development of formulations may take one to three years, and 
production occurs in tightly controlled environments to ensure purity and potency. 
Generic medicines are dosage forms that are comparable to reference drugs, or initial 
innovator drugs, based on bio-availability and bio-equivalence tests. These tests ensure 
that two drugs are the same in terms of how long the API remains in a patient‘s system 
and whether they result in the same therapeutic effect.
9
 
Understanding the pharmaceutical value-added chain provides insight into the 
forms of power that firms and industry groupings may possess. These forms can be 
divided into two categories: patent power and market power. Patent power refers to the 
state codification of intellectual property used to provide the patent holder with market 
exclusivity. As sole provider of the drug, the patent holder or originator company can 
charge monopoly rents. Market power refers to firms‘ abilities to produce any node in the 
pharmaceutical value-added chain at a lower cost than their competition, either due to the 
uneven development of capitalism (cheaper wages) or government support (subsidies).  
In analyzing Brazil‘s pharmaceutical sector, the focus will be on the API 
manufacturers (or pharmochemical sector) and drug manufacturers who produce the final 
dosage form. Pharmaceutical technology is the knowledge firms possess to combine 
active principals with inert ingredients for consumption. This know-how can be 
developed by passing through all the stages of the clinical testing of new compounds, or 
by reverse-engineering products available on the market to determine its chemical 
components and methods of fabrication.  
 
                                                 
9 Brazil also has another class of drugs called similars that contain the same active ingredient in reference 
and generic medicines, but do not pass through the same quality control tests (see Homedes and Ugalde 
2005). 
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R&D Costs and Patent Power 
 
Patent power is intertwined with the particularities of the research and 
development (R&D) of new drugs. The main factor that distinguishes the pharmaceutical 
sector from other industrial pursuits is the large, upfront capital expenditures on R&D in 
order to identify new compounds with therapeutic properties.  
The cost to produce and bring a new drug to market remains highly contested. 
Estimates at the high end, such as those produced by DiMasi and his colleagues (2005) at 
the corporate-financed Tufts Center for Drug Development, concluded that it costs $802 
million dollars to research, develop and bring to market a new chemical entity. The figure 
includes the attrition rate and cost of capital. Other estimates are as high as $1.7 billion 
for the development of a new drug (Jim Gilbert, Henske, and Singh 2007). 
These high estimates have not escaped scrutiny. Researchers at Public Citizen 
(2003) calculate R&D costs of $108 million per new drug. Adjusting for tax deductions 
on R&D expenses, the actual cost per new drug comes to $71 million. Bottom-up studies 
of specific innovator drugs place cost at $115 million to $240 million for new anti-
tuberculosis drugs (Goozner 2004) and $208 million to $878 million for a new rotavirus 
vaccine (Light, Andrus, and Warburton 2009). The debate concerning the costs of drug 
discovery and development is complex and goes beyond the scope of this study.
10
  
A strong intellectual property regime is particularly important for the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industries, since their products may be easily copied. The 
cost of reverse-engineering a product is far less expensive than the time-consuming 
process of discovery, research, and development of new therapeutic agents. Compared to 
                                                 
10 To follow the debate see (Riggs 2004; Light and Warburton 2005; DiMasi et al. 2005; Goozner 2004; 
Angell 2004; Homedes and Ugalde 2006; Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Innovation and 
Public Health 2006). 
 41 
the estimated $108 million to $1 billion cost to develop a new drug, interviewees in the 
field said that the budget to reverse engineer a new medicine and bring it to market is 
about $2.5 million (R$ 5 million). 
Patents have thus become an important tool for industry to secure monopoly rents 
based on the ability to charge prices 40-100 times the cost of production (Light 2008). 
Since the costs of developing new medicines remain high (although the exact cost is 
debatable), patents are viewed as a necessary economic incentive for attracting 
investment and dissuading competitors from simply copying new innovations. A patent is 
awarded when a claimant demonstrates novelty, industrial application, and a non-obvious 
inventive step of a new drug. In exchange for disclosing the invention, the state grants the 
inventor a set of exclusive rights for a limited period of time.  
Critics of patents contend that the legal instrument involves more problems than 
societal benefits. Typically, patents do not provide all the necessary information to 
replicate an invention and are increasingly used as a end goal instead of as a means to 
innovation. Firms use patents to generate revenue via litigation even when they are not 
using them for production (Carolan 2009). The patent system also fails to direct resources 
into R&D for neglected diseases. According to the World Health Organization, ―where 
the market has very limited purchasing power, as is the case for diseases affecting 
millions of poor people in developing countries, patents are not a relevant factor or 
effective in stimulating R&D and bringing new products to market‖ (Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights Innovation and Public Health 2006: 32). Patents are criticized 
as an incentive mechanism so that companies can develop products for wealthy 
consumers, while diseases affecting the global poor receive less attention. The end result 
is that only 10% of total R&D expenditures are invested in diseases affecting some 90% 
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of the world‘s population, located mainly in developing countries (Commission on 
Intellectual Property Rights Innovation and Public Health 2006).  
Employing various strategies to extend and control a drug market has lead to a 
veritable explosion of patents (Carlos Correa 2000). Figure 2 shows the various patents 
connected to the AIDS medicine tenofovir marketed by US-based Gilead Sciences. The 
figure shows patents on fixed-dose combinations, derivations, polymorphs, processes, 
and uses. Without entering into technical details concerning each family of patents, Table 
2 reveals the complexity related to different patent strategies and the lengths companies 
go in order to extend patent monopolies and thus reduce competition.  
Figure 2: Explosion of Patents for Tenofovir 
 
Source: Brasil (2008a)  
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TRIPS and Humanitarian Safeguards 
 
The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 allowed for the 
extension of patent power to the rest of the world. The Trade Related Intellectual 
Property System (TRIPS), one of the pillars of the WTO, establishes patents as part of an 
overarching international legal code. The accord establishes a minimum baseline of 
intellectual property protection that all WTO members must include in their national 
legislation. The agreement stipulates that a patent holder is guaranteed exclusive rights 
for the exploitation of product, process, and use over a specified period of time. 
Minimum obligations are a patent period of twenty years for pharmaceuticals and no 
discrimination against the patent rights of foreigners.
11 
 
TRIPS also provides humanitarian safeguards for members when formulating 
national legislation. Article 8 states that countries may adopt ―measures necessary to 
protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital 
importance to their socio-economic and technological development‖ as well as take 
additional action ―to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders.‖ 
The Doha Declaration of 2001 reaffirmed the rights of WTO member states to 
circumvent patents in order to uphold public health obligations. (Chapter Three describes 
Brazil‘s efforts in establishing the Doha Declaration and its relevance to country‘s 
confrontations with transnational drug companies.) 
The main legal instrument for correcting abuses by patent holders is the 
compulsory license (CL), which allows for the exploitation of a patent by third-parties 
                                                 
11 Article 7 states the objective of the accord: ―The protection and enforcement of intellectual property 
rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination 
of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.‖ 
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without the consent of the patent holder. TRIPS foresees the use of a CL in three main 
instances: national emergency, cases of anti-trust, and for public, non-commercial use. 
Before issuing a CL, a government must first attempt to reach a negotiated settlement 
with the patent holder, who, in the case of the CL, still has the right to receive royalties. 
Only in cases of national emergency and public, non-commercial use can governments 
dispense with prior negotiations (Carlos Correa 2000) . 
While TRIPS establishes a minimum baseline of patent protection of twenty 
years, states still retain a degree of maneuverability in terms of compliance and criteria 
used for adjudicating patentability. In terms of transition periods, high-income countries 
had until 1996 to change their laws; middle-income countries, 2005; and least developed, 
2016. The more time developing countries have to adjust their patents in accordance to 
TRIPS, the more their generic pharmaceutical industry will have opportunities to legally 
reverse-engineer drugs patented elsewhere. India and China waited until 2005 to change 
their intellectual property laws, while Brazil anticipated the deadline by nine years.
12
 
Domestic intellectual property legislation may incorporate a number of 
humanitarian safeguards outlined in TRIPS in order to protect domestic health care 
systems and markets from abusive market practices. These include the use of CLs and 
parallel importation
13
. States can also determine which government organizations can 
grant patents, whether other public or private organizations can participate in the analysis 
of patent applications, as well as determine narrow versus broad definitions of 
                                                 
12 The reasons why Brazil reformed its IP laws before the TRIPS deadline are addressed below. 
13 Parallel importation allows countries to perform price arbitrage for the same patented product placed in 
both foreign and domestic markets. When this TRIPS flexibility is incorporated in national legislation, the 
domestic country can import a patented product that may be cheaper on a foreign market. The patent 
holder, once placing the patent on the foreign product, has exhausted her/his marketing rights to resale on 
the domestic market. 
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patentability. Patent offices, for instance, may take into account public health concerns 
when issuing patents on medicines and diagnostic equipment.
14
 
National IP laws sometimes go beyond TRIPS minimum requirement as long as 
such laws are consistent with the international agreement. Indeed, many countries have 
embraced numerous TRIPS-plus measures; that is, they fail to incorporate all the 
proscribed safeguards, either due to domestic political considerations or as a result of 
bilateral or regional trade agreements that demand more restrictive IP laws
15
 (Smith, 
Carlos Correa, and Oh 2009). 
TRIPS institutionalizes power differentials between wealthy and poor countries, 
whereby the former with developed IP infrastructures and cultures has a clear advantage 
over the latter (Carolan 2009). Before TRIPS, countries decided the level of intellectual 
property protection they deemed compatible with their level of development. Most 
countries, even while respecting patents in other industries, did not provide patents for 
pharmaceuticals since they were considered a strategic input for the health system. The 
accord reduces the policy space available for developing country governments so that 




The Global Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
Patent power is one of the many strategies originator companies employ to 
maintain market share and high rents. The increasing salience of patent power is 
                                                 
14 For a public health perspective on patentability outlined by Argentine economist and lawyer Carlos 
Correa, see WHO/ICTSD/UNCTAD (2006). 
15 The US, for example, has pushed for more restrictions on the use of compulsory licenses in bilateral 
trade negotiations 
16 For reviews on the history of IPR and TRIPS see (Matthews 2002; Richards 2004; Sell 2003). 
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associated with the uneven development of pharmaceutical production across the world. 
Incumbent pharmaceutical corporations from wealthy, industrialized companies have 
pushed a global patent agenda in order to arrest the rise of cheap, generic producers from 
the developing world that are able to exploit their market power based on less expensive 
production costs. 
While the debate on the costs of bringing a new drug to market will continue, the 
survival of capitalist drug firms depends on large upfront investments on R&D and 
marketing. Large capital expenditures necessarily impact market structure. Compared to 
other industries, wide scale competition in pharmaceuticals practically does not exist 
between producers, except when a patent expires and generic manufacturers enter the 
market. Instead, the global pharmaceutical industry remains heavily oligopolistic with 
companies concentrating in product differentiation within specific therapeutic classes. 
This is observed even in the ARV segment, when, for instance, Roche decided to exit the 
ARV industry while other companies such as Merck and GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) 
expanded their portfolios in AIDS medicines.  
Another strategy employed by pharmaceutical firms to protect and extend market 
control over product creation and sales is industry consolidation through mergers and 
acquisitions. GSK and Pfizer recently decided to establish a strategic alliance in their 
ARV divisions. Bermudez (1995) estimates that the planet‘s ten largest pharmaceutical 
firms controlled 40% of the world market during the 1990s. Since that time mergers and 
acquisitions have continued resulting in the approximately 100 largest companies in the 
world being responsible for 90% of all the pharmaceutical products for human use. 
Around 75% of sales are concentrated in developed countries like the United States, 
Western Europe, and Japan.  
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IMS Health (2008) forecasts that the global pharmaceutical market reached $735 
billion in 2008. Market analysts predict stronger future growth in emerging markets such 
as China, Brazil, and India compared to developed countries, which is one of the reasons 
for the push to have these emerging markets adopt patents. Table 1 lists the top 20 largest 
pharmaceutical companies in the world according to total sales in 2006. It is noteworthy 
that the sales of the top eight firms were larger than the entire budget of Brazil‘s Ministry 
of Health for the same year: 
 
Table 2: Global Company Sales Summary (Millions US$) in 2006 
Rank  Company   Sales      Market Share %   Sales Growth  
1  Pfizer     45,083   8.6    1.8 
2  GlaxoSmithKline   36,947   7.1    8.9 
3  Sanofi-Aventis  35,605   6.8    4.9 
4  Novartis    28,868   5.5    17.9 
5  Roche     26,560   5.1    21.4 
6  AstraZeneca    25,741   4.9    10.5 
7  Johnson & Johnson   23,267   4.4    4.2 
8  Merck & Co    22,636   4.3    2.8 
9  Wyeth    15,683   3.0    9.8 
10  Eli Lilly    14,816   2.8    7.5 
11  Bristol-Myers Squibb  13,861   2.6    (9.1) 
12  Amgen    13,858   2.6    15.3 
13  Abbott    12,395   2.4    (6.8) 
14  Boehringer Ingelheim  10,401   2.0    15.2 
Source: Wood Mackenzie's Productview™ March 2007 
 
The world‘s largest pharmaceutical companies increasingly operate on a global 
scale and executives plan their strategies at this level, but local distribution and marketing 
continues to segment markets into national domains due to differing national regulations 
and health care systems. Nonetheless, lobbying efforts tend to be concentrated in the 
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United States. According to the Center for Responsive Politics (2010), between 1990 and 
2008 the pharmaceutical industry contributed around $170 million to federal political 
campaigns. Lobbying the US government is important for the industry to protect its most 
lucrative market and to win a powerful backer to enforce its patent rights around the 
world. 
Research on the global pharmaceutical industry highlights current factors driving 
their growth and activities. First, the wave of mergers and acquisitions the industry has 
experienced in recent decades stems, in part, from widespread overcapacity and capacity 
underutilization as a result of local production in the 1970s and 1980s. The tendency is to 
centralize production of active ingredients and de-centralize end production and 
marketing (Zeller 2000). Furthermore, centralization has led to increased intra-firm trade 
between separate branches of the same company.  
Second, global drug companies tend to out-source production less relative to other 
industries. The one exception is in research and development. Large firms increasingly 
concentrate on marketing and distribution of final products while outsourcing R&D 
activities to small-biotech companies and clinical testing to contract research 
organizations (Homedes and Ugalde 2006; Tarabusi and Vickery, Graham 1998).  
Third, pricing of patented medicines is carried out secretly by top executives and 
hired specialist consultants. Light (2008: 67) explains the pricing system: ―The value of a 
new drug is made up of the reference value, the price of the best alternative, and the 
added or differential value of the new drug‖ [italics in original]. The added or differential 
value includes all the advertising and marketing techniques employed to convince doctors 
and patients that a specific drug is the best and has few side effects.  
At the global level, prices of the same drug vary considerably, even in the 
developed world. In the US, for instance, insurance companies negotiate with drug 
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companies whereas in Canada and the United Kingdom, a pricing board negotiates with 
the drug firms. In the developing world, prices also vary considerably according to 
market competition, patent regimes, and public health systems (Silverman, Lydecker, and 
Lee 1992). In response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, large drug companies established a 
differential pricing system that sets pricing criteria for each country according to its level 
of development (high, middle, or low income as determined by the World Bank) and its 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. High income countries with the lowest prevalence rates are 
charged the highest prices, while low income countries with prevalence rates over 1% 
receive ARVs at the cost of production. 
Lastly, the rise of India and China as important producers of medicines and raw 
materials has shifted market power away from Western firms. Over the past 30 years, 
India in particular has become a powerhouse in producing generic medicines, and its 
firms such as Cipla, Ranbaxy, and Aurobindo have become leading suppliers of 
inexpensive global AIDS medicines. The growing market power of Indian and Chinese 
firms has been able to undercut not only established pharmaceutical firms from the First 
World but also Brazilian pharmaceutical companies. 
 Established firms have responded by acquiring Indian firms, such as Japan‘s 
Daiichi Sankyo buying a controlling stake in Ranbaxy as well as by establishing more 
partnerships in raw materials outsourcing and R&D initiatives. One continued concern, 
however, is the supply of cheap, generic alternatives after India and China adjusted their 
legislation in 2005 to make them TRIPS-compliant in 2005. The current forecast is that 
firms from China and India will continue to supply cheap, finished drugs and bulk raw 
materials, but newer medicines will no longer be available at inexpensive prices, or 
perhaps at all (Grace 2004). Patent restrictions could thus stem the flow of future AIDS 
medicines at affordable prices. 
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Pharmaceutical production is a complex, high-tech industry that involves different 
forms of patent and market power. The growing division of labor in the global 
pharmaceutical industry continues apace as low-cost Asian producers advance in global 
markets, but R&D remains concentrated in developed countries, especially in the bio-tech 
offshoots from university labs. Clinical trials of new therapies, meanwhile, are 
undertaken throughout the world. While this overview does not detail every aspect of the 
pharmaceutical industry‘s operations, it does provide an introduction to how the sector 
works and a background to its operations as we examine the case of Brazil. 
 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY‟S INSERTION IN BRAZIL 
  
According to IMS Health—World Drug Purchases (2008), the Brazilian 
pharmaceutical market ranked as the ninth largest in the world in 2007. Market sales 
reached $12.2 billion or 2.91% of world total. The country is home to 550 pharmaceutical 
companies that employ 69,000 people (Grupemef/Febrafarma 2007). Studies of Brazil‘s 
market reveal that 48 companies are foreign-based but are responsible for between 70-
80% of the entire Brazilian market; 18 public labs account for less than 5% (selling 
mainly to the public health sector); and the rest in the hands of local, privately-owned 
firms (Hasenclever 2002; Palmeira and Pan 2003), which vary in terms of size and 
markets. The Brazilian company Aché is the largest drug firm with 6.94% of the market, 
ahead of France‘s Sanofi-Aventis, with 6.81% (Gadelha 2007). 
The Brazilian pharmaceutical industry is highly sophisticated in its ability to 
produce end products in a variety of formulations. Few national firms have vertically 
integrated production, and foreign firms with local operations focus on end-stage 
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production and marketing of their products. Investments in research and development, as 
well as new products and processes, remain embryonic. 
Given its weak pharmochemical sector, Brazil remains heavily dependent on 
imported chemical intermediates and APIs used in drug formulations. Currently, there are 
only 23 firms in Brazil that produce active principals and intermediates, and these 
account for only 20% of the domestic market—that is, the remaining 80% used in 
Brazilian pharmaceutical production is imported. China and India together provide about 
20% of inputs on the national market. In 2006, medicine imports of$1.742 billion 
surpassed exports of $435 million; and imports of APIs amounted to $1.268 billion 
compared to U$272 million in exports (Gadelha 2007). The combined trade deficit of 
$2.3 billion continues to stimulate policy makers‘ attempts to reduce external 
dependency.  
 
Brief History of Brazil‟s Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
The current situation of dependency in the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector stems 
from the penetration of foreign capital and from several unsuccessful attempts by the 
state to encourage the development of the domestic industry. Bertero (1972) recounts 
how the first private Brazilian pharmaceutical firms were established in the 1920s and 
1930s and largely resembled their counterparts in the United States, but now after World 
War II, local firms declined as the government began providing incentives to attract 
foreign investors. Meanwhile, US and European firms began to internationalize their 
operations. Local firms lagged behind foreign competitors due to lack of access to 
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capital, technology, and managerial skills, as well as the absence of ties between 
universities and the private sector (Bertero 1972).  
During Brazil‘s period of import substitution, high tariffs resulted in a 
considerable build-up of the sector, but with no controls on the activities of transnational 
firms to operate in Brazil, acquisition of private national drug companies became the 
main strategy for foreign firms to enter the market. Between 1958 and 1972, the control 
of forty-three private Brazilian labs was transferred to multinational drug companies who 
increased their share of Brazil's domestic market from 14% in 1930 to 73% by 1960 
(Bermudez 1995).  
In the decades leading up to the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, Brazil enacted a 
number of policies to stimulate local production. First, a number of state governments 
and universities opened public, or government-affiliated, labs to produce medicines for 
the public health sector and to respond to outbreaks of tropical diseases (Flynn 2008). 
The Institute in Technology of Medicines (Instituto de Tecnologia em Fármacos—
Farmanguinhos), created in 1956 with financial assistance from the US government, 
operates under the direct control of the federal Ministry of Health and comprises part of 
the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fundação Oswaldo Cruz – FioCruz) medical and health 
complex, similar to the National Institute of Health in the United States.
17
  
In 1971 the military regime created the Central Medicines Agency (Central de 
Medicamentos—CEME) to develop policies for the sector and centralize public 
procurement of medicines from both public and private labs with the aim of developing 
the country's pharmaceutical base. CEME was also responsible for collecting regional 
                                                 
17 One former Farmanguinhos director called FioCruz ―the NIH of the poor‖ since it focuses on researching 
diseases that affect developing countries such as Brazil but with a much smaller budget (Personal 
communication, Eloan Pinheiro, 2 June 2006).  
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epidemiological information, promoting research and technological development, as well 
as controlling and assuring quality (Bermudez 1995).  
The second pre-curser to the 1990s was a change in the Brazilian Industrial 
Property Code in 1969 eliminating patents for the pharmaceutical sector, until the current 
Industrial Property Act passed in 1996. The policy was designed to help build up the 
country‘s local pharmaceutical industry by allowing for the lawful copying of existing 
drugs. 
The third major government initiative aimed to develop the fine chemicals and 
pharmochemical industries in order to reduce foreign dependency on imports. Import 
substitution policies led to the development of a base chemical and petro-chemical 
industry as well as the production of finished dosage forms, but the intermediate stages in 
the production cycle (i.e. phase two in the graph above) remained weak or altogether 
missing.  
Consequently, the government began to enact policies to attract investments so as 
to build up the fine chemical industry that produces specialized chemicals for the 
production of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and their intermediates, as well as 
for fertilizers. The Ministries of Health and of Science and Technology provided a 
number of incentives for the production of APIs and chemical intermediates. The decades 
preceding the 1990s represents the ideal form of Evan‘s ―triple alliance‖ between the 
state, multinational capital, and local bourgeoisie (Evans 1979). 
In response to sluggish economic growth, hyperinflation and growing 
indebtedness, policy makers implemented a set of neoliberal policies during the 1990s 
aimed at curtailing the government‘s role in the economy. Political elites, pressured by 
international financial agencies and motivated by ideas of a minimalist role of the state, 
believed that privatization of public assets and increasing competition from foreign 
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imports would improve the government's deteriorating fiscal position and improve 
economic productivity. Public support for drastic measures stemmed from the need to 
stabilize the economy, which was suffering from hyperinflation and heavy foreign debts 
(Weyland 1998).  
President Fernando Collor (1990-1992) adopted the Washington Consensus set of 
market-oriented policies, marking the end of ISI policies. The government slashed tariffs 
on imports, removed price controls on medicines and abandoned industrial policies. As 
tariffs on APIs and fine chemicals fell from 65% to 20% due to WTO agreements and 
privatization of state petrochemical firms, several upstream plant that had been 
established to produce APIs were phased out. In the first half of the 1990s, 1,700 
production lines of synthetic intermediates and inputs were shut down (Orsi, 
Hasenclever, Fialho, Tigre, and Coriat 2003). The consequence was evident in the 
sector's trade balance: imports of drugs and APIs climbed from $512 million in 1990 to 
$2.363 billion in 2002, while exports remained at just over $400 million during the same 
period (Palmeira and Pan 2003). 
 
The Industrial Property Act of 1996 
 
Neoliberal efforts culminated in the approval of new intellectual property 
legislation in 1996. The Industrial Property Act reinstated patents for pharmaceutical 
processes and products. When drawing up legislation regarding intellectual property, 
policy makers did not wait until the 2005 deadline set for middle-income countries to 
adhere to TRIPS. Among the reasons for early compliance with TRIPS were US 
pressures, which had begun during 1980s (Nunn 2007; Tarchinardi 1993). In 1988, for 
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instance, President Reagan used Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose a 100 
percent tariff on imports of Brazilian paper products, consumer electronics, and Brazilian 
medicines.  
In the view of Brazil‘s ambassador to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), Rubens Ricupero, the US could never prove that its pharmaceutical companies 
were losing profits due to the lack of patent protection on pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, 
he maintained the unilateral trade sanctions were illegal under international trade law. 
―We lost out because of power politics,‖ he said (Ricupero 2007) . The ambassador 
suggests that the US‘ strategy was to pressure Brazil on intellectual property in order to 
obtain concessions from other countries like India and China. 
Brazilian policy makers began discussing a new patent law in the early 1990s, but 
passage of Act #9.279 did not occur until May 15, 1996. Delays in approving the law 
stem from political changes in the Brazilian presidency, as well as resistance by public 
health advocates, known as sanitaristas. One important group that was unaware of the 
implications of the new patent legislation were AIDS activists (Nunn 2007). Without the 
input of public health advocates who did not have the backing of AIDS activists or other 
mobilized sectors of civil society, new IP legislation had few of the flexibilities outlined 
by TRIPS that were designed to protect consumers and curtail industry abuses.  
In an interview with Nunn (2007), Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Brazil‘s president 
at the time of passage and chief sponsor of the legislation, refused to comment on his 
motivations for pushing the bill, but two factors stand out. First, Cardoso and other 
members of his economic team believed that embracing IPR would be a positive step for 
Brazil‘s economic liberalization, reduce Brazil‘s dependence on technology imports, and 
attract foreign investment (Nunn 2007; Palmeira and Pan 2003). Second, policy makers 
believed that IPR would improve trade with the US. Since many members of congress are 
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tied to the export-agriculture industry in Brazil and the US is one of the main destination 
markets, deputies and senators were susceptible to US trade threats. Representatives from 
the Fine Chemical and Pharmochemical Trade Association (ABIFINA) see US pressure 
behind a bill that incorporates few of the safeguards outlined in the TRIPS accord.
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Contrary to policy makers‘ belief that increased protection of intellectual property 
would encourage more investment, foreign companies scaled back domestic activities 
(except in marketing and end-stage production). Six years after the Industry Property Act 
was passed, Brazilian firms accounted for only 3.1% of the industry‘s total 6934 patent 
claims. The vast majority have come from countries that are home to the world‘s leading 
pharmaceutical companies (Bermudez and Maria Auxiliardora Oliveira 2004).  
Modifications have been made to intellectual property laws since 1996 as a result 
of AIDS activism and the development of a domestic triple alliance. Before recounting 
the origins of these coalitions, it is necessary to describe the political climate pertaining 
to pharmaceuticals at the end of the 1990s. 
 
ANVISA and The Generics Act 
 
The promotion of neoliberal pharmaceutical policies came to a halt at the end of 
the 1990s as society demanded re-regulation of the sector. A veritable crisis in the 
pharmaceutical market due to price hikes and falsification of products gained the media‘s 
                                                 
18 ―The initial bill was approved by consensus in the House of Deputies in 1993-1994 and was very good—
ABIFINA had taken part in the negotiations with (then President) Itamar Franco and (then Minister of 
Foreign Relations) Cardoso. But when it went to the Senate, which at the time Cardoso had become 
president and had other commitments, the bill changed form. Because of pressure from the US, such as in 
1995-96, Lampreia, the Minister of Foreign Relations, warned that if Brazil did not pass the TRIPS-plus 
legislation, there would be trade sanctions on steel, orange juice, among items,‖ said Brasil (2008b), 
executive vice-president of ABIFINA. 
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spotlight resulting in a Parliamentary Investigative Committee on Medicines [Comissão 
Parlamentarde Inquérito Desinada a Investigar os Reajustes de Preços e a Falsificação de 
Medicamentos (2000)] in November of 1999. Although the high-profile congressional 
investigation did not result in heavy penalties, media attention led to renewed 
government intervention in the pharmaceutical sector, including the creation of a 
powerful regulatory agency and legislation governing generic drugs.  
In 1999, Brazil passed Law #9.782 that created the National Health Surveillance 
Agency (Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária—ANVISA), modeled after the United 
States‘ Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The new agency represented the start of a 
new regulatory system for medicines, as well as for food and other areas of sanitary 
surveillance. Since the mid-1980s, health professionals had been demanding the creation 
of an agency that would have administrative independence and financial autonomy. Drug 
companies interested in protecting its brand names also lobbied for a strong enforcement 
agency to investigate issues of fraud.  
Besides approving registrations for the commercialization of pharmaceutical 
products and inspecting factories at home and abroad, ANVISA has additional 
responsibilities, such as monitoring and controlling prices of certain drugs and medical 
inputs. In 1999, a Presidential Directive (Medida Provisória) determined the National 
Institute of Industrial Property must consult ANVISA before conferring a patent. Policy 
makers decided that the patent office did not have the expertise to analyze patent claims 
for drugs, especially to ensure that the novelty requirement is truly satisfied. The change 
has resulted in a turf war between the two regulatory bodies and a large backlog in patent 
approvals. As of the date of this writing, PhRMA and the US government continue to 
pressure their Brazilian counterparts to address the situation. 
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The last major policy initiative of the 1990s was the Generics Act of 1999. The 
law established the conditions for licensing as well as technical standards and norms for 
reference, innovative, generic, and similar drugs. While both generics and similars are 
copies of off-patent medications, only generics have passed tests of bioavailability and 
bioequivalence. This means that although both types of medicines contain the same 
active principle ingredient, only generics are proven to be interchangeable to the 
reference or innovator product in terms of safety, efficacy, and quality.
19
  
The Brazilian transnational pharmaceutical companies association, 
INTERFARMA, lobbied against the legislation and launched campaigns aimed at 
consumers and physicians questioning the quality of generic medicines (Bermudez and 
Maria Auxiliardora Oliveira 2004). Foreign firms rightly feared the loss of market share, 
for according to the generic pharmaceutical association Pro-Genericos, generic medicines 
now account for 19.6% of the entire market, up from zero when the legislation was 
passed. Of this amount, Brazilian companies account for 88% of sales (Pro-Genericos 
2009). 
Even before the Brazilian government began to confront transnational drug 
companies over the high prices of AIDS medicines and patent protections, there was 
increased societal distrust of the industry. The investigations and new legislation illustrate 
the rise of state autonomy based on democratic pressures from below and market 
irregularities from above. 
Brazil‘s pharmaceutical market remains dominated by transnational drug 
companies. The strengths of its nationally-owned pharmaceutical industry lie in 
commodity generics, conventional dosage forms, and some value-added and branded 
                                                 
19 Producing generic medicines of chemical drugs is technologically easier than making copies of biologic-
based medicines. 
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generics. A weak domestic pharmochemical sector however is considered to be the 
Achilles‘ heel of the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector. This is also the case in terms of 
producing ARVs. Despite highly trained engineers and competent scientists, discovering 
new chemical entities and treatments remains the prerogative of foreign companies and 
institutions. 
In addition, neoliberal policies increased the dependency of Brazil‘s 
pharmaceutical sector. The end of state support and patent protection marked the 
dissolution of the development alliance between the state with local and foreign capital. 
Trade liberalization and market de-regulation of the pharmaceutical sector resulted in a 
societal backlash that demanded more state intervention. Public policies which came 
from this rising form of pharmaceutical citizenship, however, occurred most prominently 
with AIDS. The next section details the changes in public health polices during the 1990s 
and exceptionalism of HIV/AIDS in the health care system. 
 
THE BRAZILIAN STATE‟S FEDERAL HEALTH COMPLEX 
Reforms to the Public Health Sector 
 
Brazilian social policies have undergone significant changes since the transition to 
democracy in the second half of the 1980s. The development model implemented under 
military rule (1964-1985) resulted in income concentration and minimal attention to 
social needs (Burity 2006). Elites integrated subordinate social groups, such as labor 
unions, into the governing apparatus under corporatist principles. Access to health care 
was determined by a welfare regime based on occupational status in which formally 
employed groups (especially high income groups) had access to sophisticated levels of 
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health care while marginalized populations and the un- and underemployed received 
inadequate care and treatment. Furthermore, public administration was inefficient and 
corrupt and was thus viewed as part of the problem instead of part of the solution 
(Bresser-Pereira 1999). 
Popular resistance to the military dictatorship flourished in the late 1970s and on 
into the 1980s. It is important to highlight the development of numerous democratic 
movements with shared common interests in reforming state-society relations based on 
notions of participation and human rights. One important group that had an impact on the 
structure of the country's health sector is the sanitary health reform movement. These 
activist physicians and health care workers, known as sanitaristas, penetrated government 
bureaucracies and have played an important role in demanding and carrying out reforms 
of the country's health infrastructure since the 1970s (Berkman et al. 2005; Paulo 
Teixeira, Vitória, and Barcarolo 2003; Weyland 1995). 
A coalition of santaristas and progressive forces established health as a human 
right guaranteed by the state in the country‘s new constitution of 1988. During the 1990s, 
the government adopted a number of reforms that resulted in the creation of a two-tiered 
system. First is a system of universal public provision geared towards the general 
population and known as the Unified Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde—SUS). 
The second system consists of private hospitals and insurance policies that cater to the 
middle and upper classes, although SUS also contracts a number of services from private 
hospitals. The 1990 Federal Law on Health established the principles of SUS: 
universality (health is everyone‘s right), integrality (health problems of both individuals 
and the collective are treated in their entirety), and equity (everyone has the equal 
opportunity to use the public health system irrespective of social class).  
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SUS‘ operational principles include decentralization and social participation. To 
this effect, the public health system has been decentralized to twenty-six states and 5508 
municipalities, and health councils have been established at the municipal, state, and 
federal levels to make decisions, provide directives, and monitor actions. Despite 
achieving important health reforms, many sanitaristas believe that SUS has failed to live 
up to its ideals. Creating a universal health care system faltered due to resistance from 
clientalistic politicians, bureaucracies controlled through lines of patronage, and 
neoliberal initiatives aimed at removing the state from the economy (Weyland 1995; 
Celia Almeida et al. 2000).  
Ensuring health equity remains a challenge for SUS due to underfunding, 
regressive taxation, and unequal distribution to the country‘s diverse regions (C Almeida 
et al. 2000). In a recent interview, Jadib Jantene, former Minister of Health during the 
1990s, said that SUS should have a budget of R$ 120 billion a year, but current amounts 
barely reach R$ 50 billion (Martins 2008). While SUS provides access to 90% of the 
population and 29% rely exclusively on the public health system, some 40 million middle 
and upper class Brazilians purchase additional health care through private insurance 
plans. Extending SUS coverage and improving service delivery continues to strain 
budgets and limit what can be spent on other programs such as the purchase of expensive 
medicines to treat people with HIV/AIDS.  
Despite its fragilities, the Brazilian state‘s federal health complex has a number of 
important actors and strategic assets to address domestic health crises, respond to civil 
society pressures, and overcome technological obstacles (see Figure 2). The Minister of 
Health oversees a number of secretariats, including the executive health secretariat that 
negotiates contracts and pays expenses. The Science, Technology and Strategic Inputs 
Secretariat, created in 2003, formulates pharmaceutical policies, while the Department of 
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Pharmaceutical Assistance administers policies, coordinates procurement, and 
investments in the country‘s network of eighteen public (state-owned) labs.  
The Department of the Industrial Health Complex has taken an increasingly 
important role in formulating industrial policies and encouraging the local production of 
inputs used by SUS. As regulator of the sector and enforcer of quality control, ANVISA 
is formally part of the Ministry of Health but politically insulated given its financial and 
decision-making autonomy. Lastly, FioCruz is South America‘s largest health research 
complex, home to technical schools and numerous research institutes, including the 
Institute of Technology in Medicines (Farmanguinhos). The pharmaceutical laboratory 
produces medicines for SUS and is directly subordinated to the Ministry of Health (Flynn 
2008). 






Over the course of the ten years between 1989 and 1999, drug prices rose fifty-
four percent above inflation while per capita consumption fell (Ministry of Health 2000). 
Graph 1 illustrates the impact of price liberalization on consumer prices. Despite early 
volatility, prices doubled between 1992 and 1994, only to fall after 1994 due to the 
introduction of a new monetary plan.  
Price increases continued until the turn of the century but have levelled off due to 
new government price regulations. Obviously, in a country with widespread inequality, 
consumption varies greatly according to income strata. One sector analysis estimated that 
by the end of the 1990s, forty percent of the Brazilian population from lower income 





Graph 1: Evolution of the Price of Medicines deflated by INPC consumer price index 
 
Source: Ministry of Health  
 
                                                 
20 Purchasing medicines at high prices not only impacts lower income sectors of the population, but also 
affects adherence and propensity to purchase fake medicines. 
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Brazil enacted a number of pharmaceutical policies in the 1990s to keep in step 
with the construction of SUS. The first of these was the closure of CEME in 1997. 
Government attempts to use CEME and public labs to develop the country's 
pharmaceutical industry–especially the development of upstream activities, such as fine 
chemicals and production of raw materials–fell short of their stated objectives (Bermudez 
1995; Ministry of Health 2002). Instead of organizing and streamlining the country‘s 
network of public labs, CEME's activities revealed the conflicts between the public and 
private sectors, especially with regard to centralized purchases of medicines. Acquisitions 
increasingly came from private companies at the expense of public labs due to the 
hegemonic position of foreign firms in the domestic market and increasing corruption at 
CEME (Bermudez 1995; Ministry of Health 2002). 
CEME‘s closure symbolizes the end of the ―triple alliance‖ in developing the 
pharmaceutical industry but also frees up the state to pursue a more autonomous 
trajectory in its pharmaceutical policies. With the closure of CEME, the Ministry of 
Health‘s lab, Farmanguinhos, became responsible for federal medicine purchases and 
distribution, and state governments stepped up programs to serve the public health sector 
(Cosendey et al. 2000). By the end of the 1990s, the Ministry of Health drafted new 
policies for supplying pharmaceuticals through SUS, including an updated list of 
essential medicines, minimum levels of care, and decentralization of basic 
pharmaceutical services. In terms of financing, the federal government would contribute 
50% of the budget, and state and municipal governments would each provide 25%. 
With the presidency of Luiz Inacio ‗Lula‘ da Silva starting in 2003, the Ministry 
of Health has increased expenditures on medicines and investments in public labs, as well 
as initiated industrial policies for the sector. Table 1 shows that federal expenditures on 
medicines increased from R$ 1.9 billion in 2003 to a proposed R$ 4.7 billion in 2007, and 
 65 
spending has increased in all categories. For ―high cost medicines,‖ outlays have 
increased by R$ 1 billion, and the costs of AIDS medicines have nearly doubled in the 
five year period. During the 2002-2006 period, federal spending on medicines jumped 





Table 3: Expenditures by the Federal Government on Medicines (in R$ millions) 
Area 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007* 
Medicines for 
Strategic Programs 231.6 790.3 681.0 690.0 721.1 
Basic Medicines 176.8 248.5 228.0 290.0 315.0 
High Cost Medicines  516.0 813.8 1,147.4 1,355.0 1,580.0 
Medicines for 
AIDS/STDs 516.0 516.0 550.0 960.0 984.0 
Vaccines 250.0 480.6 550.0 750.0 783.8 
Drugs for blood-
clotting diseases 222.0 207.8 223.0 244.0 280.0 
Medicines Total 1,912.4 3,057.1 3,379.4 4,289.0 4,663.0 
Investments in Public 




Strategic Inputs 14.4 66.6 68.4 75.3 85.4 
Source: Brazil (2007) Department of Pharmaceutical Assistance (SCTIE/MS) 
* Proposed Ministry of Health budget   
 
During the past two decades, Brazil has achieved much progress with the 
implementation of a new universalistic health care regime. Before, only the formally 
employed had access to quality care, while the un- and underemployed relied on 
                                                 
21 One factor contributing to larger outlays on medicines are lawsuits against the government by patients 
and patient associations demanding free medicines. Many of the cases have been won by the plaintiffs. 
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charitable organizations. Despite the increase in funding and consolidation of health 
programs, Brazil‘s public health system continues to suffer from inadequate care, long 
lines, and shortages of basic medicines, and attaining the principles of SUS—
universality, integrality, and equity—remains elusive.  
Access to health care in Brazil follow the changing ideas of citizenship and social 
policies in Latin America as a whole in which welfare stratification is tied to differences 
between private and public health care (Roberts 2005). The one exception, however, is 
the National AIDS Programme (NAP). 
 
The Development of the National AIDS Program 
 
It is commonly said that if you are living with HIV/AIDS in Brazil, you receive 
special treatment. Why is this the case? What are the social pillars behind this pioneering 
program that feed into social mobilization around patents? The first case of AIDS was 
diagnosed in São Paulo in 1983, and two years later the central government established a 
National AIDS Program. Despite popular perceptions of Brazilian sexual promiscuity, 
AIDS policies during the 1980s were not unlike those of other countries in that responses 
were built around denial and stigma (Biehl 2007). Brazil‘s leaders did not consider the 
disease to be a priority amidst a crumbling public health infrastructure. AIDS was 
considered a problem for the rich, internationally-connected gay community (Cristiana 
Bastos 1999).  
Brazil‘s democratic transition during the 1980s was also a time rich with 
discussions of citizenship and the development of civic associations interested in 
redefining state-society relationships. In the view of Dr. Marco Antonio Vitoria (2006), 
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one of the developers of Brazil‘s AIDS program, if AIDS had not struck Brazil during the 
democratic transition, the country‘s history would have developed differently. That is, the 
democratic opening provided a gateway for a new group of actors who were inspired by 
the ideal of universal public health as a form of social justice as these sanitaristas entered 
public administration. They tended to have a statist approach towards universal health 
care but wanted to move away from corporatist practices of the past and encourage public 
engagement based around ideas of citizenship. 
The sanitary reform movement failed to achieve its objectives, except in 
addressing HIV/AIDS. Unlike other areas of the public health establishment that did not 
have a mobilized constituency, the spread of AIDS inspired a social movement that 
pressured for public policies (Nunn 2007; Paulo Teixeira et al. 2003; Passarelli and 
Júnior 2003). The sanitaristas finally had a political ally to help them press for reforms. 
In the words of former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the ―state and the social 
movement practically fused‖ (quoted in Biehl 2004: 114).  
The alliance between ―social movement insiders‖ and grassroots organizations 
began at the municipal level (Biehl 2007). With the central government unconcerned 
about the disease, AIDS patients sought out municipal health centers to obtain 
information and treatment. These local health facilities were typically staffed by 
sanitaristas who were gaining experience in dealing with stigmatized diseases such as 
leprosy.  
The social origins of the AIDS groups must also be highlighted. The disease first 
spread amongst an urban, middle class stratum of society capable of mobilizing resources 
to establish social movement organizations. The case of Herbert de Souza, a famous 
sociologist who returned from exile in 1980s and had contracted HIV through a blood 
transfusion, best illustrates this renewed democratic activism. Based on his foreign 
 68 
contacts and fundraising skills, he created a number of organizations to provide care and 
treatment as well as advocacy, including the Brazilian Interdisciplinary AIDS 
Association (Associação Brasileira Interdisciplinar de AIDS—ABIA). During this time, 
civil society organizations addressing the AIDS crisis also sprung up in other urban 
centers throughout the country. 
Scaling up Brazil‘s AIDS program to the national level was facilitated by World 
Bank money. By the early 1990s, the World Bank was investing heavily in international 
health care, often times backed by a strong neoliberal ideology (cf. Homedes and Ugalde 
2005). But due to criticism of their environmental policies in the 1980s, Bank officials 
began to demand more social participation in the loan projects (Rich 2009).  
In the case of Brazil, the World Bank was predicting that the number of AIDS 
cases in the country would reach one million by 2000 if strong action were not taken. 
After reactionary AIDS policies developed during the administration of Fernando Collor 
(1990-1991), new progressive leadership assumed command at the National AIDS 
Program and signed a $250 million loan agreement ($160 million from the World Bank 
and $90 million from the Brazilian government) in 1993 to establish prevention and 
control activities. Technical personnel from the bank involved in the loan agreement did 
not push a neoliberal stance but instead shared many of the views of their Brazilian 
counterparts (Biehl 2007). Disputes on the two sides remained, as in the case of Bank 
officials‘ preference for prevention programs as opposed to treatment provision (Mattos, 
Júnior, and Parker 2003). Nonetheless, the World Bank loaned an additional $300 million 
in 1998 for expanding treatment and prevention programs. 
World Bank loans had a major impact on state-society relations. Contrary to the 
trend of the outsourcing of services and competition with NGOs (Roberts 2005), the 
Brazilian state centralized AIDS policy-making and established clear lines of action 
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between the state and civil society organizations that received World Bank 
disbursements. The national AIDS program focused on treatment and national prevention 
strategies, especially the use of the media, while NGOs worked at the community level 
and with stigmatized groups.
22 
 
World Bank money did more than just provide the basis for good governance—it 
transformed the National AIDS Program into a political force. The inflow of funding 
allowed the National AIDS Program to pay higher salaries to qualified professionals 
working at NGOs (Nunn 2007). Activists who established powerful social movement 
organizations now had the opportunity to assume positions of power within the 
government. ―Activists gave up their antagonism toward the state and organized, together 
with politicians, social scientists, and public health professionals, an impressive apparatus 
of HIV/AIDS control‖ (Biehl 2007:65-66). Indeed, now these AIDS bureaucrats began 
mobilizing grassroots organizations, often times for explicit political campaigns at the 
national and sub-national level (Rich 2009). 
The coalition between the sanitaristas and grassroots AIDS activists was 
strengthened and renewed in each political confrontation, with each outcome resulting in 
the expansion of collective rights. The coalition fought to reform dangerous blood bank 
practices, extend disability and pension status to people with AIDS, and defeat a bill to 
restrict the entrance of HIV-people into the country (Biehl 2007). Some of these victories 
occurred in the 1980s before World Bank funding began, but they are indicative of the 
growing ties between grassroots organizations and ―social movement insiders.‖ When 
access to medicines became an issue, this dual alliance had already achieved a formidable 
track-record in ensuring collective rights. 
                                                 
22 Brazil‘s AIDS policies resembles Tendler‘s (1997) accounts of good governance, but at the federal level. 
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Pharmaceutical Citizenship for AIDS Patients  
 
The biggest accomplishment of insider and outsider activists was the passage of 
Law #9.313 of 1996, otherwise known as Sarney‘s Law, after the bill‘s sponsor, Senator 
Jose Sarney. The law declares that everyone living with HIV or sick with AIDS will 
receive, for free, all the medication and treatment that is necessary through SUS. The law 
goes beyond Brazil‘s constitution, which mandates that the state will guarantee access to 
health, yet does not obligate the government to provide all treatments for free. Sarney‘s 
Law represents powerful legislation obliging the state to incur the costs of acquisition and 
distribution of the life-saving anti-retroviral medicines (ARVs) 
Free and universal distribution of medicines to treat opportunistic infections and 
HIV/AIDS began in the health secretariat of Sao Paulo in the early 1990s. The new law 
replicated this policy at the federal level and came soon after the discovery of triple-
therapy in fighting AIDS. Monotherapy had proved unsuccessful in treating the disease, 
but use of up to three different drugs attacking points of virus replication changed AIDS 
from a death sentence to a chronic disease. 
Sarney‘s Law states that the Ministry of Health will standardize treatment 
protocols—that is, establish guidelines for when patients should begin treatment and 
determine which medicines will be used as first, second, and third-line treatments. 
Consequently, an advisory group to the National AIDS Programme (NAP) meets 
annually to review scientific findings concerning current and new anti-retroviral 
medicines. Their conclusions comprise the therapeutic consensus, or the specific 
guidelines physicians are encouraged to use when prescribing medications. 
23
 
                                                 
23 Appendix 2 lists ARVs according to their drug classification and provides the date they were included in 
the therapeutic consensus. 
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If patients adhere to the treatment protocols, they can keep the virus in check and, 
although they are never cured, they can live healthy lives for many years. Treatment fails 
when protocols are not followed or when the virus develops resistance to medication. 
Patients must then take second and third-line therapies. Through time, some therapies 
become more common because they exhibit fewer side effects and/or more potency 
compared to others. Efavirenz, for example, was initially denoted as a second-line 
therapy, but due to ease of use and potency, many physicians began prescribing it as a 
first-line therapy. While the therapeutic consensus provides guidelines, doctors remain 
sovereign in prescribing which medicines their patients will use. 
The biggest threat to the AIDS program after Sarney‘s Law was passed in 1996 
was securing government financing. Brazil has a notorious history of passing progressive 
legislation without the means or political will to transform the law into reality. With 
protests, court orders, and constant pressures, Brazil‘s AIDS coalition ensured there were 
enough fiscal resources to purchase medicines. Even the country‘s 1999 monetary crisis 
and ensuing fiscal austerity did not affect AIDS budgets. Ministers of Health who did not 
address the concerns of this powerful constituency saw their political careers cut short, 
while others who trumpeted AIDS increased their political capital (Nunn 2007). The 
seeds of Brazil‘s reputation dividends were beginning to sprout. 
Acquisitions of ARVs by the Ministry of Health occur on a yearly basis (unless 
emergency purchases need to be made) and must follow strict procurement guidelines. 
Public procurement made by all sectors of the Brazilian government, including the 
Ministry of Health and public labs, is governed by Federal Law 8.666, or Law of 
Tenders. Approved after a corruption scandal involving Brazil‘s first elected president 
after the military dictatorship, Fernando Collor, the law was passed by Congress in 1993 
to re-establish credibility in government purchases. The guidelines set forth in the law 
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have led to an increase in bureaucratic procedures while establishing as a reference the 
lowest price for purchases without consideration of national production or other criteria. 
The law remains an important obstacle when attempting to use the purchasing power of 
the state to develop the domestic pharmaceutical industry, especially with regard to the 




Graph 2: ARV Acquisitions by Expenditures, millions of reais (R$), and by Number of 
Units, millions of Units, according to Type of Supplier 
 
Source: Flynn (2008) 
∗ Refers to years in which purchases were also made via international governmental 
organizations, not included in the graphs but accounting for 9–10% in terms of volume. 
 
Graph 2 shows purchases of ARVs expenditures and units according to the type 
of supplier. While payments to private national labs remained marginal, foreign labs have 
increased their revenues as the program has progressed, and amounts paid to public labs 
increased in the first five years before leveling off. Foreign and public labs provided the 
bulk of medicines, while national, private drug makers contributed limited amounts. Most 
strikingly, Brazil reduced payments to foreign firms after 1998 as they substituted 
                                                 
24 Chapter 4 addresses the challenges posed by Law 8.666 to the development of local ARV capacity. 
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imports with local production. With patent protection on new second-generation 
medicines, however, transnational drugs firms have been able to increase their revenues 
from 2003 onward. 
 
CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
Neoliberalism tends to be depicted as the strength of global capital to force 
developing countries to open their markets to global trade and finance (McMichael 
2004). This chapter argues that the dissolution of the development alliance resulted in the 
increasing distance between the state and transnational corporations (TNCs). With open 
markets and patent laws, transnational drug companies no longer required state support, 
but neoliberalism combined with democracy brought new actors into the state arena. 
Those groups that were best mobilized and developed the strongest partnerships with 
activist bureaucrats were able to advance their citizenship claims. The formidable 
coalition that developed to fight AIDS represents the exception to the rest of Brazil‘s 
public health care system. 
In the next chapter, I detail the origins of Brazil‘s local production of 
pharmaceuticals and the state‘s decision to produce them in public (state-run) labs. The 
period marks the high point of state autonomy and reduced external dependency. The 
assertion of patent power by foreign drug companies, however, would challenge the 
sustainability of Brazil‘s free and universal access program. Brazil‘s dual alliance of 




CHAPTER THREE – ESTABLISHING LOCAL PRODUCTION OF 
AIDS MEDICINES AND EXPLOITING REPUTATIONAL 
DIVIDENDS (1990-2001) 
The best industrial policy is no industrial policy. 
--Pedro Malan, Brazil‘s Minister of Finance 1995-2002 
 
This chapter describes the evolution of Brazil‘s technological capabilities to 
produce the first generation of anti-retrovirals (ARVs)
25
. Brazilian firms, both private and 
public, reverse-engineered these medicines, thereby broking the monopoly power of 
transnational drug firms. After the passage of Sarney‘s Law in 1996, which mandated 
free and universal distribution of ARVs, policy makers decided to mobilize state 
resources to produce ARVs for Brazil‘s national treatment program. The expansion of 
state capabilities would have long-term, unforeseen consequences for the development of 
the country‘s pharmaceutical base and varying capabilities to reverse-engineer medicines, 
especially the second generation of ARVs protected by patent. That patent laws were not 
in place provided the policy space for a quick response to the AIDS crisis, whereby the 
country could pursue autonomous development and avoid dependency. 
Despite the strong ties between social movements and Brazil‘s National AIDS 
Program, pharmaceutical policies related to AIDS medicines in the late 1990s were 
driven by state authorities. The World Trade Organization (WTO) panel the United States 
brought against Brazil concerning aspects in its intellectual property laws created a 
political opportunity that not only crystallized alliances between the Brazilian state and 
national activists but also created the necessary conditions to scale up the pro-AIDS 
                                                 
25 See Appendix Three for a list of ARVs used in Brazil‘s program. First generation ARVs refer to those 
without patent protection: zidovudine, didanosine, zalcitabine, stavudine, lamivudine, nevirapine, 
delavirdine, saquinavir, ritonavir, indinavir and fixed-dose combination lamivudine + zidovudine. 
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coalition to the global level. By exploiting the ―reputational dividends‖ of their banner 
AIDS program, Brazilian health officials mobilized their base and reached out to 
transnational advocacy groups under a common frame: ―Access to life-saving medicines 
is a human right.‖ Human rights groups supported Brazil‘s threat to use a compulsory 
license when negotiating prices with patent holders, but in the end, it was Brazil‘s ability 
to produce patented medicines that convinced foreign drug companies to reduce their 
prices to levels demanded by Brazil. With the price discounts, Brazil backed off the 
compulsory license.  
 
“BRAZILIAN AZT”: THE STORY OF MICROBIOLOGICA 
 
The first medication found to have an effect on HIV/AIDS was the anti-retroviral 
medication zidovidine (AZT), discovered by researchers at the National Cancer Institute 
in 1985 and licensed to UK-based Burroughs Wellcome (now GlaxoSmithKline—GSK). 
In the face of the growing AIDS epidemic, the Secretary of Health of São Paulo state was 
the first government agency to begin the free distribution of AZT in 1989. The federal 
government‘s National AIDS Programme (NAP) as well as a number of large companies 
followed São Paulo‘s lead and also began to purchase the drug in the early 1990s. The 
sole supplier at the time was Burroughs Wellcome, which won all the contracts until a 
new Brazilian start-up company, Microbiologica (MB), began producing the drug. The 
transnational drug company‘s market control, not only in Brazil but worldwide, was 
threatened by the start-up. 
Jaime Rabi, a Chilean-born chemist trained in the United States who played a key 
role in developing ―Brazilian AZT‖, recounts MB‘s trajectory in the academic journal 
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Quimica Nova (Rabi 2007).
26
 The company began as an offshoot of the Federal 
University of Rio de Janeiro in 1981. Contrary to Brazilian academic culture, professors 
from the Department of Chemistry decided to enter the world of business. MB first 
produced cultures and reagents for the diagnosis of tropical diseases, but responding to a 
government initiative for the national production of strategic medicines and active 
principals, decided to enter the line of chemical synthesis. With funding from the federal 
Central Medicines Agency (CEME), MB established a chemical division and brought in 
Rabi, a UFRJ professor, as a consultant. By the end of the 1990s, the lab had established 
its credibility and competence in the production of nucleoside-based compounds, such as 
mercaptopurine and azathioprine.  
Due to their small scale and exploitation of niche markets, MB survived the 
market liberalization of the early 1990s while many other manufacturers of fine 
chemicals filed for bankruptcy. Lelio Maçiara, a chemical engineer and former student of 
Rabi, who joined MB to assist his former supervisor, said that ―MB never risked much, to 
do large investments, and never had loans. Thus when the neoliberal wave hit, we were 
not a risk because we were not in debt‖ (Maçiara 2007). The new key niche market that 
MB entered was the production of AZT. Rabi (2008) explained that the reasons for 
producing AZT were related to the highly emotional aspects of the disease as well as new 
business opportunities: 
 
When you have the opportunity to enter into a new field, you have the chance to 
leverage your organization and the chance to grow because of the unmet 
necessities which require an urgent solution. Of course, there were various factors 
that contributed to our being able to make AZT on an industrial scale. First, we 
                                                 
26 Previous research on Microbiolgica was carried out by Amy Nunn (2007). My narrative of 
Microbiologica‘s history coincides with hers, but I also incorporate Rabi‘s published accounts, conflicts 
over dumping and the entrance of other local competitors into the market. 
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had experience with nucleosides and second we already had experience in 
industrial chemistry. Additionally, there were no competitors in Brazil. There was 
only the transnational company Wellcome. We were the only local company 
against Wellcome. The size of Wellcome compared to us at the time made us look 
insignificant. Of political interest is the fact that for the first time a Brazilian 
company was taking advantage of the possibility to make in Brazil a new 
medicine which was protected by patents outside Brazil. 
 
Two government programs supported MB‘s move into the production of AZT. 
First, the Support Program of Scientific and Technological Development (Programa de 
Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico) allowed MB to invest in quality 
control and in robust synthetic processes at the laboratorial scale. Second, the Financing 
Agency for Studies and Projects (Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos—FINEP) provided 
financing to purchase necessary machinery and equipment. In 1992, MB officially 
launched ―Brazilian AZT‖ and won its first public bid to sell 16,600 cases (equal to 
100kg of AZT). MB‘s price was $100 per 100 tablets versus Burroughs-Wellcome‘s 
price of $140 (Abrahams 1992).  
In the early 1990s, Brazil‘s federal treatment program was in its nascence. 
Although Lair Guerra, the director of the National AIDS Program, had been placing AZT 
orders for federal programs, MB sold to other clients, including large Brazilian 
companies such as the federal bank Banco do Brasil and the mining company Vale de 
Rio Doce, which provided medicines to their employees. Maçiara (2007) explains that 
MB‘s commercial strategy remained conservative. The company did not have a 
marketing department and sold all that it could produce. ―We opened up an office just to 
sell to individuals too. Patients used to go directly to the factory to buy medicines since 
the product was not sold in pharmacies,‖ explained Maçiara. Because it owned few of its 
installations, MB subcontracted most of the production to other companies, including the 
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production of finished dosage forms. In hindsight, Maçiara explained the business 
mentality of the company: 
 
We thought small, always very conservative. We never invested what we needed 
to in order to attend the whole market. We only sold that amount which we could 
produce. We only invested in those areas in which payments were already made. 
It was a very conservative vision. We had something very important in our hands; 
only we knew how to do it. We should have done the investment that was 
necessary, to do a world-scale plant, so that the whole world could become a 
consumer of our products. 
 
Risk averse, the owners of MB missed an opportunity to increase the scale of its 
activities. But the company also operated in an environment with minimum government 
support during the 1990s and in a market dominated by incumbent pharmaceutical firms. 
Competitors were quick to respond to MB‘s entrance into the market. When MB 
first synthesized AZT in the early 1990s, it was one of the few producers in the world 
besides the patent holder (Burroughs Wellcome) to offer the product. MB‘s production 
remained limited and supplied only half of the total procured by the public sector 
(Maçiara 2007). Nonetheless, the TNC felt its market threatened and began to lower its 
price in order to drive MB out of business. ―The extreme dumping consisted of 
donations,‖ Rabi said. This occurred not only in Brazil but also in export markets such as 
Chile. MB took the transnational drug company to court on charges of systemic dumping, 
but withdrew its case because of an inability to achieve a ruling in Brazil‘s notoriously 
slow judicial system. Another front against MB opened in the press where articles 
appeared that questioned the quality and safety of its products
27
, but despite the 
                                                 
27 Jorge Raimundo  (2008), who worked for Burroughs Wellcome before it merged with GlaxoSmithKline, 
said the company attempted to convince federal authorities to purchase only their product by arguing that 
their product‘s quality was superior, but the government was satisfied by MB‘s standards   
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inexistence of an independent regulatory agency (ANVISA was not established until 
1999), MB had already established itself as a producer of quality medicines during the 
1980s. 
MB was not the only Brazilian firm to enter the ARV market in the early 1990s. 
The year after MB launched ―Brazilian AZT‖, another small start-up, Labogen, based in 
the city of Campinas, São Paulo state, produced its first batch of the active principal. 
After failing in the field of biotechnology related to agriculture, the company‘s owners 
decided to enter the fine chemicals industry and already had set up a factory with money 
provided by the Brazilian National Development Bank (Banco Nacional do 
Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social—BNDES). ―We knew that AIDS was a big 
problem and that there will be constant demand for products. [Former President] Collor 
opened up the market to imports in 1990, and we knew that AIDS products were value-
added items,‖ explained the company‘s former director, José Machado de Campos Neto 
(2008). Similar to MB, the company had strong links to a local university. Labogen 
began as an incubator renting out an area from the Multidisciplinary Center on Chemical, 
Biological and Agricultural Research at the University of Campinas. It also had the 
support of FINEP, which provided R$ 1 million (about $1 million at the time) in funds 
required to reverse-engineer the API. Labogen only produced the API and established a 
partnership with Brazilian drug company Medley to produce the finished dosage form.  
While most of the Brazilian fine chemical sector was shrinking during the 1990s 
due to increased international competition, a few firms survived market liberalization and 
demonstrated the technical ability to produce advanced active principals used in cutting-
edge medicines. MB and Labogen could now reverse-engineer compounds and begin 
industrial production without having to respect patents. The process of ―learning by 
doing‖ that began with AZT carried over into the production of other active principals 
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used in AIDS treatment. MB also began production of estavudine and lamivudine, and 
Labogen developed estavudine, didanosine, and nevirapine as well as the API for 
ganciclovir, a drug used for treating AIDS-related opportunistic infections. The initial 
successes of the two API manufacturers would change as Brazil‘s public (or state-owned) 
labs began producing ARVs.  
 
THE DECISION TO PRODUCE ARVS IN PUBLIC LABS 
 
First Initiatives by Public Labs 
 
During the 1990s, Brazil‘s public labs operated below capacity, lacked resources 
to invest and modernize production, and were under the pressure of privatization. Despite 
their difficult financial and management problems, many labs continued to play a vital 
role in public health programs (cf. Cosendey et al. 2000; Egléubia A. Oliveira 2007). It 
should therefore come as no surprise that several public labs began to produce ARV 
medicines. Technicians from MB assisted public labs such as the Pharmaceutical 
Laboratory of Pernambuco State (Laboratório Farmacêutico do Estado de 
Pernambuco—Lafepe) in providing analytical methodology and standards for the 
production of finished dosage forms of AZT (Nunn 2007). Since public labs did not have 
capabilities with synthetic chemical processes to produce active principals, they focused 
on pharmaceutical formulations. When developing pharmaceutical technology for the 
fabrication of pills, capsules and syrups, however, they faced significant challenges in 
terms of human capital and equipment. 
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In 1994, Lafepe was the first public lab to begin production of AZT but was 
dependent on outside suppliers for the technology, as opposed to MB and Labogen that 
produced the API in-house. Before the advent of the AIDS crisis and new government 
investments in public labs, most of these facilities did not have in-house research and 
development divisions. Instead, most state sector labs relied on suppliers of active 
principals to provide the pharmaceutical technology required to make the finished dosage 
forms
28
. In-house pharmaceutical technology in formulations allows producers to better 
specify the inputs and raw materials they require; otherwise, they become dependent on 
just one supplier. After completing studies in France and gaining experience at the French 
drug company Sanofi-Adventis, Pedro Rolim was well-positioned to establish such a 
center at Lafepe.. He explained the political climate at the time he began working at 
Lafepe and why the lab entered into the ARV market (Rolim 2008) by stating, 
 
The Ministry of Health was dependent on importing ARVs. There was a big 
debate about the development of ARVs, so they invited the public labs to produce 
them. Brazil‘s intellectual classes were invited to participate in developing ARVs 
for AIDS. So the Ministry of Health, stimulated by the fact that AIDS was a 
disease of the rich, used the network of public labs to begin production and 
provided the resources. The public labs were used because they were part of the 
government so they would implement a policy of the government… Lafepe at the 
time was almost completely obsolete and did not have the capacity to develop the 
medicines. But Lafepe was one of the labs that was chosen and received 
incentives and resources to improve its infrastructure. So with those resources we 
were able to set up our R&D lab and develop the first ARV formulations. 
 
In the following years, Lafepe developed in-house formulations for a pediatric version of 
AZT, lamivudine, estavudine, and didanosine.  
                                                 
28 Typically, this would come in the form of a Drug Master File, which usually contains confidential details 
about the manufacture and production of APIs and finished dosage forms. It is provided to regulatory 
officials in order to register a medicine for commercial distribution. 
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By the time Sarney‘s Law mandating free and universal distribution of AIDS 
medicines was passed in 1996, several public labs controlled by state governments were 
in a position to contribute to the program. According to Ministry of Health (2008a) data, 
in the first two years after Sarney‘s law passed, Lafepe provided up to R$ 72 million 
worth of zidovudine (both capsules and oral solutions) and staduvidine, but foreign firms 
continued to dominate ARV sales to the government, totaling R$ 200 million, whereas 
sales from national firms such as MB and Labogen reached only R$ 5 million. 
Data from the Ministry of Health (2008a) suggests that public labs were 
competitive in terms of pricing. News reports say that Lafepe was selling a box of 100 
capsules of AZT for R$ 54-56 compared to private sector‘s price of R$ 97-120 (Junior 
1997; Lins and de Paula 1996). Without access to the bids made to supply the medicines, 
generalizations cannot be drawn, but direct comparisons show that local production was 
cheaper than imports. In the case of zalcitabine, the Ministry made two purchases in 
1997: one from the foreign lab at R$ 1.70/pill and one from the national lab at R$ 
1.17/pill, and both acquisitions were for comparable volumes of 3.2 million pills. 
Comparisons between local private and local public production reveal similar prices: 
public labs provided AZT oral solutions at R$ 9.89 per dose in 1997 compared to the 




                                                 
29 A few caveats are necessary when comparing costs between public and private labs. Public labs do not 
have to pay taxes, import duties on raw materials, dividends to shareholders, or overhead on marketing and 
advertisement. In addition, most employee salaries in public labs come from public sector budget outlays. 
However, since most labs operate under rules and regulations governing the public sector, they cannot raise 
their own capital nor have working capital in order to make purchases of inputs required for production. 
Typically, the state government would have to provide the resources required to purchase APIs and other 
raw materials. For the federal lab Farmanguinhos, the Ministry of Health would forward the money 
necessary to purchase medicines. Private labs are more efficient in terms of hiring and firing personnel as 
well as establishing supply contracts, but they must pay taxes that can account for up to one-third of their 
sales as well as generate profits for their owners and high payouts to executives. 
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Federal Government Begins ARV Production 
 
Although Lafepe and a few other public labs had already launched production of a 
few medicines, the Ministry of Health turned to its in-house facility, Farmanguinhos 
Institute in Medicines Technology (Farmanguinhos Instituto de Tecnologia em 
Fármacos—FM), to be the main supplier. During the 1990s, the lab was being 
restructured under the leadership of Eloan Pinheiro.
30
 She recounts how FM became 
involved in producing medicines during meetings with Pedro Chequer, director of the 
National AIDS Program, and the Minister of Health, Carlos Albuquerque: 
 
They considered back then, and continue until this day, that FM should be the 
leading lab. They decided at the time that FM would be with 40% of the demand 
for ARVs, 30% from public labs, and 30% from private labs. This meeting 
occurred in the Ministry of Health at the beginning of the program. They wanted 
to give 100% to FM. But told [her ministry officials] if you just have one then you 
would have none. You don‘t want to have a monopoly. You could have a 
problem, a machine breaks done, and then there would be delays and who would 
be penalized? The patient. Second, FM is a regulatory body for the Ministry of 
Health. This means that FM would make its cost available and make all the prices 
it pays transparent because you can‘t interfere in the other state labs but in FM 
you can. FM is not under contract, but the other labs are. FM makes a direct 
agreement with the Ministry of Health. For those products that FM developed 
itself, it could transfer the technology to other labs. 
 
                                                 
30 The biography of Pinheiro is interesting. She worked for UK drug maker Beecham, but remained 
involved in Brazilian leftist politics including the re-democratiziation process and was a leader of the 
chemical workers‘ union of Rio de Janeiro, as well as in efforts to reform the public health system. After 
her tenure at the drug maker, she became a consultant to Brazil‘s public labs until her election as the 
director of FM in 1994. Under her leadership when she left in 2002, the lab had increased its product line 
from three products to sixty-four. 
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The federal lab collaborated the most with the São Paulo state lab (Fundação para o 
Remédio Popular – FURP) due the latter‘s capacity and adoption of Good Manufacturing 
Practices (GMP) for drug production. 
The process of depending on public labs for producing ARVs developed 
gradually, but the initiative began relatively early in the institutionalization of Brazil‘s 
program of universal access. From the perspective of the managers of public labs 
interviewed for this thesis, a consensus emerged as to how these state enterprises came to 
play an important role (Pinheiro 2008; Oliva 2007; Pereira Gomes 2008; Rolim 2008). 
First, the AIDS program was directed by the federal government, and past public health 
initiatives depended on inputs supplied by public labs. At the time, several public labs 
were operating below productive capacity. Second, Brazil was dependent on imported 
ARVs to supply the program so there was an interest in nationalizing the production of 
these vital medicines in order to reduce costs. Without a national private sector having 
developed the entire spectrum of medicines, the government turned to public labs and 
provided the necessary resources to improve their operations. Third, the role of public 
labs is to train people in pharmaceutical production. In the advent of the AIDS crisis, 
Brazilian society had called upon the country‘s leading scientists and professionals to 
support the program. Most public labs had ties to public universities to draw on 
additional human capital and contribute to graduate level educational programs. 
One last reason why the government relied on public labs is a certain level of 
distrust of the private sector. The view of those working on pharmaceutical policies at the 
Ministry of Health and the directors of public labs is that the private sector is solely 
interested in making profits and not supportive of public health objectives. Pedro 




There is an ideological aspect related to the role of the State in the economy 
despite the new winds of neoliberalism and globalization. Besides being a 
regulator of the market and promoter of public policies, the State should also be 
the provider of goods and inputs. Obviously in a capitalist system, the state cannot 
be the provider of everything. But in some areas the State should not just be a 
policymaker or leader, but participate directly in certain areas such as education 
and housing...In the area of health, the Constitution is clear that health is a right of 
citizens and duty of the State. In this aspect, the Constitution does not restrict the 
State to just the provision of services but also includes the provision of goods and 
inputs…In concrete and operational terms, the State guarantees sustainability of 
the program. The State is not subject to variations in the market. The question that 
is important is the outcome of a permanent policy. In the case of AIDS, one of the 
prerequisites and successes of the medicines policies is the permanent provision 
of medicines on a routine basis and without interruption. We cannot be subject to 
a factory being sold or the closing down a line of production or simply believing 
that the price should be different… 
 
Chequer, a sanitarista and vocal proponent of communist tendencies, represents the most 
statist approach to medicine policies, which other sanitaristas do not share the view on 
the state‘s role. 
The political climate at the end of the 1990s contributed to policy makers‘ distrust 
in the private sector. As chapter two recounted, there were numerous scandals involving 
falsified products and exorbitant price hikes. The business strategies of MB and Labogen 
should not be discounted in the government‘s decision to monopolize the first generation 
of ARVs. Brazil‘s pharmaceutical sector had and continues to have more companies that 
focus on the last stage of production—formulation and marketing—but only a few API 
manufacturers could position themselves to control the market. Neto (2008), the former 
director of Labogen, explains the company‘s strategy during the 1990s:  
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Many private national labs are registered to produce ARVs, such as Cristalia, 
Eurofarma, etc. We saw that there was a market opportunity—we could control 
the market, and that it was much easier for two companies, Labogen and 
Microbiologica, to sell to the government than to a pulverized private market. 
Labogen and Microbiologica ended up establishing a policy together to sell to the 
official labs. We established an informal agreement to divide the market between 
the two of us. Labogen would do estavudine and MB would do lamivudine, for 
example, in which each could develop economies of scale. 
 
Labogen and MB‘s ambitions to the control the market had unforeseen consequences 
when public labs decided to import raw materials, and their strategy contributed to public 
officials‘ distrust in the private sector. Pinheiro also said that partnership was not 
established with MB because the company was interested in monopolizing AZT (see 
Flynn 2008). 
Since the start of Brazil‘s universal treatment program for AIDS patients, the 
government was interested in maintaining control of production in the public sector. The 
irony in Brazil‘s case is that the country had been implementing several neoliberal 
reforms during the 1990s, especially privatization. Indeed, elected officials in 
Pernambuco state were also lobbying for the privatization of Lafepe but changed course 
with the increased sale of AIDS medicines and investments from the federal government. 




Jose Serra Assumes the Ministry of Health and Scales Up ARV Production  
 
The evolution of Brazil‘s public production of ARVs is closely tied to the 
political trajectory of José Serra. Exiled from Brazil during the military dictatorship, 
                                                 
31 For a full discussion concerning the policy reversal of Lafepe‘s privatization see Andrade de Oliveira 
(2007). 
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Serra returned to Brazil and helped found the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (Partido 
Social Democratico Brasiliero—PSDB) together with Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(FHC). Serra, before assuming command at the Ministry of Health, was the Minister of 
Planning (1994-1997). He had definite political ambitions and would become the PSDB‘s 
candidate for president, to succeed FHC‘s two terms in office (1994-2002).  
Everyone interviewed during this thesis acknowledged that Serra had presidential 
ambitions and used his stay at the Ministry of Health from March 1998 to February 2002 
for public promotion. Interviewees also said that Serra was one of the most powerful and 
capable Ministers of Health in recent Brazilian history. With the personal support of the 
president and a strong following in Congress, Serra capitalized on the country‘s problems 
related to pharmaceuticals and pushed through significant legislation affecting the sector, 
such as the Generics Law and creation of ANVISA. He also played a lead role in 
exploiting the ―reputational dividends‖ not only for his personal political ambitions but in 
international venues. Lastly, it is worth mentioning that Serra represented the faction of 
the PSDB interested in using state power to promote national development, even though 
the party under FHC had enacted several neoliberal reforms reducing the government‘s 
role in directing the economy.
32
 
When Serra assumed control of the Ministry of Health, Brazil had already passed 
legislation mandating free and universal distribution of AIDS medicines and a new bill 
protecting patents on pharmaceuticals. The challenge was to scale up production as 
quickly and effectively as possible. Serra rose to the challenge. In 1997, the year before 
coming to the Ministry of Health, Brazil had 35,900 patients receiving ARVs and by 
2002, the number increased to 119,300. Serra also had to manage the Ministry of Health 
                                                 
32 FHC, a famous sociologist who contributed to dependency theory and had advocated the use of state 
policies to overcome dependency, said in 1993: ―Forget everything I wrote. The world has changed.‖ 
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during an economic crisis and budget cuts. In January 1999, the country was forced to 
devalue its monetary unit, the real, which had been anchored to the dollar in order to fight 
inflation. Despite budget constraints, expenditures on ARVs increased from R$ 191 
million in 1997 to R$ 496 million in 2002 when Serra left office. Reducing annual per 
patient costs on ARVs was the key to success, falling from R$ 6,223 in 1998 to R$ 4,158 
in 2002 (Grangeiro et al. 2006). He achieved these outcomes through the local production 
of ARVs and aggressive negotiations with foreign drug companies. 
Serra was not the sole actor responsible for the success of the AIDS program. He 
also counted on the support of committed social servants and mobilized civil society. The 
alliances between government and civil society has been amply documented (Nunn 2007; 
Parker 1997; Chequer 2005; Cristiana Bastos 1999; Paulo Teixeira 2003; Paulo Teixeira 
et al. 2003; Passarelli and Júnior 2003). One common theme in this literature is the 
constant mobilization by civil society and personnel in the National AIDS Program for 
securing treatment funding. Although Sarney‘s Law was on the books, lobbying by Pedro 
Chequer, the director of the NAP, and protests from the AIDS community as well as 
continued judicial actions were crucial in the face of economic crisis and fiscal restraint. 
Health officials and social movements cemented their already strong ties, while Serra was 
the head of the Ministry of Health.  
To organize the public production of medicines, the Ministry of Health selected 
those labs that were in the best position to develop ARVs and had sufficient productive 
capacity. The Ministry of Health could chose from the 18 public labs located throughout 
the country.
33
 Appendix Two lists the public labs registered to produce ARVs. The 
allocation of production during Serra‘s time at the Ministry of Health favored FM. 
                                                 
33 For more information on Brazil‘s public labs see: (Flynn 2008; Egléubia Andrade de Oliveira et al. 
2006) 
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Between 1998 and 2001, ARV purchases from public labs other than FM hovered 
between R$ 39 million and R$ 54 million while FM increased sales from R$ 0 in 1997 to 
R$ 143 million in 2001. The inflow of resources allowed FM to expand its research and 
development and even provide extra resources to the FioCruz medical complex where it 
is housed. During these years, FM provided reference prices for ARVs, but the Brazilian 
Association of Public Labs (Associação dos Laboratórios Farmacêuticos Oficiais do 
Brasil—Alfob) negotiated allocations and prices for the other public labs with the 
Ministry‘s Department of Pharmaceutical Assistance. Acquisitions from national public 
labs remained marginal except in 2000 when the Ministry purchased R$ 106 million 
worth of ARVs from this sector.  
Favoring public labs at the expense of private labs went against the original plan 
established at the onset of the program and is ironic given Serra‘s term at the Ministry of 
Health. His administration enacted several policies favoring the domestic pharmaceutical 
sector, such as the Generics Act, yet marginalized private national producers of ARVs.
34
 
By the end of 2002, there were 19 national drug makers registered with ANVISA to sell 
ARVs. Only Laob, Eurofarma, Neo-Quimica and Cristalia had closed large contracts 
during these years (Orsi et al. 2003: see Table 3).  
Farmanguinhos and other public labs were able to scale-up production because 
Serra provided additional resources for investments to expand capacity. The Ministry of 
Health‘s Guarda Chuva Project (Umbrella Project) provided R$ 41.3 million to the 
country‘s public labs between 2000 and 2002. The project, designed not only for ARVs 
but for an entire spectrum of medicines produced by the public labs, increased drug 
                                                 
34 Research and conclusions in this section are limited by the fact that Jose Serra was unavailable for an 
interview, and Barjas Negri and Platão Fischer, second-tier level officials working at the Ministry of Health 
during Serra‘s term refused interview requests. But third-tier officials Fernando Cardenas and Carlos 
Alberto Pereira Gomes were interviewed. 
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production 368%, or from 1.89 billion to 8.87 billion units. Some interviewees from 
public labs who did not receive resources claim that the investments were tied to political 
objectives. Since Serra was running for presidency, these informants claimed, he did not 
want any of the Ministry of Health‘s resources to benefit labs of state governments 
governed by opposition parties. Other state labs controlled by allied political parties, for 
example Lafepe, reversed plans for privatization after receiving purchasing contracts and 
investments from the Ministry of Health (Egléubia A. Oliveira 2007). Fernando Cardenas 
(2008), who was in charge of Guarda Chuva at the Ministry, denies that there was any 
political bargaining and states that the investments were based on technical criteria.
35
 
While the main objective of the government was to reduce overall expenses of the 
program, the strategy was to increase local production of ARVs in order to reduce 
payments to foreign companies. However, the largest outlays continued with payments to 
foreign pharmaceutical companies. This resulted from the inclusion of new second-
generation ARVs, such as protease inhibitors, that were protected by patent. Pinheiro 
(2008) said the government‘s plan was first to develop all the off-patent medicines and 
then begin work on patented ARVs used in the program. 
 
Developing ARVs and Sourcing Raw Materials  
 
Due to previous government programs and efforts to stimulate a national drug 
industry in the 1970s and 1980s, Brazil had trained scientists and engineers capable of 
reverse engineering chemical compounds and developing new synthetic processes and 
drug formulations. MB followed by Labogen spearheaded initial domestic efforts to 
                                                 
35 The data collected for this dissertation does not provide conclusive evidence regarding the political use 
of these investments but the possibility, given the nature of Brazilian politics, cannot be discarded. 
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develop ARV drugs. MB also shared its accumulated knowledge of drug development 
with Brazil‘s public labs, such as passing on analytic standards (Rabi 2008; Nunn 2007). 
Partnerships between private and public companies, such as in the case of Labogen and 
Lafepe, also resulted in the development of new medications for AIDS patients (Neto 
2008; Rolim 2008). Despite these initial contacts across the public-private divide, public 
labs ended up turning towards foreign suppliers for sourcing their raw materials, and 
Brazil‘s domestic API manufacturing industry became marginalized. The question is why 
did this occur? The consequence of favoring foreign suppliers would later prove to be the 
Achilles‘ heel of Brazil‘s efforts to produce medicines locally and issue compulsory 
licenses. To answer this question, it is necessary to look at how public labs organized 
their research and development. 
Cassier and Correa (2007, 2003) review the structure set up by Pinheiro at 
Farmanguinhos to develop new ARVs. Procedures were established to reverse engineer 
the composition of the finished dosage medicines as well as the synthetic process for 
obtaining the API. First, FM set up an analytic chemistry department for analyzing the 
quality of raw materials. The department tests raw materials to determine whether it is the 
same as that purported by the supplier and compares the acquired active principals to 
proprietary drugs. Developing in-house quality control standards and methods has 
allowed FM to determine criteria for purity and type of raw material. Second, FM formed 
a team of chemists who reverse engineer the formulation in order to identify the 
excipients used. Understanding which formulation works best based on bioequivalence 
tests allows the lab‘s chemists to determine which raw material they want as well as the 
synthetic process used for obtaining it. Lastly, based on reverse engineering techniques, 




. All the information necessary for producing the ARVs was 
not available in patents and pharmacopoeias, so the rediscovery of the qualitative and 
quantitative composition of ARVs resulted in a definitive learning process that could be 
shared with other public labs and private-sector suppliers (Cassier and Marilena Correa 
2003). 
The story of the development of the protease inhibitor indinavir, marketed by US-
based Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Merck) under the brand name Crixivan, is emblematic of 
the partnerships established and challenges faced when Brazil reverse engineered 
medicines. The FDA approved indinavir in 1996, and it quickly became the standard for 
ARV therapy. Brazil‘s AIDS Program began to distribute it in 1997, and by the end of 
2000 when FM began production, over 19,000 patients were using the protease inhibitor. 
The federal lab responded to the Ministry of Health‘s request to produce indinavir and 
established a partnership with Indian companies Hetero and Aurobindo—the two largest 
API producers at the time who were gradually moving into the ARV market. At the time, 
only Merck produced the API and had a worldwide patent on the product
37
. Hetero 
provided the first batches of the raw material, which FM formulated into medicines. 
Nubia Boechat (2008), FM‘s director research and development at the time, explained 
Merck‘s reaction: 
 
In the first lot that we produced of indinavir as a medicine, Merck knew that there 
was an element of contamination undetectable by traditional methods of quality 
control. Merck got a hold of a batch, did its analysis, and published its findings in 
the media. It caused quite an uproar, especially with all the AIDS NGOs. Merck 
                                                 
36 The references provided in pharmacopoeias contain the directions for the preparation of medicines and 
are accessible to any generic drug manufacturer interested in reproducing a drug. 
37 Merck‘s patent was not applicable to countries like India and China that had not incorporated TRIPS 
legislation, and Brazil would deny Merck‘s indinavir patent request in 2003. 
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knew that the product would be contaminated. They just wanted to discredit our 
production. 
 
Merck had not published the existence of the contaminant in its patents for indinavir. FM 
called in Rio de Janeiro-based API maker Nortec Química
38
 to work with a team of 
technicians from FM and Hetero to correct the problem. After several tests, the research 
team discovered that the reaction to produce the compound had to be achieved through 
re-cooling at a very low temperature. FM then scaled-up production and the price 
dropped from $1.89/capsule in 1999 to $0.47 in 2001.  
The episode illustrates the close working relationships with Indian raw material 
suppliers and the strategy by patent holders to question the quality of medicines produced 
by public labs when their products are copied. Domestic API producers, such as Nortec, 
were not necessarily marginalized but were only contracted to work on specific 
programs. Besides Nortec, FM sought out another domestic API maker, São Paulo-based 
Cristalia, to assist in the development and supply of ritonavir.  
The main problem faced by Brazil when scaling up ARV production was the lack 
of an extensive fine chemical sector. Neoliberal reforms and abrupt market opening 
forced 1,700 production lines of synthetic intermediates and inputs to shut down during 
the 1990s (Orsi et al. 2003). In the case of new medicines like ARVs, there were few 
suppliers worldwide producing the raw materials, much less all the different APIs 
required for the spectrum of medicines offered in the AIDS cocktail. Indeed, the first raw 
material FM acquired to produce didanosine was purchased neither in Brazil nor in India 
                                                 
38 Nortec began as a partnership between Farmanguinhos/FioCruz and the private petrochemical holding 
company Norquisa in the early 1980s to produce APIs for the federal lab. The company, whose 
shareholders include the federal development bank BNDES, maintains an accord with FM to help develop 
and supply APIs. Nortec survived the sector‘s market liberalization since it was not accustomed to policies 
of import substitution and developed a competitive product profile that included exports (Soalheiro 2008).  
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but in Germany (Pinheiro 2008). Consequently, one important factor for why public labs 
became dependent on foreign suppliers was the weak fine chemicals sector. 
Another reason why domestic suppliers of raw materials were overlooked is due 
to the specifications of the type of raw material required to fabricate certain medicines. 
Since FM had developed in-house pharmaceutical technology, its chemists had specific 
criteria for inputs used in its production (Cassier and Marilena Correa 2003). FM used 
rigid specifications when procuring raw material in order to insure quality, explains 
Pinheiro (2008). Up until the establishment of ANVISA, Brazil had a weak regulatory 
structure to guarantee the quality of medicines since there were no bioequivalence tests. 
Pinheiro explains:  
 
I had to do extra-rigid specifications. Many times, even FioCruz‘s lawyers 
thought that I was inducing specific suppliers and privileging them over others. 
So much so that Microbiologica accused me of favoring an international company 
in the case of didosanine because of the way I drew up the tenders. But I had done 
all the development with certain specifications of a type of material, the 
characteristics of the polymorphs of this material, which were not the same as 
those of MB. I remember that Jaime Rabi was very furious with me. You have the 
formulation, but you are not going to move your formula, redo all the tests, 
solubility, etc. 
 
Having developed in-house formulations of ARVs provided public labs with the 
technological autonomy to choose their own supplier instead of being dependent on just 
one. But independence in one area resulted in a new constraint—Brazil‘s rigorous tender 
laws. 
Chapter Two reviewed Brazil‘s Public Procurement Act (Law 8.666) which 
establishes the rules all public sector entities must follow when purchasing inputs. The 
legislation, designed to reduce government corruption, has had significant impact on 
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upstream ARV production (Felipe Marques and Hasenclever 2006). The procurement 
policy combined with the government‘s interest in economizing resources during fiscal 
constraints were crucial in the decision of public labs to obtain raw materials from abroad 
instead of developing local API capacity. Labogen, which only completed the final and 
most crucial steps in the synthesis process for making APIs, also obtained bulk 
intermediates from Asian suppliers. Neto (2008) from Labogen explains the situation: 
 
In terms of international tender, it was Jose Serra that began to carry them out in 
order to reduce costs. On the supply side, India and China began to know the 
Brazilian market because it was already selling intermediates to us and others. 
They knew of Brazil‘s market potential in ARVs. Labogen bought from South 
Korea, China and India which received a lot of support from their governments. 
When they knew they could enter the Brazilian market, they increased the price of 
intermediates that they sold to us and began to sell AZT and other products much 
cheaper.  
 
Brazilian API producers had neither the economies of scale nor the government support 
required to compete against Asian producers. 
Contextual factors such as fiscal restraint and the need to scale up production of 
ARVs as quickly as possible are part of the reason why public labs decided to import raw 
material instead of developing local industry. But the question remains: why were there 
not more partnerships established between public labs and private suppliers when 
developing compatible formulations and APIs? In the social circles involved in ARV 
production, directors, scientists, and engineers all know each other, but ultimately the 
government failed to establish trust across the public-private divide. Many interviewees 
for this research said that public-private partnerships were not common until recently and 
that an industrial policy was not in place to foment local development. Representatives 
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from the pharmochemical sector explained that they could easily reverse-engineer any 
ARV; they just need purchase guarantees.
39
  
While Jose Serra was using state power in the Ministry of Health to promote local 
production of medicines, economic policy-making remained in the hands of Pedro Malan 
at Brazil‘s Finance Ministry. Brazil‘s economic team remained tied to a neoliberal view 
and worked towards dismantling the developmental state that had been in place for 
decades. The lack of a coordinated industrial policy became most apparent when 
Microbiologica opened up a factory in 1997 to produce 25t of zidovudine a year—
enough to supply 10% of world demand at the time. Despite receiving support from the 
government financing arm FINEP to set up the facility, the lack of coordinated public-
sector initiatives and Serra‘s decision to obtain raw material from abroad forced MB to 
close the plant and exit the AZT market entirely in 2000.  
Even before patents became a problem, Brazil began to feel pressure from market 
power. Lacking a coherent industrial policy to compete against the rising pharmaceutical 
powers of India and China, the country was slowly becoming more dependent on the 
importation of key components of ARVs. More significantly, an important ally in the 
domestic bourgeoisie was not being cultivated. 
 
                                                 
39 ―Private-Public Partnerships were never considered in the 1990s. In this time, policies were completely 
different. PPPs were considered a type of corruption. We tried often to do this and many times offered 
assistance in the development of new and innovating medicines for treating AIDS, for example fixed-dose 
combinations of lamivudine, estavudine and AZT before they existed officially. But the Brazilian 
government through Farmanguinhos never accepted these products because they did not exist yet on the 
international market. They were not interested in innovative work. They wanted to copy what already 
existed on the market. This was an opportunity in which public labs could have established a very strong 
partnership with the few Brazilian producers that existed, such as MB. But in truth, there was not an 
environment for this because the government just thought about the lowest price,‖ explained MB‘s Jaime 
Rabi (2008).  
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SERRA‟S NEGOTIATIONS WITH MERCK AND ROCHE 
 
The success of Brazil‘s AIDS program began to receive worldwide attention by 
the turn of the century. At the Durban AIDS Conference in 2000, Brazilian officials 
presented data on falling mortality rates and reduced hospitalizations of people with 
HIV/AIDS. Between 1997 and 2000, it is estimated that 234,000 hospital admissions 
were avoided, representing savings of US$ 677 million (Bermudez and Maria 
Auxiliardora Oliveira 2004). Brazil‘s success demonstrated that a developing country can 
provide First World levels of care and galvanized efforts to replicate its success. 
Concerns about inadequate health infrastructures, lack of treatment adherence, and the 
development of an uncontrollable strain of HIV melted away in the face of Brazil‘s 
experience. The stage was set for the use of ―reputational dividends‖ in the face of WTO 
and corporate pressures. 
The turn of the century also marked increasing conflicts between countries and 
transnational drug companies over prices and patents. In 1998-99, South Africa had to 
confront foreign drug companies and pressures from the US when it passed new 
legislation aimed at lowering drug prices by allowing for parallel imports of generics and 
compulsory licensing (Bond 1999; Klug 2008). Brazil also had to face the combined 
pressures of foreign drug companies and a World Trade Organization panel requested by 
the United States questioning an article in Brazil‘s 1996 patent legislation. It was during 
tough negotiations led by José Serra that Brazil first threatened to use a compulsory 
license (CL) in order to reduce the cost of Merck‘s efavirenz and Swiss-based Roche‘s 
nelfinavir. The Ministry of Health and the companies reached agreements, as did the 
Brazilian and US government, but the case exemplifies the increased politicalization 
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concerning access to AIDS medicines and increasing support from transnational 
advocacy movements. 
Much has been written about negotiations between the Brazilian government and 
foreign companies. Past work on Brazil‘s standoff emphasizes the close relationship 
constructed between Brazilian authorities and social movements (Galvão 2002; Nunn 
2007; Wogart and Calcagnotto 2006; Greenhill and Busby 2008). Others have viewed the 
negotiations in terms of the market strategies of TNCs and potential losses given the size 
of the Brazilian drug market (Cohen and Lybecker 2005; Wogart and Calcagnotto 2006; 
Nunn 2007). Another important dimension is the tie-in of local pharmaceutical 
capabilities to make the threat of compulsory licenses credible (Orsi et al. 2003; Shadlen 
2007; Cassier and Marilena Correa 2003). Lastly, we should not discount the interest of 
Jose Serra in obtaining political capital for his bid to the presidency (Nunn 2007; Wogart 
and Calcagnotto 2006). In fact, the former Minister of Health has written about the 
episode (Serra 2004). Some scholars have focused on US pressures on Brazil during the 
price negotiations and call it the ―Merck Case‖ since the US allegedly requested a WTO 
panel at the bequest of the US-based drug company (Sell 2003; Richards 2004).  
The most coherent account of the first time Brazil threatened a CL and US 
pressures comes from Nunn (2007) whose work provides a check on validity and a source 
of empirical data for my account. My contribution will focus on the contribution made by 
Brazil‘s domestic drug companies, especially Farmanguinhos; the alliances constructed 
between Brazilian ministries and social movements; and Brazil‘s struggles at the World 
Trade Organization concerning the legality of compulsory licenses. Brazil‘s ―social 
movement insiders‖ begin to exploit the ―reputational dividends‖ of its successful AIDS 
program under the rubric of human rights. By doing so, they extend the arena of state 
autonomy transnationally and face down corporate and hegemonic power. 
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New Changes in IPR Legislation 
 
As mentioned in the last section about rolling out ARV treatment, Brazil faced 
considerable obstacles in terms of government funding. In 1999, for instance, the country 
experience an economic crisis after it was forced to devalue its currency, and the ensuing 
fiscal constraints threatened Brazil‘s AIDS program. Serra, Chequer and AIDS NGOs 
successfully lobbied Pedro Malan, the Minister of Finance, to release funds to purchase 
medicines. Besides securing the necessary resources, the other half of the strategy was 
geared toward reducing costs based on the local production of medicines and reducing 
the prices paid for imported ARVs. Brazil‘s public labs gradually substituted imports of 
the first generation of medicines not protected by patents but faced IP restrictions with 
respect to second generation ARVs protected by patent. Only with a compulsory license 
(CL) could Brazilian labs legally market the next generation of products protected by 
patents. 
The first step towards issuing a CL was to improve the legal framework. 
Presidential Decree 3.201 defined and expanded the uses for issuing a CL by amending 
Article 71 of Brazil‘s Industrial Property Law (see Appendix Four). It specified ―national 
emergency‖ and ―public interest‖ as the criteria for issuing a CL. At the end of 1999, 
Serra made his first public statement concerning the use of CL:  
 
There is a Presidential Decree that allows for patents to be broken in the case of 
abusive prices, and two of our AIDS drugs are candidates for this clause. The 
laboratories will not be penalized if they lower their prices…The prevention 
campaigns cost 10 times less than treatment. Not that our motivations are just 
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economic…its human, and its about solidarity. But we‘ve got to take costs into 
consideration. (quoted in Nunn 2007:231) 
 
In 1999, the two drugs were Merck‘s efavirenz, which cost $2,540 per patient per year, 
and Swiss-based Roche‘s nelfinavir at a price $5,585. During the 1999-2001 period when 
negotiations were taking place, the number of patients using efavirenz rose from 2,460 to 
23,313 and for nelfinavir, from 11,761 to 21,717. The total number of patients receiving 
ARVs increased from 73,000 to 105,000 over the three-year period. Purchases of the two 
medicines accounted for 22% of the total R$ 568 million spent on acquiring ARVs in 
1999—an amount that would increase to 49% of the 2001 ARV budget totaling R$ 501 
million. 
Besides the issue of compulsory licensing, another important change in legislation 
made while Serra was the Minister of Health was Law #10.196/2001 that modified 
articles of the Industrial Property Act # 9.279/1996. This new law aimed to address 
public health interests by introducing the Bolar Exception and giving ANVISA prior 
consent to the granting of patents on pharmaceutical products. The Bolar Exception 
allows a company to carry out all the regulatory tests and approvals necessary to market a 
product as soon as the patent expires. With this flexibility, a company can obtain a 
registration to sell a product from ANVISA, although it is still protected by patent. When 
the patent expires, generic competition can begin immediately, and the price of medicines 
falls. Also, when the government considers the use of a CL, a local producer could have 
medicines registered for sale and be in a position to market it to the government. 
Law #10.196 of 2001 institutionalized ANVISA‘s power of prior consent that had 
been authorized by Presidential Directive (Medida Provisório) #2.006 in 1999 and which 
had been renewed each year. Granting ANVISA the power of prior consent is one of the 
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more polemical legislative legacies of Serra‘s era and continues to involve turf battles 
between two regulatory agencies housed in separate ministries—ANVISA, part of the 
Ministry of Health, and the National Institute of Intellectual Property (INPI) pertaining to 
the Ministry of Development Industry, and Commerce. The justification of the prior 
consent mechanism was to defend the interest of public health and assist the INPI in 
assessing the novelty requirement for patents on pharmaceuticals (Bermudez and Maria 
Auxiliardora Oliveira 2004). INPI allegedly did not have the technical capacity to carry 
out this evaluation. Pressured by local drug makers, Serra lobbied for the Presidential 
Directive based on the argument that INPI was corrupt and approved every patent 
application for a pharmaceutical product it received (Wanderly Lima 2008; Raimundo 
2008). Although the INPI had been instituted long before the 1996 changes to patent law, 
the federal agency was under-resourced, had few trained personnel to evaluate drug 
patents, and thus outsourced most of the applications (Lage 2008). For representatives of 
foreign drug companies, ―prior consent is the biggest aberration that could exist,‖ said 
Jorge Raimundo (2008), a consultant and lobbyist for the foreign-based pharmaceutical 
industry group Interfarma. 
This review of presidential decrees and new legislation shows how policy makers 
began to correct a number of problems associated with the Industrial Property Act # 
9.279 of 1996. The bill had few of the safeguards outlined in TRIPS and those that were 
included required modifications. Outlining the grounds for issuing CLs had a direct 
relevance to the Ministry of Health‘s negotiations with companies selling patented 
medicines. The Bolar Exception and ANVISA‘s prior consent were designed to increase 
competition with generic medicines, thereby reducing prices for the final consumer and 
boosting the country‘s domestic drug industry. These two changes would have important 
ramifications for the production and acquisition of ARVs. Foreign drug companies were 
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unhappy with what they viewed as a weakening of IP laws, and the US pharmaceutical 
industry association PhRMA pressured the US government to take action. Indeed, US 
Secretary of Commerce William Daley, while travelling to Brazil in 2000 accompanied 
by Merck‘s president Raymond Gilmartin, and Pfizer's vice-president for Latin America 
Ian Read, expressed his displeasure in the CL decree (Aith 2000), but the only issue in 
which the USTR took action concerned the ―local working‖ clause in Brazil‘s Industrial 
Property Act # 9.279 of 1996. 
 
WTO Panel over “Local Working” 
 
Since Brazil‘s threats of using a CL during negotiations with Merck and Roche 
coincided with a US panel against the country at the WTO, the conflict over ―local 
working‖ between the two countries was considered the ―Merck case,‖
40
 and many 
observers believe that the two are directly tied to each other (Sell 2003; Serra 2004). 
However, had Brazil not threatened a CL in its negotiations with the two drug companies, 
the US still would have questioned Brazil‘s patent legislation in the ambit of the WTO. 
The panel, nonetheless, crystallized the alliance between Brazilian authorities and social 
movements interested in access to medicines. In effect, Brazil used its acclaimed 
universal treatment campaign in its defense at the WTO. 
When Brazil passed its Industrial Property Act # 9.279 of 1996, PhRMA praised 
the legislation but expressed concern over Article 68 that prohibits importation as a form 
of ―local working‖ for a patented product (Phrma 1998). The provision states the 
                                                 
40 Although Roche is a Swiss company that marketed the drug, the US still had a direct economic interest 
in the negotiations since US-based Agouron Pharmaceuticals had licensed the product to Roche. Agouron 
later became a subsidiary of Pfizer. 
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government can issue a CL if a patented good is not ―worked‖ in Brazil either through 
domestic production or permission for its domestic use. The article, in the view of the 
transnational drug companies, would oblige them to produce all medicines in Brazil and 
disrupt their strategies of achieving economies of scale through global supply chains. 
Despite complaints from industry and US officials since the passage of the legislation in 
1996, the USTR did not request bilateral consultations until June 8, 2000. The US waited 
until 2000 before taking the first step in using the WTO system to allow for the 
completion of the transition process outlined in TRIPS. For Brazil, this expired at the end 
of 1999. The USTR (2001b) specifically said that the WTO panel would not affect the 
country‘s ―widely praised anti-AIDS program‖ and did not affect the use of a CL in cases 
of public interest or national emergency.
41
 
Brazilian interviewees who worked closely on the trade dispute claim that it had 
been brewing since Brazil passed its new intellectual property legislation in 1996 (Paulo 
Teixeira 2008; Brandelli 2008). But the US decision to initiate a WTO panel when 
Brazil‘s program was attracting worldwide attention provided Brazilian authorities the 
opportunity to use its AIDS program for its defense at the WTO. Paulo Teixeira (2008), 
the director of Brazil‘s National AIDS Program, explained the country‘s strategy:  
 
(…) national production started to be the reference for the world. The Brazilian 
Example! We got together with the Itamaraty [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] and 
                                                 
41 ―On February 1, 2001, a WTO panel was established. Since the establishment of this panel, however, 
Brazil has asserted that the US case will threaten Brazil‘s widely-praised anti-AIDS program, and will 
prevent Brazil from addressing its national health crisis. Nothing could be further from the truth. For 
example, should Brazil choose to compulsory license anti-retroviral AIDS drugs, it could do so under 
Article 71 of its patent law, which authorizes compulsory licensing to address a national health emergency, 
consistent with TRIPS, and which the United States is not challenging. In contrast, Article 68 -- the 
provision under dispute -- may require the compulsory licensing of any patented product, from bicycles to 
automobile components to golf clubs. Article 68 is unrelated to health or access to drugs, but instead is 
discriminating against all imported products in favor of locally produced products. In short, Article 68 is a 
protectionist measure intended to create jobs for Brazilian nationals‖ (USTR 2001b: 10). 
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came to a conclusion. The National AIDS Program could be Brazil‘s defense. We 
did not have the support of all the ministries. The Ministries of Planning and 
Agriculture did not agree. They thought it inappropriate. (…) We made an 
agreement with the local NGOs to back up our strategy against the panel and the 
price negotiations. We also articulated with international NGOs CPTech, MSF, 
Oxfam and ACT-UP. We were the ones that sought them out. They always did 
not trust government much, but we were able to get their trust. This began in 
February and March of 2001. 
 
The NAP coordinated with prominent NGOs when confronting the US. Although 
there were close alliances between the state body and civil society organizations during 
the 1990s, the trade dispute over ―local working‖ crystallized the relationship and, for 
local AIDS NGOS, brought the issue of patents and the price of medicines to the 
foreground. Activists began to demonstrate in front of US consulates in Brazil, and 
numerous foreign-based organizations began to lobby the US government to end the 
WTO panel. Brazil‘s National AIDS Program also began to extend its activities 
internationally by reaching out to foreign-based advocacy groups.  
Brazil‘s strategy of mobilizing support from local and foreign civil society 
succeeded. The US withdrew the WTO panel on June 25, 2001, alleging that Brazil had 
not actually used a CL based on Article 68 of its patent law (USTR 2001a). In addition, 
the two sides set up a Consultative Mechanism in which the Brazilian government would 
give the US advance notice if it were to use a CL based on the ―local working‖ clause.
42
 
Another factor that weighed in on the resolution of the conflict is that Brazilian diplomats 
defended themselves by showing that US Patent Code contains ―local working‖ 
provisions for patents developed with assistance from the federal government and began 
their formal consultations in the ambit of the WTO for a possible panel against the US  
                                                 
42 To date, this Consultative Mechanism has never been used but draws attention to how much sovereignty 
a country has when taking advantage of TRIPS flexibilities. 
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Brazil‟s Involvement in the Doha Declaration  
 
The Brazilian government and allied NGO groups not only joined forces against 
the US pressures at the WTO, but also coordinated efforts in other international 
government bodies. According to Nunn (2007: 281), there was a ―symbiotic relationship‖ 
between José Serra and social movements to push their agendas forward: ―José Serra and 
Brazil provided the personal and nation-state leadership that was necessary to propel 
these reforms forward.‖ International venues included the United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights, the World Health Assembly and the UN General Assembly Special 
Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS). Transnational advocacy networks needed a leading 
country to change treatment paradigms at the international level just as much as Brazil 
needed their support to push its agenda. The coalition between Brazil and international 
civil society was also instrumental in affecting the Doha round of trade negotiations. 
Because of the growing awareness of the AIDS crisis, the need to provide inexpensive 
medicines for treatment, and problems Brazil and South Africa had experienced with 
foreign drug companies, developing countries were able to place the issue on the trade 
negotiation agenda. 
Serra instructed Brazil‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to find a way for the country 
to never have to face pressure at the WTO concerning its patent legislation and use of 
CLs again (Nunn 2007; Serra 2004). The goal was to clarify the use of CLs outlined in 
TRIPs in terms of public emergency. The term ―public emergency‖ remained vague and 
subject to broad interpretation. Brazilian negotiators insisted the goal was not to abrogate 
the TRIPS accord; instead, it was to rebalance the rights and privileges between private 
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and public interests. Even though it initially resisted the Declaration, the US eventually 
capitulated but only after threatening to use a CL to purchase ciproflaxin when the 
anthrax scares struck Washington, DC, in the aftermath of the September 11
th
 attacks. 
The US Secretary of Health and Human Services‘ threat to use a CL to lower the prices 
of the only known medication to fight anthrax and whose patent was in the hands of 
German-based drug company Bayer exposed the US to accusations of hypocrisy. The 
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health was signed a month later, in November 
2001, and declared that each member of the WTO had the right to determine the grounds 
for using a CL and to define what constitutes a national emergency (WTO 2001). 
The Doha Declaration did not have an immediate impact on Brazil‘s negotiations 
with Merck and Roche, nor did the Declaration fully resolve issues related to parallel 
importing and exports of medicines. Diplomat Francisco Cannabrava, Brazil‘s TRIPS 
negotiator, explains that his country‘s interest in the agreement was primarily to import 
raw materials necessary to make generics and not to export medicines (quoted in Nunn 
2007: 278). If there is no patent on the product in the country that will export the 
medicine, a CL is not required, but a decree would be necessary if there is a domestic 
patent on the product.  
There is some debate about the significance of the Doha Declaration. Industry 
representatives, highlighting that it did not modify any articles of TRIPS, downplayed its 
significance (Sell 2003), but in legal circles, the opinion is different. Leo Palma (2006), 
an attorney at the Advisory Centre on WTO Law involved in negotiations leading up to 
the Doha Declarations, said that the Declaration has the force of law in international trade 
disputes and provides an extra layer of protection for countries to use CLs.  
For Brazil, the Doha Declaration represents the global apex of the ―reputational 
dividends‖ of its banner AIDS program. It also provided additional legal justification to 
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use compulsory licenses. In subsequent threats, Brazilian health officials would always 
invoke the Doha Declaration when declaring a medicine to be in the ―public interest.‖ 
Nonetheless, the accord would not resolve the country‘s growing dependence on 
imported raw materials.  
 
Negotiated Settlements with Merck and Roche 
 
The inclusion of patent protection increased the country‘s dependency by 
increasing the bargaining power of foreign drug companies and reducing the policy space 
available to government officials. Up to this point, local industry had developed and 
produced off-patent medicines. Now, they entered the complicated terrain of developing 
ARVs that had patents along the entire production chain. Reverse-engineering medicines 
became increasingly complicated legally, politically, and technologically. While insuring 
the legal backdrop at the global level for employing a CL, the Ministry of Health sought 
local production of patent-protected ARVs. Serra said he proceeded with caution when 
threatening to use a CL to ensure that local production would be able to fulfill the gap. In 
a previous interview, he said: 
  
I first had to talk to the Indian drug laboratories to make sure I could get the raw 
materials from them. Because you can‘t threaten to break a patent if you can‘t 
actually produce the drugs—the problems aren‘t only legal—there are also 
technological barriers. (quoted in Nunn 2007: 232) 
 
Serra relied on foreign suppliers of raw material even though he asked if local 
private industry could develop and produce the medicines. Local pharmochemical labs 
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such as Labogen and Microbiologica began to develop the synthetic chemical process of 
both efavirenz and nelfinavir, but later halted their activities (Maçiara 2007; Neto 2008). 
From the public labs, only Farmanguinhos and Lafepe presented proposals to 
produce these medicines in their final dosage forms. In the case of efavirenz, the federal 
lab confronted problems due in part to legal restrictions and in part to poor raw material. 
Merck threatened to sue Farmanguinhos after it purchased a generic form of efavirenz‘s 
API from India, alleging the acquisition infringed on its patent (Darlington 2001). Merck 
never took the Farmanguinhos to court, nor did the lab ever complete the development of 
the drug since a negotiated settlement was achieved soon thereafter. The new price of 
$0.84 for 200 mg dose represented a 59 percent discount from $2.06. The National AIDS 
Program announced that the price deal economized $39 million. 
Negotiations with Roche dragged on further. Serra refused the company‘s initial 
offer and pressed forward with the local development of nelfinavir. Farmanguinhos 
completed the bio-equivalence tests and produced samples of the finished dosages. ―We 
formulated nelfinavir and had a meeting with Roche and showed them the final product, 
although we still had to do the scale-up,‖ explained Pinheiro (2008). ―But we showed 
them we were capable of doing it. And Serra threatened the compulsory license.‖ The 
public lab still required another six months to begin industrial production, and there were 
no risks of stock-outs since the previous contract with Roche covered the time it would 
take to do the scale-up. In addition, Farmanguinhos could produce nelfinavir at 40 
percent less than the current price charged by Roche.  
On August 22, 2001, Serra announced a CL but added that he was still open to 
negotiations. A week later, Roche (2001) announced that it would reduce the price of the 
ARV from $1.07 a pill to $0.64—a 40 percent discount comparable to Farmanguinhos‘ 
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cost parameters. The Swiss drug company also agreed to move production of nelfinavir to 
Brazil since the agreed volume of purchases made it economically viable.
43
 
The reaction by foreign pharmaceutical companies to Brazil‘s aggressive 
approach of copying drugs in public labs and threatening to the use compulsory licenses 
has varied. On one extreme, executives were upset that their products were being 
―pirated‖ and demanded action from the US government to protect their interests (Biehl 
2006; Nunn 2007; Raimundo 2008), but executives remained attracted to Brazil‘s large 
pharmaceutical market. Although not directly involved in the negotiations at the time, 
Roche‘s head of government affairs, João Carlos Ferreira, highlights Serra‘s interest to 
launch his presidential campaign: 
 
We were always under a lot of pressure during the talks. At the time, it was more 
a public relations issue than having to do with the compulsory license. During the 
negotiations, Minister Serra had met with the president of Roche, and they 
seemed to have reached good terms. It did not stop the Ministry of Health from 
threatening to issue a compulsory license, but the negotiation was already clear. It 
was more about getting the spotlight for his candidacy. 
 
Brazilian private drug makers came to a similar conclusion. Neto Machado (2008) 
from Labogen explained: ―With respect to compulsory licenses, we began to research and 
develop efavirenz and nelfinavir because Serra threatened to break the patent, and even 
used it in his political campaign. He said that he wanted to have a product ready. But 
since he did not issue the compulsory license, we stopped developing it.‖ Trumpeting a 
positive government program such as Brazil‘s AIDS program and threatening to break 
patents is not uncommon for any politician with future political ambitions. Indeed, Serra 
                                                 
43 The company later closed the operation due to increasing costs and reduced sales volumes. 
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left the Ministry of Health in February 2002 to launch his campaign for Brazil‘s 
presidency.  
Bringing price negotiations to the public spotlight would have lasting effects on 
corporate strategies.
44
 Foreign drug companies that did not have dedicated offices and 
personnel for negotiating directly with the government would set up a division. However, 
local autonomy to negotiate contracts would increasingly become more restricted as 
home offices set pricing criteria. Under the industry-backed Accelerating Access 
Initiative
45
 and other firm-level efforts, global differential pricing schemes were 
established. Typically, the criteria depended on World Bank classification of a country as 
high-, medium-, or low-income as well as its HIV prevalence rate. Countries with the 
highest prevalence rates and lowest levels of income would receive ARVs at the cost of 
production. Brazil‘s successful AIDS policies were launching political careers and 




Brazil was able to avoid dependency when the AIDS crisis struck. Despite the 
impact that neoliberal reforms had on domestic drug makers, Brazilian firms, both private 
and public, demonstrated the technological competence to reverse-engineer and produce 
advanced medicines. Up to this point, domestic ARV manufacturing capabilities were not 
                                                 
44 Marcos Levy, then Director of Public Affairs at Merck Brazil, said, ―Merck had been conducting price 
negotiations with the Health Ministry since 1995, but it was done very quietly back then, and the 
government still got a good deal. It was José Serra who took this whole thing public when he was running 
for President‖ (quoted in Nunn 2007: 279). 
45 In May 2000, several UN agencies entered into a partnership with five pharmaceutical companies 
(Boehringer Ingelheim; Bristol-Myers Squibb; GlaxoSmithKline; Merck & Co., Inc.; and Hoffmann-La 
Roche and later joined by Abbott Laboratories) to offer price discounts in 80 countries. 
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affected by new intellectual property laws. Without this industrial base, Brazil would 
have been much more beholden to foreign suppliers. Nonetheless, state monopolization 
of ARV production amidst neoliberal policies resulted in contradictory state policies. The 
reliance on public labs and the lack of coordinated industrial policies, for example, 
resulted in the absence of constructive private-public collaboration that could produce 
innovative AIDS medicines, develop upstream activities for producing active principals, 
and make Brazil an export platform of ARVs to the rest of the world.  
The alliance between activist policy makers and social movements crystallized 
with domestic groups and extended to transnational advocacy networks when the US 
applied trade pressure concerning Brazil‘s patent laws. Had the US not brought a WTO 
panel against Brazil, it is unlikely that Brazil‘s domestic AIDS coalition would have gone 
global. The country‘s successful treatment program based on local production of ARVs 
provided a rallying point for activists and policy makers to exploit ―reputational 
dividends.‖ The symbolic power of a middle-income country trumped the material 
interests of the US and transnational drug corporations. Brazil‘s power, nonetheless, 
rested on the credible threat of local production. At this point, private drug makers were 
not part of the AIDS alliance due to the state monopolization and foreign sourcing of 
APIs. Nevertheless, the existence of several private domestic companies producing APIs 
and final dosages increased the country‘s credible threats (Hasenclever 2008; Lowtroska 
2008).  
Serra‘s leadership at the Ministry of Health marked the high point of state 
autonomy. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate how patent power and market power 
increased Brazil‘s external dependency. Meanwhile, the number of patients enrolled in 
treatment continued to increase, and the use of ―reputational dividends‖ related to 
Brazil‘s successful AIDS policies expanded. 
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CHAPTER FOUR – FRAGMENTED DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 
AND EMPTY COMPULSORY LICENSE THREATS (2002-2005) 
Brasil é uma esculhambação.
46
 
--Luiz Felipe M. Lima, sanitarista and ANVISA manager 
 
In this chapter, I seek to explain the increasing foreign dependency of Brazil‘s 
pharmaceutical sector due to the impact of intellectual property legislation. During the 
1990-2001 period, Brazil was able to legally copy first generation medicines used in the 
―AIDS cocktail.‖  Over the next few years, domestic drug-making capabilities based on 
production at public (state-run) labs declined. This process occurred while the number of 
ARVs offered in its treatment program increased from 13 to 18. Meanwhile, the total 
number of patients enrolled in the program rose from 125,000 in 2002 to 165,000 in 
2005.  Due to the increased number of patients and the inclusion of more expensive 
second-generation, patent-protected treatments, annual ARV expenditures doubled from 
R$ 496 million to nearly R$1 billion (about $500 million).  
The patent power of originator companies and market power of low-cost 
producers in Asia constricted Brazil‘s ARV producing abilities, thereby curtailing 
Brazil‘s state autonomy. Confrontations between the government and transnational drug 
companies created another political opportunity concerning the use of compulsory 
licenses, which resulted in increased societal mobilization. Despite the fever pitch of 
activists (both inside and outside the state) who maximized the use of Brazil‘s 
―reputational dividends‖—the symbolic resonance of Brazil‘s successful AIDS 
program—the government once again backed off the use of compulsory licenses. The 
                                                 
46 ―Brazil is an esculhambação.‖ The Michaelis Moderno Dicionário Português-Inglês (Portuguese-
English) defines esculhambação in the following way: [eskuλãbas'ãw] sf (pl esculhambações) Brazilian, 
slang 1. disorder, confusion, disarray, anarchy. 2. reprimand. 3. demoralization. 
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confrontation renewed the alliance between social movement insiders and human rights 
activists, and revealed the need to include another domestic ally: local pharmaceutical 
industrialists. 
 
THE NEW PRESIDENCY OF LUIS INÁCIO „LULA‟ DA SILVA 
 
Jose Serra, despite attracting international attention in leading Brazil‘s struggle 
against AIDS and defending countries‘ rights to use TRIPS flexibilities, suffered a loss in 
Brazil‘s 2002 runoff presidential elections. Left-of-center candidate Luiz Inacio ‗Lula‘ da 
Silva received 61% of the votes against Serra. After eight years of neoliberal economic 
policies by Fernando Henrique Cardoso from the PSDB, Brazilians opted for the 
candidate from the Workers‘ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores-PT) who promised to 
redistribute Brazil‘s wealth and expand social programs tackling chronic poverty. Lula, 
whose candidacy was backed by social movements interested in addressing Brazil‘s 
social inequities and the local bourgeoisie affected by neoliberal policies of the past 
administration, was Brazil‘s president to have come from the country‘s popular classes. 
The new administration, however, did not rescind past neoliberal reforms. Rather, Lula 
streamlined and expanded existing social programs and kicked off industrial programs to 
support strategic sectors of the economy. 
Policies for treating AIDS patients were not expected to change significantly in 
the presidential transition, since the program had already become institutionalized and 
many of the directors of the National AIDS Program had strong ties with the social 
movements that supported Lula and the PT. In fact, many activists believed that Lula‘s 
administration would be more aggressive in its pursuit of compulsory license for AIDS 
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medicines. The one concern was that, since Serra had used the AIDS banner during his 
political campaign, the new administration would undertake personal changes at the 
Ministry of Health affecting the local production of ARVs. 
 
Restructuring Pharmaceutical Policies and Reorganizing Public Labs 
 
Humberto Costa, a physician from the northeastern state of Pernambuco, was 
chosen to assume command of the Ministry of Health in Lula‘s new government. He was 
not considered as strong or as capable a politician as Jose Serra, but a new group of 
sanitaristas had entered the top positions of the Ministry. Noberto Rech (2008), leader of 
the pharmacists‘ trade union from Santa Catarina state and affiliated with PT‘s political 
ally, the Communist Party of Brazil (Partido Comunista do Brasil—PCdoB), explained 
in an interview the changes made in pharmaceutical policies. First, the transition team 
comprised of Rech and others decided to create a new Secretary of Science, Technology 
and Strategic Inputs within the Ministry of Health under which the Department of 
Pharmaceutical Assistance would be subordinated and given responsibility for 
implementing pharmaceutical policies.  
Second, the Ministry consolidated the 23 different programs related to 
pharmaceutical assistance left over from the Serra era. Internal debates concerning which 
medicines should receive priority reflected an interest in local production to insure 
sustainability of strategic health programs:  
 
In the case of the medicines considered strategic or being used in strategic 
programs, we wanted to review the mechanisms of acquisition, identify the 
priorities of these medicines, their costs, and what actions we could do for 
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inducing public production or private production of these medicines in the 
country, and thus give sustainability of these medicines, and that is where AIDS 
comes in. (Rech 2008).  
 
Regarding the network of 18 public labs, the Ministry of Health continued to 
invest in their modernization but with some modifications. The Umbrella Project (Projeto 
Guarda Chuva), the investment program undertaken during Serra‘s administration, only 
invested in new machinery and increasing productive capacity, Rech (2008) explained. A 
new round of investments went into new technologies, improving human capital, and 
bringing the public labs up to date with increasingly stringent regulations published by 
the National Sanitary Surveillance Agency (Agencia Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária—
ANVISA). In fact, investments in public labs increased significantly in subsequent years. 
Table 3 shows that during Serra‘s administration, annual investments did not top R$ 15 
million. But the Workers‘ Party kicked off the Modernization Program of Public Drug 
Production in 2003 and investments jumped from R$ 36 million during their first year in 
office to around R$ 78 million in 2004. Total production of medicines increased but 













(billions of units*) 
Production of ARVs 
(millions of units*) 
1997 - 2.1 71.9 
1998 - 2.3 86.2 
1999 - 2.5 103.9 
2000 - 3.5 136.8 
2001 14.5 4.0 202.4 
2002 11.4 5.3 194.2 
2003 36.0 5.3 153.6 
2004 77.9 5.6 118.5 
2005 60.7 7.5 209.0 
2006 67.9 7.8 163.2 
2007 56.4 4.8 163.3 
* The Ministry of Health defines a pharmaceutical unit based on its pharmaceutical form; 
that is, for solids—one pill, one capsule, one vial containing sterile powder; for liquids—
one vial; for semi-solids—one collapsible tube; for intravenous—one blister, one vial. The 
unit is not comparable to private sector units. Source: Ministry of Health (2008). 
 
Despite the investments in capacity and technology, Brazilian labs were unable to 
compete with international price trends. While Brazil‘s entrance into the generic ARV 
market in the late 1990s reduced the per patient per year prices to less than one-third of 
the $15,000 of US retail prices, Indian suppliers were offering prices in the hundreds of 
dollars for the same medication. One calculation estimates that Brazil paid an excess 
amount of $110 million from 2001 to 2005 for locally produced generics compared to 
international reference prices paid by other low- and middle-income countries (Nunn et 
al. 2007). Another study showed a difference of $57.6 million just in 2005 (Felipe 
Marques and Hasenclever 2006). While aggressive negotiations with patent holders 
resulted in savings of $1.2 billion (Nunn et al. 2007), it still begs the question why 
officials continued to pay more to public labs instead of economizing resources by 
sourcing ARVs from abroad. 
 117 
Brazil‘s continued support for its public labs are associated with maintaining state 
autonomy and avoiding foreign dependency. Specifically, having local production of 
medicines allows for a tougher negotiating stance. The $1.2 billion in savings would not 
have been achieved without Brazil‘s ability to produce ARVs in public (or private) labs. 
Rech (2008) explains the Ministry‘s decision to continue the policy of acquiring ARVs 
from public labs: 
 
In the moment that I just substitute national production, despite being a little more 
expensive, for purchases abroad that are in principle less expensive, through time 
I will discourage the [domestic] industrial park—not just in the public but also in 
the private sector—and the result will be its subsequent contraction. What does 
this mean? Loss of technological capacity implies losing the capacity through 
time to have a more active role in negotiations. Therefore, those medicines which 
at first were much less expensive purchased abroad, through time—insomuch as 
the national industrial park be it public or private is shut down due to a decision to 
import—certainly, and this is a rule of the capitalist world, a product‘s price will 
tend to increase. This would place us in a situation of being hostages to decisions 
made abroad. 
 
Although international reference prices for AZT and other commonly used 
medicines to treat AIDS began to fall in price, Brazilian health authorities believed it was 
necessary to continue investing and purchasing medicines made by public labs in order to 
boost their bargaining position.
47
  
One reason Brazilian public labs are not competitive is their inability to achieve 
economies of scale.
48
 The country‘s network of 18 public labs is controlled by distinct 
                                                 
47 Brazil, nonetheless, tapped into cheap international markets when it joined forces with other South 
American countries and engaged in collective negotiations in order to obtain better prices. For an 
evaluation of the first round of collective negotiations in 2003 and the difficulties encountered, see the 
study carried out by the Center for Pharmaceutical Policies (Cristante, Osorio-de-Castro, and Oliviera 
2008: 8). 
48 Other reasons include the lack of incentives for administrators in public labs to reduce costs, poor 
production planning, lack of administrative flexibility illustrated by Law 8.666, and the Ministry of 
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branches of government at the federal and state levels. Under Serra, the allocation of 
ARVs was centralized under Farmanguinhos (FM) and the Brazilian Official 
Pharmaceutical Lab Association (Associação Brasileira de Laboratórios Oficiais do 
Brasil—ALFOB. The new administration attempted to streamline output from the public 
labs (not just ARVs but other medicines used in public health programs). Additionally, 
the new administration felt that the federal lab had concentrated too much ARV 
production and began to re-distribute supply contracts to other public labs (and to a lesser 
extent other national private labs) (Felipe 2008). 
Efforts to better coordinate the network‘s production failed, but ARV purchases 
from other public labs increased at the expense of FM. In 2001, the federal lab produced 
135 million pharmaceutical units of ARVs worth R$ 145 million, more than double the 
amount procured from other public labs combined. By 2005, the situation had reversed: 
other public labs were contributing triple the amount relative to FM. The changes had 
significant, unforeseen consequences that would increase the country‘s external 
dependency. Instead of working together, public labs began to compete against one 
another for federal contracts to supply ARVs, which were considered a high-end product 
compared to other drugs. Pedro Rolim (2008), former director of production at Lafepe, 
described the situation: ―There was never development as a group of public labs acting 
together. It ended up being a little cannibalistic: Each one seeking out their own 
development and pride since they have distinct juridical bases.‖ 
 
Problems Sourcing Raw Materials 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Health‘s willingness to pay more for ARVs to cover the fixed costs of public labs (Clinton Foundation 
2006).   
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One area that revealed Brazil‘s dependency as a result of increasing globalization 
is problems sourcing raw materials—the active principal ingredients (APIs) and chemical 
intermediates required to make final dosage forms. As described in Chapter Two 
detailing Brazil‘s pharmaceutical industry, South America‘s largest country has a weak 
pharmochemical base. Brazil is home to approximately 550 drug firms that combine APIs 
with inert ingredients to make the final product but has only 23 firms that produce APIs 
and only a few of those are completely verticalized, that is capable of producing synthetic 
chemicals, APIs, and final dosage forms. The one notable exception of verticalized 
production is the private domestic firm Cristalia, which also produces ARVs. It is 
estimated that imports account for 80% of the domestic pharmochemical market (Chamas 
2005). There has been growing dependence on imports from China and India, but since 
they consist mainly of low value-added products, they do not account for more than 25% 
of total imports (ABIQUIF 2009).  
Most public labs produce low value-added medicines so they tend to rely more on 
Asian raw material suppliers. The director of the public lab Funed said that two-thirds of 
their inputs come from China and India (Pereira Gomes 2008). A few, such as 
Farmanguinhos (FM), have in-house laboratory scale operations to produce small batches 
of APIs for some orphan drugs, but industrial-scale production of bulk active principals 
goes beyond FM‘s current capabilities. 
Sourcing of foreign APIs not only increased dependence as market power of 
Asian suppliers grew but in some instances put the country‘s universal AIDS treatment 
program at risk. The factors that led to this situation were, first, that several part of the 
administrative changes enacted by the new PT government that came into power in 2003 
affected how public labs obtained active principals. During the scale-up of ARV 
production under Minister Serra, procurement of raw material was, to a large extent, 
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centralized in Farmanguinhos. When the system moved towards decentralized purchases, 
economies of scale were lost. But possible benefits of spreading risk (i.e. faulty material 
or delivery delays) were not achieved since most labs ended up buying from the same 
suppliers (Lowtroska 2008).  
Second, global demand for ARVs sky-rocketed as national and global efforts 
attempted to replicate Brazil‘s success in other parts of the developing world. Multilateral 
initiatives included the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (2002), the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) ―3 by 5‖ strategy was jointly launched in December 2003 with the 
aim of having 3 million people on treatment by 2005, and US President's Emergency Plan 
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) launched in 2003. Marco Vitoria Antonio (2006), who once 
helped establish Brazil‘s National AIDS program and now works as a medical officer at 
the WHO, warned that there could be a ―stock out, not because of a lack of political will, 
but because there are not enough producers of APIs.‖ Rising demand for APIs strained 
Brazilian procurement already encumbered by highly restrictive rules governing public 
tenders. 
The third reason is the strict tender laws that favor awarding procurement 
contracts to suppliers that offer the lowest price. Nearly all the different groups 
interviewed for this project complained about Public Procurement Law 8.666 of 1993. 
The problems of the rigid tender law on public labs‘ contracts have attracted the attention 
of Brazilian academics (cf. Felipe Marques and Hasenclever 2006). My review coincides 
and supplements their account. After massive corruption scandals in the early 1990s, 
Brazil passed new rules governing all contracts carried out by the public sector.  
The Public Procurement Law establishes formal procedures to avoid corruption. 
The same legislation applies to the whole public sector whether a municipal government 
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or state enterprise; consequently, departments or agencies cannot adopt internal rules. 
Also, tenders cannot distinguish between foreign versus local suppliers nor impose 
technical restrictions, such as quality, apart from price criteria. In sum, price auctions 
award contracts regardless of other criteria. When carrying out auctions for the 
procurement of raw materials, public labs are legally obliged to award contracts based 
solely on price and then analyze quality afterwards.
49
 
Interviews carried out with local pharmochemical industry and managers of 
public labs revealed the problems associated with the rigid process of awarding contracts. 
Neto Machado (2008) from São Paulo-based Labogen explained that merchants 
connected to trade networks in Asia would always win the auctions. ―The Chinese 
representative would hear all the bids then get on his phone and place a lower bid than all 
those that were submitted.‖ In addition, Brazilian firms were placed at a disadvantage due 
to strong competition from Asian competitors and a complicated tax code that favored 
imports: 
 
When Lula came to power, carrying out international tenders became the 
standard. I did a spreadsheet and I showed Furlan [Minister of Development, 
Industry and Trade] that I could take advantage of drawback measures, sell my 
product to the Cayman Islands, re-sell back to Brazil and be competitive with the 
Indian and Chinese competition. But I would not do so because I would get in 
trouble with Brazil‘s tax authorities. There were even some instances that I would 
export my product to China and then the Chinese would sell it back to Brazil. 
They said they could still make money because they receive a lot of fiscal benefits 
from their government. I asked Furlan to begin anti-dumping measures against 
China in the case of DDI [didanosine], but he said that he could not do anything 
                                                 
49 ―As a consequence [of Law 8.666], national suppliers have been losing space to Chinese and Indian 
producers that offer lower prices since they fulfill fewer phytosanitary demands. This dependence has 
become more uncomfortable during phases of rising world demand that has been occurring, in which the 
government feels obliged to ration the consumption due to scarcity of raw material‖ (Felipe Marques and 
Hasenclever 2006: 13-14). 
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to favor a small industry such as mine in the face of the Chinese that import 
billions of dollars of Brazilian steel, soy, and other exports…(Neto 2008) 
 
Labogen‘s experience provides insight into how the current global economy 
favors exports based on tax credits at the expense of local producers. Drawback measures 
allow companies to assemble products in export processing zones without having to pay 
taxes on the value added. In extreme forms, fiscal benefits transform into export subsidies 
that result in dumping.  
The account also highlights China‘s growing market power in the global 
economy. The ARV commodity chain links workers from the Chinese hinterlands to 
Brazilian patients. Lelio Maiçara (2007) explains the dynamic process: ―The Indians 
obtained scale and acted in world markets as large suppliers and now obtain their raw 
materials from the Chinese. The Chinese that speak English buy the materials from the 
non-English speaking Chinese in the interior. It is a chain that starts in China and goes to 
the Indians.‖ Between January 2002 and February 2005, foreign suppliers won 82% of 
the 68 auctions to supply APIs for making stavudine, didanosine, indinavir, lamivudine, 
and zidovudine amounting to $26 million in contracts. Just for the months of January 
2004 to February 2005, foreigners won 93% of the contracts worth $21.2 million (Lages 
2007). Maiçara, a representative of Brazil‘s pharmochemical industry, alleges that 
Brazilian API suppliers would be as competitive as foreigners if they were to circumvent 
the commercial intermediaries and obtain basic raw materials from the interior of China.  
The sourcing of APIs by public labs became increasingly problematic, ranging 
from issues with pre-qualifying suppliers to allegations of corruption. Public labs 
operated by state governments tend to confront most of the problems of pre-qualification. 
Pedro Rolim (2008) from Lafepe recounts his experience with poor raw material: 
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We always received a lot of raw material that was of bad quality, contained 
impurities, etc. If you don‘t have a good analytic methodology, then you let these 
impurities get by. Doing pharmaceuticals is not like following a recipe to make a 
cake. You always have to evaluate every step. We never sent our raw material to 
be re-processed. We sent it back to the supplier and told them to send us another 
batch. It is a prostitute market. They show one product that is good quality, and 
then when they send the whole batch, it is of horrible quality. It is not possible to 
identify a ―picareta‖[cheat] during the tender process. If we reject some raw 
material, it could take up to 15 days, at best, to get another batch.  
 
In one instance, a South Korean supplier that had their product rejected bythe  
public lab Vital Brazil located in Niteroi, Rio de Janeiro, sent the same item to Lafepe in 
Pernambuco without even removing the rejection label off the top of the box! Purchasing 
raw material at the lowest price did not economize resources. Maçiara (2006) estimates 
that public labs pay an extra 30% on the cost of producing ARVs due to the need of re-
processing or purifying poor-quality APIs.
50
 
Brazil‘s endemic corruption has also found its way into the API market. Although 
interviewees at public labs and government as well as the private sector denied any direct 
knowledge of corrupt practices, they did not rule out the possibility. Hasenclever (2008), 
an economist at UFRJ, explained the process:  
 
The money made by the public labs ends up in a public fund. The difference is 
between the price paid for raw material and the price sold to the Ministry of 
Health. The money can then be used to finance political campaigns. This is 
―Samba do Crioulo Doido‖[or ―Samba of the Crazy Creole‖]. Much of the 
accounts do not pass through the TCU [Public Audit Court]. Public labs ended up 
buying raw material from the Indians and Chinese and instead of purchasing at 
                                                 
50 This provided a new niche for some Brazilian pharmochemical firms, such as Labogen, which became a 
service provider re-processing imports of APIs. 
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the price offered, would mark up the price, i.e. overbill, so that they could remain 
with the difference. 
 
Evidence for her claims came from a federal prosecutor Jose Vagos. The Roupa Suja 
[Dirty Laundry] investigation, which concluded in 2005, uncovered a price-setting 
scheme between allegedly rival suppliers and kick-backs to employees of public labs. 
Claiming that all public labs are corrupt at all times is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. If public-private partnerships remain suspect due to fraudulent practices, the 
ability to construct a ―triple alliance‖ remains problematic. 
In sum, Brazilian public labs became increasingly dependent on Asian suppliers 
of the key ingredient, the API, for the production of its AIDS medicines. Procurement 
decentralization caused by each facility purchasing its supplies individually only serviced 
to fragment a streamlined process organized by Farmanguinhos. This shift in 
procurement occurred at a time when global demand for ARVs became overheated. 
Previous stable supplies of raw material from India and China were disrupted as these 
foreign producers rushed to fill a jump in demand and started to out-source production to 
poor-quality suppliers. A strict interpretation of Public Procurement Law 8.666 forced 
Brazilian purchasers to remain beholden to lowest-priced foreign bidders even though 
quality dropped.
51
 The Brazilian pharmochemical industry lost an opportunity to grow 
and instead became a service provider purifying imported raw material. The Achilles‘ 
heel of Brazilian local production would threaten its universal access program but also 
provide an opportunity for Brazil‘s AIDS coalition to add another partner. 
                                                 
51 An opposing view concerning the poor quality of Asian suppliers comes from the ex-directors of 
Farmanguinhos Eloan Pinheiro and Nubia Boechat who praise the quality of Indian firms like Hetero and 
claim that the problem with poor quality stems from way public labs write up their call-for-tenders. If these 
labs had included more rigid product specifications, they would not have had so many problems. In either 




Supply Problems of the National AIDS Program 
 
At the start of 2005, Brazil‘s model treatment program was placed in risk. Part of 
the problem resulted from the rationing of medicines due to the aforementioned problems 
related to foreign supplies of APIs. Another issue was that the federal government was 
late in approving the 2005 budget the previous year. Since public labs rely on the 
government for working capital to purchase inputs, production timeframes were pushed 
back. According to Carlos Alberto Pereira Gomes, the president of public lab industry 
association ALFOB, the delay in closing the contracts with the Ministry of Health only 
occurred in December and not in October when they typically occurred. ―We buy by the 
Law 8.666, so it was delayed. Since the process of signing contracts got backed up, the 
purchase of raw material took place later,‖ he was quoted as saying in Folha Online news 
service (Leite 2005). The delay in receiving funds to produce medicines affected 30,000 
patients, the news service reported. 
Responses to the stock-outs reveal the importance of maintaining the 
―reputational dividends‖ of Brazil‘s banner AIDS program. Failing to manage the 
symbolic currency of the program could weaken ministers of government as well as 
provide opportunities for image management by drug corporations. Supply problems 
revealed management problems and political infighting at the highest levels of 
government.  
An editorial in the Estado de São Paulo newspaper (2005), often critical of the 
left-leaning PT government, underscored the ―screaming technical incompetence of the 
Minister Humberto Costa‖ and the ―administrative disorder that delayed in almost three 
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months purchasing orders and the release of funds for the public labs‖. Costa initially 
blamed Indian suppliers of raw material for the disruption, while former and current 
Ministry of Health officials all began to point blame at each other. Asked about the 
reports of delays in the delivery of raw material, Costa responded: ―If we had been 
advised on the first day about the delays, we would have taken the measures we took 
now‖ (Constatino 2005). The Ministry ended up importing three tons of medicines from 
Argentina using contacts established by Pedro Chequer when he helped set the 




The Ministry‘s budget and administrative problems were not restricted solely to 
public labs, but also affected the purchasing of medicines from foreign companies. In 
early 2005, health officials claimed that stock outs of patented ARVs were the 
consequence of companies not lowering their prices. The situation placed companies in a 
dilemma but also presented a public relations opportunity. The difference in tactical 
responses can be seen at the company level. Gilead, the supplier of tenofovir to the 
program, ended up trading accusations with the Ministry of Health. Health officials said 
the company did have its importation papers in order and could be fined, whereas 
company representatives claimed the ministry did not have $6 million available for 
payment (FSP 2005).  
Bristol Meyers Squibb (BMS) saw the ministry‘s budget problems as an 
opportunity to improve its relationship with the public and to present itself as a partner to 
Brazil‘s AIDS program. Antonio Salles (2008), director of corporate relations for the 
company‘s local division explained the problem and his company‘s approach: 
                                                 
52 Brazil later paid back the Argentine government with R$ 3.9 million worth of ARVs. 
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Because the budget wasn‘t approved, the government didn‘t purchase anymore 
drugs. I kept warning them: look you have x number of days left of product. I 
warned Antonio Alves, at the time who was executive-secretary of the ministry. 
Of course when this hit the news, the government didn‘t want to look bad. When 
the Estado de São Paulo newspaper contacted us, we of course had all the letters 
we sent warning the government. So the government asked us to deliver the 
product and sign the contract at the time of delivery. So we sent a plane from 
Indiana with atazanavir. So there was a picture in the Estado de São Paulo, with 
the product being offloaded… If you look in the newspaper, Bristol made a 
statement saying there was no contract with the government. We even advised all 
the ONG‘s what was going on. We have a very good relationship with the NGO‘s. 
Mario Scheffer [from Grupo pela Vidda] can confirm this. 
 
Despite the positive relationships cultivated, companies like BMS still could not win the 
ideological battle concerning patents. Asked about the rationing of medicines, Rubens 
Duda, President of São Paulo State AIDS/NGO Forum, was quoted as saying: ―The 
movement does not want to know the motive behind the stock outs; it wants a medicines 
policy. We want the breaking of patents,‖ (Leite 2005). 
 
HEALTH MINISTERS BACK OFF COMPULSORY LICENSES 
 
Brazil‘s problems with local production of ARVs compounded the country‘s 
ability to take advantage of flexibilities outlined in the TRIPS agreement. In this sense, 
state autonomy was constrained due to the lack of domestic alternatives. In 2003 and 
2005, Brazil threatened to issue compulsory licenses (CLs) for the purchase of patented 
AIDS medicines, but on both occasions, the Minister of Health backed off the threats and 
reached a negotiated settlement. The two events reveal the problems associated with local 
production and increased dependency on foreign suppliers.  
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Besides the budget and administrative problems at the Ministry of Health, there 
are several other factors that contributed to the failure to take advantage of the TRIPS 
flexibilities. These include higher standards in pharmaceutical production, perceived US 
retaliation, and, most importantly, the inability to obtain access to patented inputs used 
for making drugs. Nonetheless, the on-going problems with local production and the 
continued government clashes with foreign companies over high-priced, patented 
medicines increased civil society‘s mobilization around issues of patents and local 
production. 
 
Changing Negotiating Strategy Based on Imports 
 
When the left-of-center government of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva assumed power 
on January 1, 2003, social movements felt invigorated by the prospect of more 
progressive social policies. Although the National AIDS Program had already established 
close ties to civil society groups, activists expected the new administration to follow 
through with threats against transnational drug companies.  
The AIDS coalition would be disappointed. Instead of ending patent monopolies, 
Brazil‘s clashes with Abbott, Gilead, and Merck revealed additional obstacles in the 
development and sourcing of generic alternatives, especially given the short time 
horizons of drug negotiations. Alexander Grangeiro (2008) who was in charge of the 
National AIDS Program in 2002-2003 explains that his agency became the ―protagonist‖ 
in terms of negotiating with foreign drug companies and evaluating different policy 
options at the start of Lula‘s first term in office:  
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We presented two options to the companies: One, reduce prices, or two, provide a 
voluntary license for production of the medicines in Brazil. Within this informal 
group we determined that production of any of these drugs would take at least a 
year. Lopinavir was the most complex to produce while the other two easier. 
Nelfinavir and efavirenz were already available in generic form in India and 
China, but they did not have a market to sell the medicines because Third World 
countries were just starting to use these ARV drugs and there was low demand for 
them. The Indians had them available on the shelves but they had not passed all 
the tests of bio-equivalence and bio-availability. People from Farmanguinhos and 
ANVISA (the regulatory authority) went to India to evaluate these medicines.  
 
This is a vicious cycle: without a market they did not have production ready, and 
in an emergency they wouldn‘t be ready. To produce these medicines in Brazil, it 
would take one to two years. Farmanguinhos was in a transition phase, and other 
projects were paralyzed at Farmanguinhos. So the other option was to import the 
medicines. (…) At the time the Brazilian law did not allow the importation of the 
drugs so we started to work on changing the laws related to compulsory licenses.   
 
This quote by Grangeiro highlights a number of theoretical points related to 
TRIPS, local production, and ensuring access to medicines. First, Brazil issued Decree 
#4.830 in 2003 that allows for parallel importation of products when a CL is issued. 
When Brazil had threatened CLs in previous years, the threat was backed by capability to 
produce the medicine locally. Importation was not considered a possibility because it was 
illegal under the patent legislation in force at the time. A drug company could legally 
restrict importation but not local production! The new decree allowed Brazil to import 
drugs from countries in which the product was not protected by patent. Since India and 
China took advantage of the complete transition process to become TRIPS-compliant (i.e. 
waited until 2005 before recognizing patents on pharmaceutical products), they reverse 
engineered and developed several second generation ARVs that were protected by patent 
in Brazil but not their countries.
53
 
                                                 
53 Appendix 4 includes a list of TRIPS flexibilities and related Brazilian legislation. 
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Second, officials from the Ministry of Health took the lead in modifying 
intellectual property law. It is important to highlight that domestic, privately-owned drug 
companies did not sponsor the legislation, nor did they block it, as other scholars have 
argued (Shadlen 2009).
54
 Representatives from the transnational drug industry, however, 
were vehement in their opposition to laws that increase the use of compulsory licenses. 
Jorge Raimundo (2008) from Interfarma, an industry organization representing the 
interests of foreign drug companies, called the decree an ―aberration.‖ Despite changes in 
government, Brazilian health officials especially from the AIDS program continued to 
press for increasing humanitarian safeguards in domestic IP laws. There has a continuous 
learning curve concerning the use of TRIPS flexibilities that resulted from price 




Third, Brazilian officials began to rely more on imported versions of patented 
drugs than on local development and production to guarantee the sustainability of its 
treatment program. During the 1990 to 2001 period, Brazil demonstrated its capability to 
quickly copy medicines and ramp up production. The reasons for its success include 
competent scientists and engineers in both private and public sector companies attracted 
to the nation‘s call to fight the epidemic, capable politicians backed by a mobilized civil 
society who fought for sufficient resources for R&D and production, and most 
importantly, the first ARVs used in triple therapy consisted of medicines not protected by 
                                                 
54 Shadlen (2009), however, notes that a lawyer from Brazil‘s fine chemical industry association ABIFINA 
drafted Decree #4.830 outlining the uses of a compulsory license.  
55 Incorporating TRIPS flexibilities were not always successful. In 2002, Brazil passed Law 10.603 which 
grants protection for undisclosed data drug firms provide to regulatory officials in order to obtain marketing 
approval. Extending the timeframe for protecting undisclosed data—considered a TRIPS-plus measure—
restricts competition from generic drugs markers, which could lead to lower prices. The law was passed 
after Jose Serra had left the Ministry of Health to campaign for the presidency and before new PT officials 
had assumed control of government. The law may have been more difficult to pass had it not been pushed 
through during this window of opportunity between administrations. 
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patent. In the first confrontation over the price of patented medicines and threats to issue 
a CL, Brazil was able to make a credible threat of local production of Roche‘s nelfinavir. 
The initial face-off, despite ending in a negotiated settlement and price reduction, 
foreshadowed the challenges in subsequent years. 
Decree #4.830 of 2003, which revealed that Brazilian authorities were going to 
rely on Indian suppliers of ARVs, had contradictory affects. On the one hand, it showed 
that local production capabilities had weakened. A new director, Nubia Boechat, took 
control over Farmanguinhos and began to reorganize operations. Even without the 
temporary disruptions in the federal lab‘s operations, developing and registering a new 
formula became more time consuming. ―In 2001 the drugs could have been produced 
without having to pass certain quality tests,‖ explained Grangeiro (2008). Both 
pharmaceutical companies and some NGOs, he added, attempted to discredit or challenge 
the quality of generic drugs. ―So in 2001 it was much more politically feasible to produce 
these drugs. In 2003 it was unthinkable,‖ he said. ANVISA, created in 1999 to regulate 
the pharmaceutical market, had established more stringent guidelines for registering 
products by 2003. During the reign of Eloan Pinheiro at Farmanguinhos (1994-2002), 
most quality tests were carried out in-house without ANVISA‘s external verification. 
On the other hand, Decree #4.830 improved the Brazilian governments bargaining 
position. The perception was that drug companies felt they had an advantage during price 
negotiations since Farmanguinhos was in a transition period, and it was unlikely that 
President Lula would spend political capital on a CL during his first year in office and 
potentially scare off foreign investors. The leftist president‘s arrival to power had already 
alarmed investors who threatened an economic meltdown by speculating against the 
country‘s currency. Grangeiro (2008) reveals the dynamic in the political process 
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between the Minister Health Humberto Costa, Jarbas Barbosa (Secretary of Health 
Surveillance at the Ministry) and President Lula: 
 
Lula said ‗Brazil is not going to be held hostage‘. ‗If we need to, we will do a 
compulsory license.‘ But there was a lack of continuity between Lula‘s discourse 
and what Costa was saying. (…) Jarbas Barbosa also was against the compulsory 
license. Other Ministers were on the fence, but Jarbas said it was like an atomic 
bomb: ‗The compulsory license is not to use, it would lose its‘ effect. Kind of like 
the compulsory license is more effective as a deterrent.  
 
Although many health officials knew they could rely on support from 
international civil society if they were to move against patent monopolies, many policy 
makers had not reached the cognitive liberation, i.e. the subjective realization of the 
political possibilities at the current political conjuncture.
56
 Nonetheless, the 2003 decree 
allowing for parallel importation was effective in forcing drug companies to lower prices. 
Negotiated settlements with patent holders finalized in January 2004 allowed the 
Ministry of Health to save R$ 299 million, representing 37% of its ARV budget (Maria 
Auxiliadora Oliveira et al. 2004). The savings represent the enrollment of 20,000 new 
patients in the AIDS program and two additional ARVs, tenofovir and atazanavir, to be 
included in treatment regimens. 
 
Research and Development of New and Patented ARVs 
 
After having successfully developed and produced most off-patent ARVs, the 
question became which patented medicines to develop and how to successfully continue 
                                                 
56 The concept of cognitive liberation comes from social movement literature (see McAdam 1982) but has 
the same relevance in this context given policy makers‘ fears of retaliation and unforeseen consequences. 
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the program. But in subsequent years, Brazil‘s public labs achieved limited success with 
second generation ARVs. Brazil passed Law 10.196 in 2001 that allows a drug company 
to carry out all the necessary tests and procedures required for the registration of generic 
versions before the patent expiration. Despite the incorporation of this TRIPS flexibility 
known as the Bolar Exception, why did Brazilian firms not make greater use of this 
allowance?  
Besides the ratcheting up of quality standards set forth by ANVISA for obtaining 
product registration,
57
 another factor was administrative changes at Farmanguinhos. 
Eloan Pinheiro, whohsf directed the facility since 1994, was forced to leave at the end of 
2002. The new PT administration felt that she was too closely tied to Lula‘s former 
presidential challenger. Indeed, Jose Serra requested Pinheiro to continue as FM‘s 
director until the presidential elections, contravening the institute‘s rules to vote on a new 
director every three years. An adjunct director assumed control for three months until 
Farmanguinhos‘ employees elected Nubia Boechat, an organic chemist and FM career 
employee, as the new head of the federal lab. She removed personnel associated with 
Pinheiro and brought in new researchers and scientists. It is not uncommon for a new 
administration to enact personnel changes, but interviewees acknowledge that the 
changes made were significant. Boechat (2008) adds that the company was in disarray 
even before she assumed control since the interim director, in power for three month 
period, did not sign any contracts to obtain raw material nor make any operational 
decisions for the year. 
The transition of a new administration under Boechat could not have come at a 
more inopportune time. The Ministry of Health was redirecting purchases away from FM 
                                                 
57 ANVISA was not only tightening product standards to improve consumer protection on the domestic 
market. The regulatory agency was looking to increase the quality of Brazilian pharmaceutical products on 
global markets (cf. Flynn and Andrade de Oliveira 2009). 
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to other public labs. As a result, the substantial sums of money brought in from ARV 
purchases during Pinheiro‘s administration and which she used to finance other R&D 
projects was drying up. ―In 2003, the resources available for R&D disappeared,‖ Boechat 
(2008) claimed. When Pinheiro left Farmanguinhos in 2002, she had eight projects 
related to ARVs in development. Boechat said she continued to invest in ARV 
development, but there were no new ARV launchings under her watch.
58
  
Other public labs operated by state-run governments did not undergo complicated 
transitions like Farmanguinhos and were in a position to continue their research and 
development, but there was no coordination from the federal authorities directing state 
labs to invest in specific ARVs. Indeed, with the Ministry allocating more production 
towards other public labs, they would have more resources for R&D. The managers of 
public labs, however, did not want to risk investing scarce resources without purchase 
guarantees from the Ministry of Health.  
The situation of São Paulo state lab Furp, a close partner of FM, is emblematic of 
the situation. Ricardo Oliva (2007), Furp‘s director, explained the importance of federal 
contracts and inherent investment risks without a coherent policy for strategic medicines. 
In 2005, Furp sold R$ 50 million in medicines including ARVs to the Ministry of Health 
and R$ 22 million the subsequent year. The revenue difference had a significant impact 
on the laboratory‘s cash flow. He stated: 
 
Public companies do not have venture capital…Am I going to invest in efavirenz? 
I would not even think about it...I am not going to do it because I don‘t have a 
market…In principle, nothing stops me from producing in advance, waiting for 
                                                 
58 During this time, Farmanguinhos only registered one product. Boechat adds that ANVISA‘s stricter 
regulations were also a factor. ―Eloan was able to approve eight medicines in one year. Afterwards, 
ANVISA began its operations and it became difficult even to renew registrations. I think the only item I 
was able to launch was a syrup form of ferrous sulfate,‖ she said. 
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the moment for the patent to fall or to support the development of the national 
pharmochemical industry or to be used as a political instrument for negotiating 
price. Can it be done? Of course, just as long as you have a view towards that 
objective.  
 
Now I cannot produce in advance and [the Ministry of Health] turns to me and 
says: ―We are not going to buy from you. We are going to buy from 
Farmanguinhos.‖ I can‘t do this. I am going to invest some US$ 2.5 million in two 
years to do any ARV in advance, to do the reverse engineering and necessary 
investments...have this waiting on the shelves, and afterwards [the Ministry of 
Health] turns to me and says: ―I am going to do this with Lafepe and 
Farmanguinhos.‖ I lost US$6 million from the government of the state of São 
Paulo that could have been used to develop something else! 
 
Although São Paulo state has the largest AIDS populations, Oliva says that it 
would be a waste of the state government‘s resources if it were to develop and produce 
ARVs just for distribution within the state because the program has been federalized. 
―The Ministry of Health buys the medicines and distributes them,‖ he said.
59
  
Coordinating R&D and staying abreast of changing treatment protocols are 
internal problems related to administering a complex social program. These 
administrative challenges are exacerbated by external constraints imposed by originator 
companies who were able to use their patent power to restrict the development of generic 
copies. Despite the Bolar Exception allowing for registration of generics before a patent 
expires, foreign drug companies filed several injunctions restricting access to patented 
                                                 
59 Another state lab, Lafepe based in Pernambuco, risked developing new ARV formulations, but the 
results could not keep pace with changing treatment protocols. In 2004, the company registered a 200mg 
formulation for efavirenz, but in the same year the NAP therapeutic consensus began recommending a 
600mg formulation recently launched by Merck. Instead of taking three tablets a day, the new formula 
required patients to only take one tablet, thereby improving treatment adherence. Changing protocols affect 
not only patented products, but also the development of fixed-dose combinations. Pedro Rolim (2008) said 
he had to drop development of the three-in-one pill comprised of stavudine-lamivudine-nevirapine after 
NAP stopped recommending the usage of stavudine. The R&D projects were not a complete waste since 
they did contribute to graduate student training and advanced Lafepe‘s learning process, which then could 
be applied toward developing new therapies. 
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APIs. Their legal argument is that market exclusivity provided by a patent allows for 
research and development of the patented product but not its commercialization. 
Consequently, if a company wanted to develop the pharmaceutical technology required to 
produce the 600mg formulation of efavirenz, they would still require a CL to purchase 
the API. This key ingredient for making a medicine is also under patent! 
In 2005, the last year of her administration at Farmanguinhos, Boechat (2008) 
said that she signed an agreement with Pedro Chequer to develop efavirenz, atazanavir, 
and lopinavir. The agreement included R$ 8 million in funding through Fiotec (the 
funding arm of the FioCruz foundation) for the purchase of raw material and 
development up to the industrial scale, but the main obstacle was obtaining APIs in to 
reverse engineer and develop the drug. Boechat explained: 
 
In 2005, there was a group at the National AIDS Program—including a group of 
lawyers contracted by them—and I was instructed to solicit a letter from suppliers 
for all purchases of raw materials. According to our law, they are obliged to sell 
to us. So I asked to purchase 200kg of evafirenz, 100kg of lopinavir, and other 
raw materials. They all refused to sell me raw materials, and only wanted to sell 
the finished product.  According to the law, they have to sell. But since I had 
these letters, we opened the tender process to international companies. In 2005 
Cristalia and some others entered the bidding process. The patent owners said that 
the law in Brazil permits purchases of raw materials, development of the product, 
and even registration but not commercialization. You need raw material in order 
to do the development and also to do the registration. The [patent owners] 
prohibited these companies to commercialize in Brazil.  
 
Although Brazil‘s industrial property legislation allows for the commercialization of 
patented products for research and development (even without the patent holder‘s 
consent), foreign drug companies succeeded in filing court injunctions that circumscribed 
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Other public labs faced similar obstacles when attempting to develop formulations 
of patented ARVs. Lafepe‘s development of new ARV formulations, despite the 
registration of 200mg efavirenz, remained problematic due to restricted access to APIs. In 
2003-2004, the state lab was commemorating its entry into international markets after 
obtaining approval from the Pan American Health Organization for its pediatric formula 
of AZT.
61
 In the following conversation, Rolim (2008), the former director of production 
at Lafepe, explains the difficulties related to sourcing active principals for developing 
patented medicines: 
 
Interviewer: Could you develop tenofovir? 
Rolim: We could develop tenofovir but it depends on the raw material. If I were 
to obtain the raw material, I would definitely work on it. I have all the interest to 
do so. I just need to get the raw material... Doing the API is very expensive. You 
need to buy all the intermediates and equipment. There are many stages. 
Interviewer: What about Kaletra (ritonavir-lopinavir)? 
Rolim:  It was also part of our strategic plans, but the problem is access to raw 
material so we could not develop it. I need people, equipment and raw material.  
Interviewer: But you were able to some work on efavirenz? 
                                                 
60 Private generic drug companies do not face the same restrictions as public labs when taking advantage of 
the Bolar Exception. Since they are not required to publicize their tenders, patent holders do not have 
knowledge of their R&D strategies and therefore cannot lodge any injunctions restricting access to patented 
products. 
61 ―We did do some donations of AZT syrup to other countries in Latin America and Africa. We were the 
only public lab that did AZT syrup. It was also important in confronting TNCs, which said that we did not 
have quality, at the moment when we started producing a lot of ARVs. They did not want us to start 
exporting to Asia and Africa at cheaper prices. All the TNCs with patents viewed Brazil as a competitor 
and wanted our product to just stay in Brazil. One impediment to exporting was the necessary registrations 
that we needed to have in that country. All these countries wanted to buy our product,‖ said Rolim (2008). 
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Rolim:  I began working on it even when it had a patent because I got the raw 
material on the international market via donation. The supplier sends samples. 
Nelfinavir had a patent, but I developed it using samples from suppliers in India.  
 
Interviews with the managers of other public labs said that patents are the main 
problem when attempting to develop patented medicines. They were able to circumvent 
this obstacle through donations provided by private sector companies. Since the product 
was donated and not commercialized, there was no legal impediment, but donations of 
APIs remained limited. Private domestic firms do not want to make a larger investment 
without a guaranteed market. Farmanguinhos was able to obtain some samples from 
Nortec, a Brazilian private pharmochemical maker and the lab‘s technological partner,  
but again, this option has its limitations.  
Brazilian local ability to have generic copies of patented ARVs available for 
distribution in its AIDS program would comprise state autonomy during price talks in 
2005. The challenge to surmount patent power would also present an opportunity for the 
powerful AIDS coalition to reach out to the pharmochemical industry. 
 
US and NGO Pressures during Negotiations with Abbott 
 
The year 2005 proved a pivotal one in Brazil‘s AIDS treatment program. ARV 
costs had jumped to R$ 1 billion, and 165,000 Brazilians were in treatment. Health 
Minister Humberto Costa demanded discounts and/or voluntary licenses from Merck for 
efavirenz, from Abbott for Kaletra (ritonavir/lopinavir), and from Gilead for tenofovir. 
Abbott was the most intransigent during the negotiations, and on June 24, 2005, Costa 
declared fixed-dose combination Kaletra to be in the public interest. The declaration is 
the first step for issuing a CL, and the patent holder would have ten business days to 
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respond. From 2002 to 2005, the number of patients using Kaletra jumped sevenfold to 
23,400 and the annual expenditures reached $91.6 million. Health officials forecast that 
the number of patients would increase to 60,000 over the next four years. Negotiations 
with Abbott began in March, and negotiators demanded a price reduction from $1.17/pill 
to $0.68/pill—the cost that Farmanguinhos could allegedly produce the medicine. The 
talks with Abbott were complicated by the fact that Costa left office after supposedly 
reaching an agreement, and negotiations resumed under the new Minister Saraiva Felipe. 
The Kaletra negotiations of 2005 illuminate the framing of interests, different 
alliances, and potential impacts that various groups have on the state as a result of 
globalization. Corporate defenders of strong intellectual property rights quickly began to 
lobby the USTR to apply pressure on Brazil in March soon after Humberto Costa had 
placed the CL option on the table. They couched their arguments in terms of stealing 
property and US national interests. ―This theft has gone on at the expense of the 
American people and the US economy,‖ said Nancie Marzulla, president of Defenders of 
Property Rights (2005). In this view, the victim is the US people who witness their 
intellectual creations suffer from Brazilian piracy. This frame captured the attention of 
members of the US Congress who lobbied the USTR to fight Brazilian ―theft‖ and 
―piracy‖ of US intellectual property and questioned Brazil‘s ―emergency‖ since its 
successful AIDS program kept prevalence rates comparable to those in the US (Wilson 
2005). US legislators expressed concerns of national competitiveness being threatened by 
another rising economic power (Palmedo 2005):  
 
Brazil, with an economic output comparable to Germany, appears to be seeking a 
way to develop its generic manufacturing capacity through confiscating our 
pharmaceutical technology…Currently, Brazil is incapable of mass producing 
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these medicines but could quickly become a generic provider by gaining 
American technology. 
 
The concern was that Brazil would begin competing against US companies for export 
markets such as Africa. Indeed, Lafepe obtained quality approval from PAHO to export 
to Ecuador. 
Transnational advocacy groups defending Brazil framed the issue not along 
nationalist lines, i.e. US versus Brazil, but in terms of greedy corporations. These 
activists claimed to push for the interests of people across the world (Health GAP 2005): 
 
Brazil has let itself be bullied by big drug companies long enough. It's time for 
Brazil to stand up to them and show the world the kind of global leadership this 
issue so desperately needs—Dr. Paul Zeitz, Executive Director of Global AIDS 
Alliance. 
The success of the Brazilian AIDS treatment program has been made possible by 
the local production of generic medicines. This policy has brought down the price 
of raw materials for antiretroviral medications internationally. The Health 
Ministry must stand up to pharmaceutical companies—not only for the Brazilian 
people, but for people living with AIDS around the world—Sean Barry of Health 
GAP. 
 
The targets of malfeasance in this view are large corporations whose excessive 
prices keep access to drugs out of the hands of those who need them. Brazil‘s model 
AIDS program based on local production had become a symbol for the rest of the Global 
South. The Working Group on Intellectual Property, part of the Brazilian Network for the 
Integration of People [Grupo de Trabalho sobre Propriedade Intelectual – GTPI – da 
Rede Brasileira pela Integração dos Povos – Rebrip], organized worldwide petition 
drives through the internet, arguing that Brazilian officials were not assuming their 
leadership position at the WTO and other international bodies. By refusing to issue a CL, 
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they argued, Brazil was behaving like a ―tiger without teeth.‖ Activist efforts were 
capable of gaining the support of influential media such as the New York Times (New 
York Times 2005) that defended ―Brazil's Right to Save Lives‖ in an editorial, but their 
efforts failed to win over US diplomats. 
When Brazil first threatened a CL in 2001, US pressure consisted of a dispute 
resolution panel at the WTO. The US withdrew the panel after AIDS activists began to 
protest, and it became clear the legal basis of the complaint was weak. US authorities, 
however, retained other instruments of pressure. The USTR produces the annual ―Special 
301‖ Report that identifies countries that fail to improve the intellectual property 
protection.
62
 If a USTR investigation discovers that a country is at fault, then trading 
privileges under the General System of Preferences (GSP) could be withdrawn.
63
 In 2001, 
the agency placed Brazil on its Watch List and then on the Priority Watch List in 2003 
after Brazil decreed the use of parallel imports in cases of a CL. During the Kaletra 
confrontation in 2005, members of the US Congress urged the USTR to withdraw 
Brazil‘s trade privileges provided under the GSP. Estimates of Brazilian exports affected 
by the possible trade retaliation range from $48 million (Boletín Farmacos 2005) to $3.6 
billion (Kogan 2006). 
A request made under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of US Department 
of State Cables between 2004 and 2006 provide insight into the interactions between US 
                                                 
62 The Special 301 provision is found in Section 182 of the Trade Act of 1974 and strengthened by Section 
1303 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1998. Mandatory actions must be taken by the 
USTR according to a non-compliant country‘s classification. A ―Priority Foreign Country‖ indication 
means that a country‘s policies or practices have the most adverse impact on US products; a ―Priority 
Watch List‖ designation implies that a country has some but not all of the criteria for a ―Priority Foreign 
Country‖; and a ―Watch List‖ classification mean that a country has some problematic IP-related issues 
(Sell 2003). 
63 Sell (2003) has detailed PhRMA‘s influence on the USTR‘s decision-making process. Based solely on 
information provided by the lobbying group, USTR withdrew trade preferences worth US$260 million 
from Argentina in 1997 (Sell 2003:136). In the case of Brazil, PhRMA requested the USTR to include it on 
the Special 301 for lack of IP protection. 
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and Brazilian officials concerning the use of CLs.
64
 The cables reveal the depth of US 
involvement in monitoring price negotiations, the politics of patents, and defense of US 
companies involved in the negotiations—Abbott, Merck, and Gilead. A cable dated June 
3 from the American Embassy Brasilia (2005) with the subject heading ―Ambassador 
Meets with US Pharmaceutical Firms Threatened with Licensing‖ makes the conclusion: 
―We continues (sic) to believe that to resonate with the [Government of Brazil], the 
arguments will need to provide a sound analysis as to why compulsory licensing would 
be damaging to Brazil‘s economic and public health interests.‖ In subsequent cables, US 
diplomats warned Brazilian officials that a CL could harm the country‘s interests in 
attracting foreign investment and dissuade foreign drug companies to introduce new 
medicines into the market. US diplomats did not adopt the language of ―piracy‖ or ―theft‖ 
in their discussions that the defenders of strong IP protection employed, but the cables 
note that the Brazilian government invoked the ―public interest‖ and not the ―national 
emergency.‖ In this way, Brazilian authorities could avert criticism that they were 
suffering from an out-of-control AIDS epidemic, since in fact their model program had 
kept prevalence rates at levels comparable to those in the US 
 The details provided under the FOIA request do not detail the full extent of US 
pressures since many sections in the cables were excised. Agenor Alvares (2008), who 
was second in command at the Ministry of Health under Saraiva Felipe and present 
during the negotiations, described the extent of US pressures:  
 
What was strange during the negotiations was the interference on behalf of the US 
Embassy. Diplomats from the US Embassy requested a meeting with us, and 
explicitly threatened that if a compulsory license is used the US would review all 
                                                 
64 US-based consumer activist organization Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) published the cables 
on their website (2007). 
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the partnerships between the US and Brazil, including training partnerships of 
Brazilians in research centers in the US. This was explicit. We took into 
consideration all the accords that Brazil and the interest of the Brazilian 
government to send Brazilian scientists to the US for training, we reaffirmed our 
intention that it is important for Brazil‘s technology development to continue 
sending scientists there, but we would not accept the threat. 
 
It is amazing that US officials would make such an explicit threat to limit a country‘s 
technological development, but the action demonstrates how far US diplomats would go 
to defend the interests of its drug firms.  
While direct threats did not convince officials from Brazil‘s Ministry of Health, it 
did lead to increasing intervention by other ministries in the topic. Both Alvares and 
Felipe said that the Minister of Development, Industry and Trade, Luiz Fernando Furlan, 
convened a meeting concerning the use of a CL in order to persuade health officials to 
find an alternative—an action outside of Furlan‘s ministerial jurisdiction. The fear of 
trade retaliation hit a nerve at the economic centers of Brazil‘s agro-export economy.
65
 
The Brazilian government was feeling pressure not only from the US government 
but also from Brazilian civil society. On August 11, the National Health Council 
[Conselho Nacional da Saúde—CNS] approved a resolution recommending the 
immediate issue of a CL for Kaletra, efavirenz, and tenofovir ―as well as other patented 
anti-retrovirals that burden or come to burden the budget of the Unified Health System—
SUS‖. The CNS, which is composed of representatives from civil society, is the highest 
level of social participation in the country‘s health system. Although Saraiva Felipe as the 
Minister of Health is the president of the CNS and stated at the August meeting that ―the 
                                                 
65 More recently, Brazil threatened trade sanctions against the US after winning a WTO dispute over cotton 
subsidies. Before a bilateral settlement was reached, Brazilian diplomats threatened to suspend US 
intellectual property rights on seeds and medicines. ―Traditionally, retaliation in trade has been the preserve 
of the largest developed countries, which have market power,‖ said Robert Z. Lawrence, an economist at 
the Harvard Kennedy School. ―But this mechanism — suspending intellectual property protection — gives 
smaller, developing countries a way to enforce their rights under trade rules‖ (Chan 2010). 
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only inviolable patent is that of life itself‖ (Boletín Farmacos 2005), he never signed the 
resolution and thereby never sanctioned its legal power.  
When Felipe assumed command of the Ministry of Health on July 8, 2005, he 
attempted to depoliticize price negotiations. Agenor Alvares (2008), appointed second in 
command at the Ministry, explained that the first change the new minister initiated was to 
remove the ―emotional weight of the negotiations and place the talks on a professional 
level.‖ They assured US officials that the negotiation process would be transparent. 
However, leaders at the Ministry of Health had to contend with the AIDS coalition, 
which lobbied to ―break patents‖ and who symbolized the ―emotional weight‖ brought to 
bear on the administration.   
The second change concerns the sources and uses of price parameters. When 
Costa led the negotiations, the target price was $0.68 per pill that Farmanguinhos could 
allegedly produce the medicine. That price dropped to $0.41 per pill after the New York 
Times (Prada 2005) quoted a Ministry Health official saying that an internal review of 
local producers demonstrated that they could provide the drug at the lower price. This 
price then became the new baseline that NGOs demanded and was mentioned in the CNS 
resolution. The new baseline appears more of a negotiating tactic than a definite reality, 
although US State Department cables relate that Brazil‘s Health officials said the Clinton 
Foundation could source efavirenz at the 41 cent price.  
Despite the allegedly cheaper prices, the problems of sourcing Kaletra if a 
compulsory license were issued continued to haunt top officials. Jarbas Barbosa (2008), 
the Secretary of Health Surveillance involved in the negotiations, explained the 
difficulties in finding an alternative supplier to replace Abbott: 
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At that moment, we did not have any generic producer of Kaletra pre-qualified by 
the WHO. We sent a mission to India, one person from the Ministry of Health and 
another from ANVISA, to have meetings with generic producers. They did not 
have the product in stock and affirmed that they could make it, but we would still 
have to carry out bio-equivalence and bio-availability tests. This had a major 
weight in our decision in not issuing a compulsory license…In relation to national 
production, we did not have any producer of the basic salt [the API] for Kaletra. 
There was the possibility of an Indian producer supplying the basic salt to 
Farmanguinhos, but then we would still have the same problem. There was no 
Indian producer of the basic salt pre-qualified by the WHO…Farmanguinhos still 
could have used an Indian supplier of the API, but it still would have taken two 
years to complete the development. We did not divulge this because it would have 
weakened our bargaining position.   
 
Since no producer had completed the quality tests, health officials worried that 
doctors would not prescribe the medication to their patients. Barbosa explained that 
Abbott eventually offered a price below that of Indian producers. The final agreement 
signed on October 10
th
 cut the price of Kaletra to $0.63/pill (the lowest price for the ARV 
outside of Africa). 
AIDS bureaucrats and their NGO partners were outraged by the accord and kept 
up the pressure. One of their chief complaints was that the contract was valid until 2011 
and did not foresee the possibility of future price reductions or technology transfer. On 
December 1
st
, World AIDS Day, activists filed a civil lawsuit requesting an injunction 
against the contract signed with Abbott and an immediate compulsory license for the 
drug. Pedro Chequer (2008), the director of NAP, said that he provided all the necessary 
information to NGOs to carry out legal actions, but the courts did not uphold the 
injunction, arguing that a CL would harm the country‘s economic interest due to possible 
US retaliation.  More importantly, the court questioned whether there was technical proof 
of the country‘s local capacity to produce the medicine at $0.41.  
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The Kaletra episode was a humbling experience for Brazil‘s AIDS coalition. It 
revealed the limits their actions could have on pressuring for certain outcomes. Their 
power remained limited to the degree that there are readily available alternatives to 
source ARVs. But the confrontation with Abbot also provided a political opportunity for 
this dual coalition of ―social movement insiders‖ and outside activists to develop closer 
ties with the country‘s local pharmaceutical sector.  
Representatives from Brazil‘s private sector drug companies said that Chequer 
actively sought companies that could provide the key inputs to Brazil‘s public labs. 
During the negotiations, the Brazilian Fine Chemical Industry Association (Associação 
Brasileiro das Indústrias de Química Fina, Biotecnologia e suas Especialidades—
Abifina), the most vocal of the private sector lobbying groups representing domestic 
companies, did not make any declarations in favor or against the use of a CL for Kaletra, 




A number of organizations outside of government also began to carry out 
evaluations of Brazil‘s pharmaceutical capacities, including the Clinton Foundation 
(2006) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP 2006). Besides these 
important studies, Doctors Without Borders teamed up with ABIA (Fortunak and Otavio 
Antunes 2006) to finance a study of Brazil‘s local production capabilities. At this point, 
activist groups were becoming directly involved in industrial policies and establishing 
closer ties to the domestic pharmaceutical sector. The timing could not have been more 
                                                 
66 Alvares (2008) said that Cristalia could offer the API to Farmanguinhos at a price of R$ 0.47 per pill, 
about US$0.20.  Farmanguinhos, in turn, said they could have the final product available in two year‘s time 
as long as there were no problems at any stage of development. Here again, there remains the problem of 
the time-delay between having a readily available alternative in case a CL is issued and the time necessary 
to complete a drug‘s development and certification. 
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auspicious since the government of Lula began to implement industrial policies to 




The 2002 to 2005 period that overlaps Lula‘s first term in office marked the nadir 
of state autonomy in the country‘s AIDS program. As predicted by theories of 
globalization, the impact of patent power constrained the policy space available to 
politicians. Had Brazil not incorporated TRIPS into its legislation, dependency could 
have been averted. Market power from increasing Indian and Chinese competition would 
continue even without TRIPS, especially if the pharmaceutical sector did not receive 
government support in the form of industrial policies. External factors were not the sole 
reason for weakening domestic capabilities, for lack of government coordination and 
restrictive domestic regulation also played their part; weakened state capabilities stymied 
the AIDS coalition to take full advantage of Brazil‘s ―reputational dividends.‖ The 
episode, however, provided an opportunity for another key ally in Brazil‘s fight against 
AIDS—the domestic pharmochemical sector. 
In the next chapter, I explain the Brazilian government‘s dirigiste, or state-
directed, approach to developing domestic pharmaceutical capabilities through the 
implementation of a number of industrial policies for the sector. Most importantly, in 
2007, Brazil decided to issue a compulsory license for Merck‘s efavirenz. The action 
symbolized the institutionalization of the triple alliance between social movement 
insiders, human rights activists, and the private domestic drug industry. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – CONSOLIDATION OF THE DOMESTIC TRIPLE 
ALLIANCE (2006-2009) 
 
Here in Brazil it all ends up working out, but very slowly. It could be much better. 
—Lelio Maçiara, chemical engineer and drug maker 
 
This chapter will explain the development of industrial policies for Brazil‘s 
pharmaceutical sector. Essential drugs and medicines used in the country‘s public health 
system (Sistema Unica da Saúde—SUS) are increasingly defined as ―strategic‖ goods. 
The Brazilian state, led by its Ministry of Health, took an increasingly dirigiste role in 
directing the development of the health industrial complex. Through public labs such as 
Farmanguinhos, the Ministry established public-private partnerships with local 
pharmaceutical companies in order to nationalize the production of strategic medicines. 
These initiatives solidified the support of important sectors of the national bourgeoisie for 
the country‘s aggressive AIDS policies. At the same time, industrial policies increased 
the distance between the state and transnational drug companies.  
The institutionalization of this domestic triple alliance organized by civil servants 
in the Ministry of Health thus provided the social bases for government use of the 
flexibilities outlined in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS). This is evident in the cases of two important anti-retroviral medicines (ARVs), 
efavirenz and tenofovir. After several episodes of contentious price negotiations and 
threats over the use of compulsory licenses (CLs), Brazil finally issued a compulsory 
license in 2007 for Merck‘s efavirenz. By this time, members of the triple alliance 
assumed concrete roles to support the decision.  
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IMPLEMENTING INDUSTRIAL POLICIES  
 
Technological Transfer and Lead Up to Public-Private Partnerships 
 
Developing countries viewed technology transfer
67
 as part of the deal when they 
signed on to TRIPS. Attempts to create working groups and consultation systems at the 
intergovernmental level for resolving issues related to technological transfer have only 
revealed the discrepancies between developed and developing countries (South Centre 
2005). Brazil‘s experiences in requesting technology transfer of AIDS medicines from 
patent holders reveal the strategic nature of pharmaceutical technology and increasing 




During price talks with transnational drug companies, Brazilian negotiators 
always requested a voluntary license. On no occasion did these negotiations result in a 
patent holder agreeing to transfer technology to the Brazilian public or to private labs. 
Discussions advanced the furthest in the case of Merck‘s efavirenz, but Brazilian officials 
rejected company proposals. In the view of the Brazilian government, the transfer was 
only to be concluded two years before the patent‘s expiration on 2012 and with the 
condition that the active principal ingredient was provided by the company.  
In lieu of voluntary licenses, Brazilian policy makers have taken a dirigiste 
approach towards acquiring technology. The previous chapter showed that 
                                                 
67 Technology transfer is defined as ―transfer of systematic knowledge for manufacture of a product, for 
the application of a process or for the rendering of a service‖ (Chapter 1: 1-2 of the Draft International 
Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology). 
68 The Brazilian government and transnational drug companies have achieved a limited number of 
partnerships in developing health technologies, most notably in the area of vaccines. FioCruz has joint 
projects with GlaxoSmithKline, and the Butanta Institute, another government research institute, has 
partnerships with Sanofi Pasteur. 
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pharmochemical production remained the Achilles‘ heel of Brazilian local production. 
Not only have patent holders restricted access to APIs, but on several occasions the poor 
quality of imported raw material increased costs and delayed production, often times 
forcing the National AIDS Program to ration treatments. With the public labs 
monopolizing end production of ARVs and the Ministry of Health establishing state 
enterprises in other product lines,
69
 why did the Brazilian government not just establish 
its own pharmochemical company? 
Managers of public labs expressed the need for a stronger pharmochemical 
industry but also had mixed opinions concerning the best course of action. Eloan Pinheiro 
(2008) said she was against the idea of Farmanguinhos (FM) having its own API 
manufacturing plant due to public sector inefficiencies. Nubia Boechat, who succeeded 
Pinheiro at the federal lab, had a different view. In fact, during her administration 
Farmanguinhos (FM) purchased a production facility from GlaxoSmithKline for R$ 18 
million (about $9 million) to increase capacity to over 10 billion units. The purchase, 
however, did not include a pharmochemical division. Boechat (2008) still wanted to 
expand into upstream production: 
 
I wanted to purchase a pharmochemical factory to do FM‘s raw material. If I 
would have stayed in the administration, that is what I would have done. I wanted 
to get Microbiologica‘s old factory to produce on an industrial scale. I would have 
invested in this. We were pretty advanced in the negotiations. I come from the 
API sector and would have invested in this. I do not agree with the policies of 
[current FM‘s director] Eduardo Costa who believes that we should support 
national private API manufacturers. FM‘s market is completely different from the 
private market. But even if we had purchased the API manufacturing plant, I think 
                                                 
69 The Ministry of Health, seeing a gap in the local production of Factor 8 and 9 as well as 
immunoglobulin, decided in 2004 to invest US $60 million to create a company called Hemobrás and 
purchased the requisite technology from the French state-owned company Laboratoire français du 
fractionnement et des biotechnologies (LFB). 
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we would have done the same modality of out-sourcing the API in the case of 
efavirenz to national producers or Indian companies. I don‘t think it would have 
been much different. But with the Indians under TRIPs, it will become 
increasingly difficult. 
 
The purchase of the API plant never came to fruition. Had the state invested in an 
upstream factory, it is unlikely that it would have had an impact on producing efavirenz 
before the compulsory license for the drug. Instead, policy makers have embarked on 
various public-private partnerships to develop APIs and medicines.
70
 With India adhering 
to TRIPS in 2005, the need for developing local API capabilities became increasingly 
more important. Patent barriers could restrict the future sourcing of both medicines and 
active principals from Asian countries. 
 
Need for Industrial Policies to support the Pharmaceutical Sector 
 
Brazil‘s 2005 price dispute with Abbott revealed the need for a strong 
pharmaceutical base to support its AIDS program, and local industry was keen on 
obtaining a cut of the government‘s R$ 1 billion in annual ARV purchases. Industrial 
policies were needed to support the beleaguered sector. By the turn of the century, 
neoliberal ideology amongst policy makers began to give way towards more of an 
interventionist attitude. Although economic policy making remained in the hands of 
orthodox economists like Pedro Malan, Health Minister Jose Serra favored state 
promotion of national development goals. He was instrumental in passing the Law of 
Generics in 1999, which stimulated the development of a national generic drug industry, 
                                                 
70 One exception to the state not entering the API business is a pharmochemical hub being established in 
Pernambuco. Hemobrás will also include a space for Lafepe‘s upstream activities (Rolim 2008). 
 152 
but the bill benefitted more end product producers than the pharmochemical sector 
responsible for the production of active principals (Brasil 2008b). Nonetheless, towards 
the end of Cardoso‘s presidency, nonetheless, new sector funds were set up to stimulate 
technology in local industry, including the Health Sector Fund (CT-Saúde). This program 
was established to encourage private investment in research and development for 
products destined for the public health sector. 
The National AIDS Program was also pushing the government to support the 
pharmaceutical sector to ensure the long-term sustainability of its treatment program and 
to improve its bargaining leverage in ARV price negotiations. By the time Alexander 
Grangeiro left the program in 2003, the link between compulsory licenses and industrial 
policies had become more obvious, but one had to come before the other. Grangeiro 
(2008) explains: 
 
[the] compulsory license is not a solution for the pharmochemical sector. The 
whole compulsory license process is so exhausting; to base development policy 
on a compulsory license is not reasonable. Better to strengthen the technical 
capacity of the industry which gives you a lot more power to regulate prices. 
Having the technical capacity and having the medicines on the shelves already 
facilitates price regulation. The other initiative is to provide investment so 
industry could work on small innovations and improvements of the medicines. 
We discussed with [national development bank] BNDES the possibility of 
providing incentives to this area and to ARVs… 
 
Compulsory licenses, given their political and bureaucratic complexity, should not be 
seen as a form of industrial policy.
71
 With the arrival of Luiz Inacio ‗Lula‘ da Silva to 
                                                 
71 This counters claims by US-based groups that Brazil was trying to become an export platform in 
medicines made with US knowhow.   
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power in 2003, Grangeiro and others found a more receptive government in relation to 
industrial policies. 
The Workers‘ Party headed by Lula had been currying favor with Brazilian 
industrialists during its presidential bid. The new administration now had a chance to 
deliver.
72
 Guidelines for Industrial, Technological, and Trade Policies (Brazil 2003) 
outlines the vision of the new government to provide support for domestic industry. Its 
conclusions were drawn from increasing debate and policy recommendations concerning 
the fragilities of Brazil‘s pharmaceutical sector that had increased since the turn of the 
century (Marília Bernandes Marques 2002; Palmeira and Pan 2003; Palmeiro Filho and 
L. X. Capanema 2004; Ministry of Health 2003). Given the sector‘s high levels of R&D, 
looming trade deficits, and the tie-in to public health objectives, drugs and medicines 
were considered a strategic sector for government support, alongside semiconductors, 
software, and capital goods. 
Industrial policies for the pharmaceutical sector got off to a slow start during 
Lula‘s first term in office. The one exception is the Profarma program administered by 
Brazil‘s National Development Bank for Economic and Social Development (Banco 
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social—BNDES). The program‘s objective 
was to strengthen local industry by upgrading facilities to stricter quality and regulatory 
standards (such as the Good Manufacturing Standards), expanding their production 
portfolios, and even encouraging domestic mergers and acquisitions. BNDES program 
managers Palmeiro and Capanema (2005) responsible for Profarma explained the 
increasing strategic nature of medicines: 
 
                                                 
72 He also wanted to use state power to support the growth of Brazilian multinational corporations (see 
Flynn 2007).  
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Medicine is not the same as any other product. It is strategic. You can‘t remain 
exclusively in the hands of commercial relations. If there were a war for example 
between India and China, you must have capacity to produce locally…another 
possibility is if the US were to take action against India or China at the WTO for a 
certain product… 
 
BNDES officers underscore the increasing importance Brazil‘s top policy makers give to 
addressing the country‘s growing dependency on pharmaceutical imports. 
During Lula‘s second mandate (2007-2010), policies for supporting the 
pharmaceutical sector became increasingly concentrated in the Ministry of Health instead 
of in the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign Trade. Jose Temporão, who 
assumed command of the Ministry of Health in March 2007, centralized health-related 
industrial policies in the Secretariat of Science, Technology, and Strategic Inputs under 
the rubric of the Health Industrial Complex.
73
 The Secretariat coordinated with other 
government agencies and programs to encourage import substitution and new innovations 
to feed the needs of the public health system (SUS).  
The Health Industrial Complex specifically mentions the ―structuring of public 
production and transfer of technology of strategic pharmochemicals to the country, 
including the nationalization of anti-retrovirals‖ (Ministry of Health 2008b: 47). For state 
officials interested in stimulating the pharmochemical industry, this means conducting as 
many stages of synthesis locally, especially the last steps of synthesizing the API.
74
 To 
                                                 
73 ―It all crystallized in the second half of Lula‘s mandate…Temporão does not present a political party but 
that of a physician, sanitarista, with a national program in line with all the ideas that ABIFINA has been 
defending,‖  explained Brasil (2008). 
74 ―Verticalizing all the production of APIs here is nearly impossible today, but the more stages of 
synthesis done here, the better. What is most desirable is that the last steps of the API are done here. The 
problem with the entire route of synthesis is that the Chinese dominate the intermediate market. Setting up 
the entire intermediate industry here would be very expensive and involve lots of pollution,‖ said Andre 
Porto (2008). 
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this end, the Health Ministry has drawn up a list of ―strategic medicines‖ that includes, 
among others, all the ARVs used in the national treatment program. 
Brazil‘s industrial policies for the pharmaceutical sector represent a coup for the 
Brazilian Fine Chemicals Producers Association (Associação Brasileira das Indústrias de 
Química Fina—ABIFINA). During the Lula government, the industry association has 
achieved an important space in the policymaking process due to shared interest with state 
elites in developing local capabilities to supply the growing demands of SUS. The 
director of Farmanguinhos even gained a seat on the association‘s board. 
The distance between the Brazilian government and transnational drug 
companies, meanwhile, has grown during Lula‘s second term in office. For Jorge 
Raimundo (2008), president of the consultative committee of INTERFARMA, the close 
working relationship with Fernando Furlan at the Ministry of Development, Industry, and 
Trade came undone in Lula‘s second term. 
 
With Furlan, we were able to advance in the areas intellectual property, 
investments, support for foreign companies to invest in Brazil and to have 
financing from the BNDES, improving ANVISA‘s flexibility, and recognizing 
and incorporating new technology, access to medicines, reducing the arm of the 
state in the production of drugs, use the state‘s money to equip hospitals instead 
of constructing factories. Now all has changed and we have the health industrial 
complex, factory investments...It is the same government that lets the hospitals 
deteriorate, and they want an industrial complex. 
 
For Raimundo and other representatives of foreign industry (Singer 2007), the 
government should restrict its role to issues of access through targeted social policies and 
private insurance coverage for drugs whereas producing medicines should be left to the 
private sector. 
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Representatives from local divisions of foreign drug companies have expressed 
their attraction to aspects of the industrial policies—but with reservations. João Sanches 
(2008) who was in charge of government affairs at the Brazilian division of Merck, 
explained: 
 
In the program, there is what they call the pharmaceutical or health care value-
added chain, which includes the pharmaceutical sector. These include strategic 
products for [the public health system]. What strategic means is different for 
different people. But what they say that is strategic is that Brazil can‘t be 
dependent on international sources of supply. Sometimes we see this as 
nationalistic... 
 
The Lula administration represents an important shift in ideology compared to the 
previous Cardoso administration. While the Workers‘ Party has not rescinded past 
neoliberal policies, it has charted a new direction towards developing local industrial 
capacity in a globalizing world. 
The actors involved in devising the industrial policies reveal the state‘s increasing 
embeddedness with national industrialists. Andre Porto (2008), a project coordinator 
from the Ministry of Health, who participated in reforming government policies and 
defining the strategic objectives, explained: 
 
INTERFARMA did not participate in the development of the new industrial 
policies. It was more ABIFINA and ABIQUIF that contributed. NGOs did not. 
One TNC informally said that they could do technology transfer and even said 
they could do all the strategic medicines. But that is not our intention to foment 
the development of local industry and then just kill it, which would be the case. 
The TNC wanted to have a market guarantee by the government…AIDS of course 
has been an important motivation for the new industrial policies. 
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Neither civil society groups nor INTERFARMA, which represented transnational drug 
companies, played important roles in contributing to the new policies. Instead, industry 
associations representing the national bourgeoisie have taken the lead. 
While civil society groups did not participate in discussions about industrial 
policies for the health sector, they continued to defend initiatives focusing on local 
production. Veriano Terto (2005) explains the position of AIDS activist group ABIA: 
 
For ABIA, it is a concern that being merely a country that consumes ARVs and 
not produces them could threaten Brazil's program since more and more resources 
will be needed. Thus, ABIA defends industrial policies in relation to medicines to 
ensure the country's autonomy. One of the principles of TRIPS is to transfer 
technology, but this is not the case. Big Pharma argues that it can‘t share its 
industrial secrets and that it is more important to keep people alive by using its 
products. 
 
Civil society groups have taken a growing interest in the challenges and obstacles 
faced by local industry to provide strategic medicines. The connection between industry 
and civil society, however, remains the weakest link in Brazil‘s triple alliance against 
corporate globalization. AIDS activists are distrustful of profiteering by private industry. 
Nonetheless, AIDS activists have grown more aware of the difficulties related to local 
production. Mario Scheffer (2008) from Grupo Pella Vida explained: ―We never had 
direct dialogue with industry. Now we are coming to understand the position of private 
industry here. For example: their reluctance to invest in producing ARVs if preference is 
given to buying from public labs. This is the reality.‖  
The most important change affecting the construction of Brazil‘s triple alliance 
was the decision to establish partnerships between public labs and private API 
manufacturers for the production of active principals used in AIDS medicines. When 
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Eduardo Costa assumed command of the Health Ministry‘s public lab Farmanguinhos 
(FM) in February 2006 from Nubia Boechat, he introduced a new mode for acquiring 
APIs. Instead of carrying out auctions that award contracts to the lowest bidder, the lab 
sub-contracted out API production to pre-qualified domestic producers.  
Importers took FM to court for allegedly contravening the country‘s rigid Law on 
Public Tenders (Lei de Licitação 8.666 de 1993), but FM‘s lawyers made a convincing 
argument that the new modality for acquiring the API actually economizes resources, 
since its technicians could monitor the production process and guarantee quality and 
technical specifications.
75
 ARVs were the first product line to use the new modality 
(Costa 2009). 
Industrial polices during the Lula administration enshrined the support of local 
industrialists and boosted state autonomy. Headed by sanitaristas with a nationalist bias, 
the Ministry of Health has been at the center of constructing the triple alliance with 
advocacy groups on the one hand and local bourgeoisie on the other. Now the 
government was in a stronger position to confront foreign drug companies. 
 
COMPULSORY LICENSE AND DOMESTIC COALITIONS 
 
The Decision to Issue a Compulsory License for Merck‟s Efavirenz 
 
                                                 
75 Sub-contracting production services of APIs also overcame another contradiction in Brazil‘s complex 
regulatory framework governing pharmaceuticals. The Law of Generics stipulates that drug makers must 
retain three API producers in order to obtain generic certification of their product. Since public labs had to 
award contracts to the lowest priced seller, typically on a yearly basis, they often had only one supplier of 
raw material, which could change from year to year. Consequently, their products retained the 
denomination of similar as opposed to generic. While a similar and generic may have the same API, 
quality assurance is greater for generics since they pass through bioequivalence and bioavailability tests. 
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In May 2007, Jose Temporão, Brazil‘s Minister of Health (2007-present) finally 
made good on Brazil‘s threats to ‗break the patents‘ of drugs used in its AIDS program. 
The minister said that Brazil issued the compulsory license (CL) for efevirenz because 
US-based MerckSharpeDohme (Merck) did not reduce the drug‘s price low enough to fit 
within the Ministry‘s budget parameters. Brazil requested Merck reduce unit prices from 
$1.65 to the price of $0.65 enjoyed by Thailand. Since Brazil purchases larger quantities 
of the AIDS‘ medicine, Brazilian negotiators argued, they should receive at least a 
comparable price. 
Merck‘s formula for pricing AIDS medicines, however, is based on a country‘s 
level of development and HIV prevalence rates, of which Thailand‘s is three times 
greater than Brazil. Merck initially provided a discount of 5%, which increased to 30% in 
its last proposal, thus effectively reducing the unit price to $1.10. The company also 
offered to transfer technology to produce efavirenz, but for Brazilian officials the price 
discount was not steep enough and offers of technology transfer not in line with the 
country‘s strategic objectives (see above).  
After nine rounds of negotiations and stocks of the medicine decreasing, Brazil‘s 
government declared efavirenz in the public interest, and on May 5, 2007, President Luiz 
Inacio ‗Lula‘ da Silva announced the compulsory license. It appears ironic that Brazil‘s 
president transformed the occasion into a media event that Minister Temporão could have 
conducted behind closed doors. Would US‘ President George W. Bush have done the 
same if the US issued a compulsory license for ciproflaxin in the wake of the anthrax 
attacks of 2001? It is unlikely. For Brazil, the ―reputational dividends‖ of its AIDS 
program reach up to the highest office. 
As a result of the CL for efavirenz, Brazil expects to save US$30 million in 2007 
and a total of $236.8 million by the time the patent expires in 2012 (Ministry of Health 
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2007). Some 75,000 of the 180,000 patients in Brazil‘s treatment program were using the 
ARV in 2007. The CL had important knock-off effects in other negotiations, too. Brazil 
obtained price discounts it sought in subsequent negotiations with Abbott for Kaletra 
(lopinavir/ritonavir) and Gilead Sciences for tenofovir.  
A number of factors had changed leading up to the CL compared to previous 
threats. First, the availability of WHO pre-qualified generic versions of the medicine was 
pivotal in providing an alternative supply of the strategic medicines in a short time 
horizon. In fact, initial purchases of the medicine came from three Indian companies pre-
qualified by the World Health Organization (WHO) for $0.45/unit until public labs 
scaled-up production. 
 In the past, local producers, both government labs and private national 
companies, had provided input on costs. Knowing that Farmanguinhos provided support 
during the negotiations may have led patent holders to concede to government demands 
for a price discount in the past. On the one hand, the inability of Brazil‘s public labs to 
take advantage of the Bolar Exception (i.e. develop a drug and obtain regulatory approval 
for marketing before its patent expires) as noted in the previous chapter improved 
Merck‘s bargaining position. But on the other, the availability of generic alternatives 
certified by inter-governmental organizations weakened the firm‘s negotiating strategy 
and provided Brazilian health officials ammunition against criticism related to the quality 
of generic medicines.  
A second important difference between previous threats and the CL for efavirenz 
is that other sectors of the government backed the Ministry of Health. During the 2005 
negotiations with Abbott, ministries related to trade and finance voiced concerns about 
the possible ramifications of trade sanctions were Brazil to issue a CL for Kaletra. Two 
 161 
years later the situation had changed—all the other ministries supported health officials‘ 
tough stance against Merck (Passarelli 2007).  
One factor is the recent changes in ministers. João Sanches (2008), Merck‘s 
communication‘s director, explained: ―The problem was we had a new cabinet, a new 
Minister of Health and a new Minister of Commerce. And we, Merck, did not even have 
time to talk with these ministers because they had changed so quickly.‖ Merck officials 
did not have time to curry favor with strategically placed officials in the Lula government 
and entice them with prospective investment plans. Another related factor is derived from 
the concept of ―cognitive liberation‖ from social movement literature (cf. McAdam 
1982). Policy makers had finally overcome the fear of retaliation and the belief that the 
CL was like an ―atomic bomb‖ to be used in the last instance. 
Part of overcoming the fear of political backlash and obtaining increased 
ministerial coherence stems from a third factor—less direct US pressure during 
negotiations. During previous threats of a CL, there had been parallel pressures of a trade 
panel at the World Trade Organization and overt threats of restricting US science and 
technological partnerships. In a review of US government documents related to the CL 
(obtained under the Freedom of Information Act), US diplomats repeated the common 
theme of the importance of patents for generating new innovations. US officials did not 
express any outright threats or present challenges at international bodies during the 
efavirenz negotiations. If Brazil was going to break Merck‘s patent, the US ambassador 
only warned the Health Minister that there would be a ―political storm‖ (Mazurkevich 
2007).  
Brazilians involved in the negotiations and interviewed for this research also did 
not mention any US pressures. In fact, the US Trade Representative (USTR 2007) had 
removed Brazil from its Priority Watch list due to the country‘s efforts to protect 
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intellectual property, although it continued to highlight concern over the use of CLs. The 
US also did not apply any trade sanctions nor initiate any out-of-cycle reviews of Brazil‘s 
intellectual property protection, despite pressures from the Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA).
76
  
Industry and their supporters continue to stress the importance of strong patent 
laws. Certain groups such as USA for Innovation (2007) called on the US Congress to 
fight Brazil and Thailand‘s ―theft‖. But this language is not employed by the rest of 
industry. The mainstream view from industry alleges that it is not against CLs per se. 
Instead of invoking terms such as ―theft‖ and ―piracy‖, industry representatives argue that 
Brazil‘s effective treatment program would not be possible without innovations carried 
out in the private sector that result from strong IP protection.  
A PhRMA representative said that the Brazilian government acted within the 
TRIPS agreement but ―against the spirit of the law‖ when issuing the CL (Singer 2007). 
Representatives of the Brazil‘s pharmaceutical industry dispute the ―public use‖ 
justification. Ciro Mortella (2008), executive director of the Brazilian Pharmaceutical 
Industrial Federation (Federação Brasileira da Indústria Farmacêutica—Febrafarma), an 
umbrella organization that includes both foreign and domestic companies, explained: 
 
The compulsory license is proscribed in the law, but it is not proscribed in the law 
that its use is justified to achieve economic savings. What justifies a compulsory 
license is public utility…Economic savings and public administration was not 
considered in the spirit of the law in intellectual property. When you talk of public 
                                                 
76 US actions in the Brazil case suggest that direct US support to industry in cases of compulsory license 
has decreased since Thailand issued compulsory licenses for medicines in late 2006 and early 2007. Several 
international civil society organizations criticized the US for pressuring Thailand after the Asian country 
issued several compulsory licenses. After this episode, the US has not made taken any explicit actions 
against countries that opted for CLs. Instead of applying pressure in specific cases, US efforts in stronger IP 
protection focus on trade talks and international treaties. 
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interest in the law, you are talking about an exceptional situation, a situation 




Industry representatives thus have a definite normative view considering the use of CLs 
apart from strict legal definitions. However, this view carries few allies within the 
Brazilian state health complex given their emphasis on ―strategic medicines,‖ nor with 
the access to medicines movement.
77
 
Merck‘s discourse has also adjusted to the changing counters of Brazilian politics 
and use of CLs. While the company viewed itself as the ―victim‖ when efavirenz‘s 
market exclusivity was revoked, the company‘s discourse also invoked ideas of 
partnership in the country‘s economic development. Sanches (2008) from Merck 
explains: 
 
Let me make this clear. Merck is not against the use of CL. This is in every 
country‘s regulations and laws. We argue against the government‘s reasons. 
Public interest is not just budget concerns. What about other public‘s interest in 
exports, R&D, jobs, and bringing innovation to Brazil? 
 
The director informed that, besides offers to transfer production and technology related to 
efavirenz, its CEO, Richard Clark had discussed with Brazil‘s President Lula the firm‘s 
investment plans for establishing an innovation hub in the biotech and life sciences in 
Brazil. But after the CL, Tadeu Alves, the president of Merck‘s Latin American division, 
said that ―the perception of Brazil will not be the same‖ and that the company is 
reviewing its investment plans in the country (Borsato 2007). 
                                                 
77 One notable and vocal exception is the Brazilian-American Chamber of Commerce. The biggest 
opposition from industry comes from those sectors with commercial relations with the United States, 
including Brazil‘s powerful export agricultural sector. 
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Merck‘s investment offers came too late and won too few supporters. Even 
Miguel Jorge, the new Minister of Development, Industry, and Trade, acknowledged that 
Brazil was only saving a minor amount by relying on the CL compared to the possible 
impact on future investment. Nonetheless, he said that Merck ―precipitated this situation‖ 
and other ministries supported the policy (US Embassy Brasilia 2007).  
For Brazilian health authorities, Merck‘s actions, far from transferring technology 
to develop Brazil, have kept the country from developing an important technology. 
Eduardo Costa (2009), the director of Farmanguinhos at the time of negotiations, insisted 
that one of the factors that contributed to the government‘s decision to issue a CL was the 
company‘s court injunctions limiting access to the active principal ingredient of 
efavirenz. 
The testimonial from Agenor Alvares (2008), the adjunct Minister of Health at the 
time, is the most illuminating in this regard. Since he was involved in two important 
negotiations—the Abbott confrontation in 2005 resulting in a negotiated settlement and 
the Merck talks leading up to the CL—his perspective is insightful of the companieis‘ 
two different approaches and respective outcomes: 
 
The first accord that Merck presented was completely unfeasible for the Brazilian 
government. They presented a timeframe for completing the transfer of 
technology when the patent had expired. So we told them that this was not 
interesting and that we would like a different price from 2006 onward. They 
returned in 2006, and we initiated a discussion that was the most difficult because 
Merck basically sat at the table to play poker. They basically thought that the 
Brazilian government was bluffing in terms of using a compulsory license. They 
thought that our poker hand was weak, but we did not have a weak hand. We had 
the support of the presidency and all the bodies of government. All the price 
offers that they made throughout the year of 2006 and up to the beginning of 2007 
were unacceptable…So we began to organize ourselves internally and seek 
support from other branches of government.  
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Alvares and other government officials can relate the reasons and events leading up to the 
CL, but fundamental in supporting the government‘s move has been the 
institutionalization of alliances made between civil servants at the Ministry of Health, 
civil society activists, and private domestic drug makers.  
 
The Consolidation of the Domestic Triple Alliance 
 
Each time the government considered issuing a compulsory license and took the 
first step towards that end by declaring a specific medicine in the ‗public interest‘ a 
political opportunity was created that resulted in increased societal mobilization. The two 
pillars of support for government initiatives for using TRIPS-related flexibilities are civil 
society organizations and the domestic pharmaceutical industry. The positive outcome of 
each failed attempt of using a CL has been the establishment of stronger relationships 
between the Ministry of Health and these two groups. The increasing politicization over 
the issue of patents has concatenated into a formidable triple alliance.  
In the original formulation of this concept developed by Evans (1979), the triple 
alliance was a key component in explaining dependent development. It was comprised of 
state bureaucrats, transnational capital, and the domestic bourgeoisie. The unforeseen 
consequence of globalization thirty years later is the severance of TNCs and 
incorporation of civil society groups tied into transnational networks of activists. My 
argument is that activist bureaucrats, acting as social movement insiders, in the Ministry 
of Health have been at the center of constructing this triple alliance.
78
 Evans (1996: 1119) 
                                                 
78 The argument that Brazil‘s social movement built around AIDS has been the catalyst of change and thus 
explains the development outcomes is limited by the case of Kaletra described in Chapter Four. Another 
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has employed the term synergy, to describe the ―mutually reinforcing relations between 
government and groups of engaged citizens.‖ However, the evidence provided so far 
suggests that the construction of synergistic relations has been highly political, as 
suggested by Hickey and Mohan (2005). 
By the time Brazil finally issued a CL in 2007, the triple alliance was 
consolidated and concrete roles played by domestic private industry and advocacy groups 
established. In fact, several observers were surprised by the decree. Maçiara (2007) from 
the pharmochemical industry explained that previous health ministers when confronting 
TNCs had always consulted with the makers of active principal ingredients, but Minister 
Temporão did not.
79
 Members of Brazil‘s domestic API industry tend not to lobby the 
government to use CLs, but remain important defenders of Brazilian policies in this 
regard. Nelson Brasil (2008b), Vice President of Brazilian Fine Chemicals Industry 
Association (ABIFINA) explained: 
 
The compulsory license will not affect the growth of the API manufacturing 
industry. The compulsory license for efavirenz was absolutely legal and 
legitimate. The use of the compulsory license is not unrestricted and should not 
be…The US on a daily basis even kidnaps intellectual property, not in the name 
of health, but more so in the name of defense or economic abuse by removing 
concessions in cases of anti-trust law. In Brazil, the use of compulsory license is 
for anti-trust purposes or for ‗public interest,‘ and it has to be used. It should be 
used soberly.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
argument, and an detailed in Chapter Two, is that government and social movements fused during the 
1980s and 1990s when developing Brazil‘s National AIDS program.  
79 ―Temporão never consulted us much and just decided to break the patent. The other times they consulted 
us a lot. It was a surprise. He could have done it in a different fashion. We could have prepared ourselves a 
little more,‖ said Maçiara (2007), referring the import of the drug in lieu of the domestic industry not 
having the drug readily available.  
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The discourses of Brasil and Maçiara represent the nationalist viewpoint of domestic 
industry. Had the country‘s pharmaceutical sector been more fully integrated into global 
circuits of capital through trade relations or mergers and acquisitions with larger TNCs, 
they would likely take a different position.  
When comparing the evolution of IP legislation between Mexico and Brazil, 
Shadlen (2009) correctly argues that Mexico incorporated fewer TRIPS flexibilities since 
Mexico‘s generic pharmaceutical industry is more closely tied to the US market and 
enjoys higher levels of foreign ownership. Despite the early passage of TRIPS, Brazil 
incorporated more TRIPS flexibilities at a later date because of the interests of a 
nationally owned pharmaceutical base. Shadlen (2009) highlights the role of industry 
association ABIFINA in promoting more flexible intellectual property legislation. What 
is missing in his analysis of the Brazil case is the strategic role played by pro-active 
public health officials to promote changes in intellectual property laws and industrial 
policies. 
In Brazil, the Ministry of Health through its many affiliated organizations has 
played a leading role in pushing for industrial policies to develop the country‘s 
pharmaceutical industry. The most important policy for obtaining the support of national 
capital was FM‘s decision to sub-contract API production to domestic producers instead 
of holding tenders. The new public-private partnership, along with several industrial 
policies, solidified the support of the domestic pharmaceutical industry, especially the 
weakest link in the production chain—the pharmochemical producers. 
The relationships between the Ministry of Health and civil society organizations 
developed along a different trajectory. The key intersection between the ministry and 
social movements has been the National AIDS Program (NAP). Nunn (2007) recounts 
how the body responsible for developing and implementing policies to deal with the 
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epidemic recruited heavily from activist NGOs. This mobilizing structure continued in 
relation to the issue of intellectual property and access to medicines.  
During the 1990s, public health reformers failed to stop the passage of intellectual 
property legislation that would affect access to medicines, due in part to their weak links 
to strategic allies in other civil society. At the time, the pharmaceutical sector, especially 
pharmochemical makers, were grappling with neoliberal reforms that removed 
protectionist barriers and eliminated industrial policies. AIDS activists were not 
cognizant of the impact patent laws would have on drug prices until the use of patented 
ARVs became more widespread and Minister Serra began to confront the US over 
TRIPS. One AIDS activist
80
 explained in a personal interview: 
 
We were somewhat aware of patent laws when they were passed in 1996. But we 
really began to see the impact when the US set up the panel at the WTO. We 
demonstrated in front of the US consulate and in Recife during an AIDS 
conference. We had more of the initiative and took the problem to government 
officials. 
 
In the view of the activist, social movements made government officials aware of the 
situation. But it was the WTO dispute of 2000-2001 that galvanized activists to mobilize 
on issues of intellectual property. 
While AIDS activists have been pivotal since the 1990s in pressuring government 
officials to confront TNCs and ―break patents‖, more interesting from a resource 
mobilization perspective was the need for increasing technical competence in the area of 
pharmaceuticals and IP law. São Paulo-based activist Mario Scheffer (2008) explained: 
 
                                                 
80 The interviewee preferred to remain anonymous. 
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We have accumulated a lot of experience. Negotiations and treatments have 
always been a very complex topic. Within the priorities of the movement it was 
not preferred due to the technical level required and also due to interest.  
 
Many workers and volunteers at activist NGOs prefer to work on concrete issues and 
face-to-face care provision instead of sorting out the technical details related to patents 
and pharmaceuticals.   
The professionalism within and coordination between NGOs evolved over time to 
act as interlocutors with the government and explain the issues to a wider audience. The 
new organization created to lobby the government on patents and access to medicines is 
the Working Group on Intellectual Property from the Brazilian Network of Peoples 
Integration (Grupo de Trabalho em Propriedade Intelectual da Rede Brasileira pela 
Integração dos Povos—GTPI /Rebrip). The working group
81
, created in 2001 as a result 
of the WTO dispute between Brazil and the United States, now includes patent lawyers 
and trained pharmacists. The GTPI does not play a direct role in negotiations between the 
government and industry, but maintains pressure through formal organizations like the 
National Health Council and through informal channels of communication, mainly 
through the National AIDS Program. For example, Carlos Passerelli who had worked at 
Brazilian Interdisciplinary AIDS Association (Associação Brasileira Interdisciplinar de 
AIDS—ABIA) and headed the GTPI, now works as the international coordinator at the 
National AIDS Program. 
The weakest link in the triple alliance is the relationship between AIDS NGOs 
and the domestic pharmaceutical industry. There have never been formal channels of 
communication and mutual support between the two groups. Activists do not want to be 
                                                 
81 GTPI is comprised of the following local NGO groups ABIA, CONECTAS, GAPA – SP, GAPA – RS, 
Gestos, GIV – Grupo de Incentivo a Vida, INESC, INTERVOZES, and Pela Vida, as well as international 
groups MSF and OXFAM.  
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viewed as pawns of private sector interests.
82
 Industry typically does not view activists as 
necessary allies to press for government policies. Nonetheless, during the 2005 Kaletra 
negotiations, NGOs sponsored studies detailing the capacities of Brazilian industry, and 
representatives of the pharmochemical sector gave presentations to local activists 
concerning local industry‘s capacity to produce patented ARVs. Several interviewees 
from industry specifically mentioned the actions of Pedro Chequer, NAP‘s director 
during the Kaletra negotiations, in reaching out to the country‘s pharmochemical sector. 
 
The Triple Alliance in Action: Efavirenz and Tenofovir 
 
Each confrontation between Brazil‘s government and transnational 
pharmaceutical companies has strengthened the triple alliance between activist 
bureaucrats, civil society, and local industry. During the first threats of a compulsory 
license and the WTO dispute in 2000-2001, Paulo Teixeira, Brazil‘s AIDS director at the 
time, recalled how the National AIDS Program reached out to NGOs for support. Missing 
from this alliance, however, was the participation of domestic private-sector drug 
companies. This latter group became incorporated during the first term of Lula‘s 
government starting in 2003 with the announcement of industrial policies. State support 
for the pharmaceutical sector gained salience with the new administration, especially 
during the 2005 negotiations for Abbott‘s Kaletra. From 2006 onward, the roles of the 
triple alliance have become more defined. The cases the ARVs efavirenz and tenofovir 
illustrate this point. 
                                                 
82 In fact, many interviewees related cases in which a drug company sponsors a patient group to sue the 
government so that the state would purchase their medicines. 
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Brazilian health officials began to mobilize for a compulsory for efavirenz in 
January of 2007 after it appeared that Merck would not budge in its negotiating position. 
Between the start of the year and May 2007 when efavirenz was declared in the public 
interest, the National AIDS Program began to articulate with its NGO base. Passerelli 
(2007) explains the interlocution: 
 
In the case of efavirenz in my area, we made consultations with certain 
organizations to see if we would have the support of civil society in the case of a 
compulsory. We knew we could count on their support, but other sectors of the 
government didn‘t know what type of political support could be obtained. So we 
did these meetings and concluded that Brazilian civil society supports the 
measure. We started with ABIA as the representative of REBRIP. We also talked 
with MSF. 
 
But NGO groups remained cautious in their support. Protests, mobilizations, and 
even lawsuits failed to force the government to issue a CL for Kaletra in 2005. Gabriela 
Chaves (2008), a pharmacist who works at ABIA and the GTPI explains the situation and 
the role carried out by her organization: 
 
Within the movement there was discussion on how to support it. We had to 
support the measure but not completely. We were already disappointed in the case 
of Kaletra. But we were there when Lula signed it, and it was extremely 
emotional, and then the pressure from the media and industry began. Industry 
ended up attacking the measure with all sorts of arguments. ABIA mapped out 
and responded to all the arguments that industry did in the media against the 
CL…We said this is an important step for the country. In that way, we supported 
the government‘s measure and did them a favor. We did that pamphlet in two 
weeks. We tried to get a space in the public opinion and we achieved it… 
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NGOs thus played an important role not only lobbying for the use of TRIPS flexibilities 
and voicing their political support, but also, and perhaps more importantly, explaining the 
implications of the measure to patients. In the face of allegations concerning the quality 
of generic drugs, legal issues related to employing the use of CLs, and threats to 
continued supplies and future innovation, the assurances by activists helped to allay 
public doubt and concern. 
The role of local industry was to assist in the local production of the drug. During 
the negotiations, Health Minister Alvares (2008) said that he received verbal 
confirmation from Eduardo Costa, FarManginhos‘ (FM) director, and from Costa‘s boss, 
Paulo Buss, the director of the FioCruz Foundation, that the Health Ministry‘s lab could 
have efavirenz ready in one year. (They ended up erring in their timeframe.) An 
agreement between the Ministry of Health and the federal lab was only signed after the 
CL was decreed. Pernambuco‘s public lab Lafepe was also selected to develop efavirenz 
since it had already developed a 200mg formulation of the drug, and its experience could 
be leveraged in developing the 600mg dose currently in use. FM, under the new modality 
of sub-contracting out production of the API, selected three Brazilian pharmochemical 
companies to produce the raw material—Cristalia, Nortec, and Globe.  
Scaling up production of efavirenz for 80,000 AIDS patients using the medicine 
remains a challenge for local labs and has tested their relationships with AIDS activists. 
The first batch of production was only delivered on February 2009—21 months after the 
CL! FM had even established a consultative council in January 2008 to incorporate the 
voices of civil society representatives. Activists, however, publicly decried the lab‘s lack 
of transparency and delays in launching new ARVs. Eduardo Costa (2008) responded by 
saying that FM had attempted two years ago to import the API prior to the CL, but faced 
legal injunctions by the patent owner. ―If we consider that pilot batches only could be 
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carried out after the production of the API, we can see that the task was almost 
impossible,‖ he defended.  
Production of efavirenz also encountered technical problems when FMs‘ 
formulation failed bioavailability tests in May 2008. Costa admitted the public lab‘s error 
by not demanding Merck to provide all the technical details of its reference drug—as 
determined by the compulsory license decree—so that the generic copy would be 
identical (Cimieri 2008). 
The struggles over tenofovir, a nucleotide analogue reverse transcriptase inhibitor 
marketed by US-based Gilead Sciences, also highlight the actions of the triple alliance. 
By 2007, there were close to 31,000 patients using the ARV. Per capita annual cost in 
that year stood at R$ 3,121, equal to R$ 89.8 million in expenditures. Brazil‘s negotiators 
were able to obtain a deep discount for 2007 purchases after the CL with Merck, but costs 
for the patented medicine remained high.  
Local NGO analysts, working with public labs and international partners, noticed 
that the ARV was protected by a weak patent. In 2005, Wanise Barreto, a patent lawyer 
at Farmanguinhos, filed a pre-grant opposition to the patent of tenofovir with Brazil‘s 
national patent office (Instituto Nacional da Propriedade Intellectual—INPI). She argued 
that the drug company‘s request lacked novelty and inventive activity. GTPI obtained 
Barreto‘s pre-grant opposition and, combining its information with reviews by Indian 
partners, undertook a supplementary review of Gilead‘s patent request for the drug. It 
sent its review to the National AIDS Program and to the INPI. The patent office 
continued to delay a ruling on the Gilead‘s patent application, although it had been 
deposited in 1998. Chaves (2008) explained the next step: 
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So the solution that we told the AIDS Program is to declare tenofovir in the 
‗public interest‘ for patent analysis so that we could accelerate the process to 
either produce it or purchase it internationally. We do not know what they are 
going to do. But we have done our part in providing them with information of 
what needs to be done… I am not always accompanying the negotiations, but am 
saying that it is expensive and that there is no reason why we should be 
purchasing it from Gilead. This is the worst case, knowing that you have 
alternative suppliers in China. There is no reason for it…  
 
Brazil‘s Minister of Health ended up declaring tenofovir in the public interest; not as the 
first step in breaking the drug‘s patent, but to force the INPI to rule on the drug‘s 
patentability. Brazil‘s patent office ended up denying Gilead‘s patent in 2009, thus 
opening up the possibility for alternative suppliers and local production.  
The only producer registered to sell the drug in Brazil is Gilead, but there are 
WHO-prequalified generic producers of the ARV in India. Consequently, Brazil-based 
ABIA teamed up with Indian NGO Sahara Centre for Residential Care & Rehabilitation 
to file a pre-grant opposition to Gilead‘s patent of tenofovir in India, too. For local 
production, the Ministry of Health chose Farmanguinhos and Minas Gerais state public 
lab Funed to develop and produce tenofovir in partnership with national API makers 
Globe, Nortec and Blanver (Ministry of Health 2009). 
 




The post-TRIPS era, with both China and India facing significant barriers in 
producing generic medicines, poses challenges and opportunities. In the future, health 
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officials may not have readily available alternatives when they contemplate using a 
compulsory license. The situation may create another opportunity for Brazil‘s public labs. 
Whereas many private pharmaceutical firms in developing countries may be restricted 
from developing generic versions of patented medicines due to strategic alliances or 
licensing agreements with originator companies, Brazil‘s public labs remain under the 
control of public health authorities. The two key obstacles faced by domestic policy 
makers are successful public-private partnerships and foresight when using the Bolar 
Exception, i.e. the legal provision that permits the lawful development of a patented drug 
but not commercialization until the patent expires. 
Employing public labs to regulate prices of strategic medicines, ensuring the 
sustainability of the country‘s treatment program, and stimulating technological 
development requires state management that combines bureaucratic agility with market 
perspicacity. State managers must have foresight into the new medicines on the horizon 
that will become the future standards for treatment and mobilize resources for their early 
production. The process entails several risks that even public labs avoid. Since the 
reverse-engineering process can take one to three years to complete, funds must be made 
available for research partners to develop promising new drugs on the horizon. The risks 
can be socialized under the rubric of education and technological development, but the 




                                                 
83 Brazil has also lagged behind in developing and offering more fixed-dose combinations of ARVs. 
Atripla, a one-a-day capsule combining efavirenz-emtricitabine-tenofovir, has become standard treatment 
in other countries. One reason why Brazil has lagged behind is that fixed dose combinations were banned 
in the 1980s after a number of products of dubious effectiveness appeared on the market. Only in 2004 did 
ANVISA come out with new regulations governing fixed-dose combinations. Pedro Rolim (2008) said that 
he has received money from FINEP (a technology funding arm of the federal government) to revamp his 
lab at the Federal University of Pernambuco and developed new ARV combinations in association with 
public lab Lafepe.  
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Efforts continue by Brazil‘s public labs to create innovative medicines and take 
advantage of early working provisions in patent laws. Interviewees were reluctant to 
discuss their development drug portfolios but acknowledged some problems. When asked 
why Farmanguinhos did not take advantage of the Bolar Exception more often, Andre 
Daher (2008), a physician who works at the R&D division of the lab, responded: ―Maybe 
due to the traumatic experience with Kaletra in which there was a furious response by 
industry.‖ The experience relates to Abbott‘s efforts to stop the lab from obtaining 
patented raw material of lopinavir used in the Kaletra formulation. Additionally, the lab 
must balance a number of demands from the Ministry of Health, and concentrate 
resources in treatment areas forsaken by private industry, such as pediatric formulations 
of ARVs and strategic objectives including drugs used to combat flu pandemics.
84
 
The state is likely to continue building South-South coalitions to negotiate 
collective drug purchasing agreements and overcome technological obstacles. Brazil‘s 
National AIDS Program has spearheaded the International Network in Technological 
Cooperation in HIV/AIDS. The network, which includes China, Ukraine, Brazil, 
Argentina, Thailand, and Cuba, is focusing research efforts on developing technology 
used for soft-gel capsules of ritonavir as well as quality control of diagnostic kits.
85
 The 
Ministry of Health also donates ARVs and technical support to other AIDS programs in 
South America and Portuguese Africa. In one instance, Brazil is donating pharmaceutical 
technology from FM so that Mozambique can establish its own ARV factory. 
.  
                                                 
84 ―The objective the public lab is not to have profit but to have a large therapeutic arsenal and offerings for 
special populations, i.e. treatment failure and pediatrics,‖ explained Daher (2008). 
85 To become a member, countries must have three criteria: 1) committed to fight HIV/AIDS, 2) have a 
flexible approach to intellectual property; and 3) have technical capacity and scientific capability in the 




The most enduring legacy of Brazil‘s experience with contentious AIDS policies 
is the strong coalition between activist groups outside of government and social 
movement insiders, especially in the National AIDS Program. Until there is a cure for 
AIDS, this coalition will continue to reinvest the ―reputational dividends‖ of Brazil‘s 
banner program.  
The success of this AIDS coalition rests on the ability to ensure alternative 
suppliers of essential medicines. The 2005 dispute over the price of Abbott‘s Kaletra is a 
case in point. Advocacy groups mobilized protests, lobbied the National Council of 
Health, and filed lawsuits to force the government to issue compulsory licenses. Despite 
their efforts, policy makers backed down. One of the overriding concerns was the 
availability of generic copies. Local Brazilian producers would take six months to three 
years to make the first batches available, and equivalent medicines from Asia still had to 
go through the necessary safety tests. Regulatory approval could have been fast-tracked, 
but authorities would still be vulnerable to accusations of sub-standard quality. 
Activists continue to provide support to public labs and are also reaching out the 
local industry. The link between activists and national bourgeoisie is likely to remain the 
weakest link in the triple alliance but also the area with the most potential. The 
implementation of industrial polices provides an opportunity for social accountability of 
state support for the local production strategic medicines. 
Lastly, Brazilian organizations are likely to continue establishing more South-
South links with activists in other countries. Connections with Indian activists have 
already begun due to the importance this Asian country plays in providing medicines, but 
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alliances and mutual support will also likely to grow with groups in other countries facing 
patent monopolies. 
 
National Bourgeoisie  
 
Brazilian firms (whether public labs or private sector firms) are being squeezed by 
both patent monopolies from above and market pressures from below. Besides patent 
restrictions on the lawful copying of medicines, they face increasing competition from 
generic suppliers in Asia. To confront patent power and market power, Brazil‘s 
pharmaceutical sector has received support from the government‘s new industrial 
policies.  
State support, however, has not been sufficient for the two companies that first 
began producing active principals—Labogen and Microbiologica. The former went into 
bankruptcy after Rio de Janeiro public lab Instituto Vital Brazil (IVB) failed to pay its 
debts to Labogen for raw materials supplied to make ARVs and also due to its inability to 




Microbiologica continues to work in some areas related to AIDS, but now 
survives as a contract research company producing small batches of ARVs under 
development by transnational drug companies and exporting high-end products used as 
references for biological testing in the US. Lelio Maçaira, who left Microbiologica, now 
                                                 
86 Neto (2008) also stated: ―If the government does not set a market guarantee of some say 40% of 
purchases, I think the API manufacturing sector will continue to disappear. Nowadays, no one wants to 
work on AIDS medicines. It is a waste of time. Only now the government began to do some changes to the 
Tender Law and some industrial policies. But the private sector does not have time to wait, the government 
does.‖ 
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operates a contract manufacturing company, Laborvida, producing medicines for both 
originator and generic medicines. His firm even won a bid to manage IVB‘s outsourced 
production. 
Global integration in the private sector, meanwhile, continues apace. In April 
2009, French company Sanofi-Aventis purchased Brazil‘s third largest generic drug 
maker Medley for R$ 1.5 billion (about $750 million). Historically, expansion of Brazil‘s 
privately owned drug companies have resulted in increased foreign penetration in the 
form of mergers and acquisitions by TNCs. This route to financial success chosen by 
Medley‘s shareholders represents a challenge to policy makers at the BNDES who are 
contemplating sector policies to forge a domestic, privately owned mega-pharmaceutical 
company, capable of competing head-to-head on the global market (Agência Estado 
2007). In the near future, the national drug companies will be able to count on the support 
of the Brazilian state for industrial and technological development. 
 
Transnational Drug Companies 
 
At this current conjecture, foreign capital is unlikely to become a member of 
Brazil‘s development alliance as it once was before neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. The 
uniformity of intellectual property laws across the world has increased their structural 
power. Given current trends, however, they are unlikely to obtain bilateral support from 
the US in specific IP disputes. Rather, US diplomats will focus their attention on bilateral 
trade agreements and international treaties to ratchet up intellectual property standards. 
 In light of Brazilian attempts to become more self-sufficient in medicines and 
economize fiscal resources spent on ballooning health budgets, what strategies and tactics 
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have worked best for foreign-based firms to pursue patent power and avoid compulsory 
licenses? Of course, they could always acquiesce to commodity prices demanded by the 
Brazilian government. Apart from this unlikely outcome, the Brazilian case demonstrates 
the success of some corporate approaches versus others.  
Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS), for example, has had fewer problems with 
government negotiators compared to other firms. Unlike Merck Sharpe and Dohme 
(MSD), which lost about $30 million when the compulsory license for efavirenz was 
issued in 2007, BMS has never had market exclusivity of one of its ARVs threatened by 
the government. Most drug companies use some form of tiered pricing set by global 
headquarters and based on a country‘s GDP per capita and HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. 
Local officials at BMS took a different approach and convinced the corporate head office 
to provide them with increased autonomy to establish the price of ARVs closer to that of 
least developed countries. When the National AIDS Program began to distribute 
atazanavir in 2004, BMS deviated from its global price guidelines and gave Brazil a 
deeper discount. Salles (2008), the head of corporate relations, explained that one of the 
reasons was to avoid conflicts over prices.
87
 BMS‘ strategy is to project its image as a 
partner instead of being viewed as an obstacle in Brazil‘s success. 
Another strategy employed by BMS is to stay ahead in the technological curve, 
even at the level of formulations. After Brazilians began to produce didanosine, BMS 
introduced an enteric-coated formulation that includes an extended release mechanism so 
that only one tablet, as opposed to two, is taken each day. The National AIDS Program 
began distribution of the advanced formula in 2002, and while Farmanguinhos said it is 
                                                 
87 Market success can breed its own problems. As BMS‘s atazanavir wins more market share from 
Abbott‘s Kaletra, the company‘s sales being to claim a larger percentage of the government‘s budget for 
ARVs. Civil society groups have begun to lobby health officials to threaten its patent. 
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This chapter argued that industrial policies increased state autonomy by securing 
the support of the local bourgeoisie. These state policies marginalized the interests of 
transnational drug companies and gave preference to the local pharmochemical sector. 
AIDS has been at the forefront of industrial policies for the pharmaceutical sector, but as 
state elites return to the business of economic development, policy-making concerning 
the disease has been subsumed under the goal of economic development. Not even the 
compulsory license of efavirenz, marketed by Merck, in May 2007, generated significant 
social protest since new domestic agendas and alliances had been firmly established. 
This chapter recounted the institutionalization of the triple alliance between the 
government, local pharmaceutical sector, and patient advocacy groups. At the center of 
the alliance is the Ministry of Health: with local industry, public-private partnerships 
were established using public labs to produce strategic medicines; and with local NGOs, 
information and political support are exchanged concerning the impact of breaking 
patents on its treatment program. The weakest link in the triple alliance is between AIDS 
activists and local industry.  Nevertheless, there is growing awareness of the challenges 






CHAPTER SIX – SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Most of Brazil’s population are absent from  
this analysis because they are absent from  
the decision making that is being described… 
--Peter Evans, Dependent Development (1979: 13) 
 
Brazil has rediscovered itself, and this rediscovery is being expressed in its 
people's enthusiasm and their desire to mobilize to face the huge problems that lie 
ahead of us.  




This dissertation has argued that a national triple alliance developed in order to 
defend a domestic social program in the face of globalizing pressures and norms by 
analyzing the case of Brazil‘s response to the AIDS crisis. I have also argued that the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) has increased the 
structural power of transnational drug corporations in their relations to the developing 
country states. Lastly, I show the triple alliance contests the structural power of 
corporations by exploiting the ―reputational dividends‖ of its successful AIDS social 
program. 
Brazil‘s implementation of neoliberal economic policies during the early 1990s 
strengthened the power of transnational drug companies (TNCs) to obtain monopoly 
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rents. The passage of new intellectual property legislation in 1996 allowed firms to use 
Brazil‘s justice system to enforce their patent power. Market de-regulation, trade 
liberalization, new property protections also produced countervailing social forces. By 
the end of the decade, the state began to re-assert its control over pharmaceutical markets. 
And, more importantly, it began to do so without the help or guidance of TNCs. The 
former triple alliance between state, TNCs, and local capital, alluded to in Evans‘ quote 
above, had disintegrated. 
In the democratic spaces that opened up in Brazil during the 1990s, some 
mobilized groups were able to make rights claim on the state more than others. Brazil‘s 
public health system was in shambles and access to basic medicines under threat. The one 
exception was Brazil‘s AIDS program, which resulted from a strong coalition between 
activist AIDS NGOs (mainly urban, middle-class citizens affected by the disease and the 
high price of drugs) and activist health reformers that transformed the ―right to health‖ 
into a concrete social program.   
Leadership at the highest levels of government, such as astute politicians, played 
an important role in opening up spaces to allow for successful AIDS policies, in part 
because of the political gains to be made. But more important were the mid-level 
bureaucrats who circulated in and out of the revolving door between public 
administration and advocacy groups. These actors represent the ―social movement 
insiders‖ (Santoro and McGuire 1997) that forge alliances with activists outside of 
government and lobby for policy from within. This constellation of forces were able to 
pass a law making it the obligation of the state to provide free and universal access to 
AIDS medicines to all those in need. 
During the 1990s, the dual coalition had focused their attention on national issues 
concerning access to medicines and sufficient fiscal resources. The situation changed 
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when the sustainability of the program came under threat from the high prices of patented 
medicines. Ever since the US threatened a WTO panel in 2000 against Brazil, the 
National AIDS Program has mobilized its local NGO base and reached out to 
international human rights groups to defend its cause. Brazilian diplomats, known for a 
strong tradition of professionalism and excellence, increased collaborations with AIDS 
bureaucrats and skillfully constructed alliances with other countries to push a health 
rights agenda in international venues. In sum, they exploited the ―reputational dividends‖ 
of Brazil‘s successful AIDS program to contest US hegemony and corporate power. 
Building alliances with the local bourgeoisie occurred after the weaknesses of 
Brazil‘s pharmaceutical capacities became apparent. The evolution of the local 
production of ARVs has evolved through a number of institutional settings over the past 
two decades. At the start of the 1990s, Microbiologica reverse engineered the AZT 
molecule to become the first Brazilian maker of the medicine. Its experience was not 
nurtured when Farmanguinhos, operated by the Ministry of Health, was mobilized to 
quickly produce generic copies of ARVs not protected by patent.  
When the government scaled up production and called on the nation‘s scientists to 
respond to the AIDS crisis, informal collaboration across the public-private divide 
developed and the country‘s best minds made contributions. But the joint efforts were 
fleeting. Brazil failed to keep pace with technological trends due to changes in the 
organization of public labs and impact of patents on second generation ARVs. Only after 
the contentious politics of breaking patents and paucity of off-the-shelf alternatives 
exposed the weakness of Brazil‘s pharmochemical base did Brazilian policy makers ramp 
up support for local private API fabricators and formalize partnerships between public 
and private drug companies. 
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The unforeseen consequence of US pressures, panels at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and price disputes was the resurrection of parts of Brazil‘s dirigiste 
policies of the past to direct the development and import substitution of inputs for its 
growing health system. The election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva provided the backdrop 
to industrial policies designed to support the country‘s national bourgeoisie. The key 
private sector actor has been ABIFINA, the industry association representing the 
pharmochemical sector. State directed industrial policies have translated into technical, 
legal, and political support from this industrial segment when the state has had to 
confront external forces. 
Communication within the ―triple alliance‖ and instrumental use of ―reputational 
dividends‖ rests upon a frame of human rights. The right to health care, enshrined in UN 
conventions, provides a common discursive framework for institutional insiders, 
domestic activists, and NGOs with a global media presence. Specific frames have shifted 
during each conflict over patents and high prices. For example, when Brazil finally issued 
a compulsory license, debate increased over the impact on the country‘s economic 
development.  
The frames employed by transnational drug companies and their backers were 
less coherent and more variable. Initially, they purported the breaking of patents as 
tantamount to theft. Later attempts by pharmaceutical companies to frame themselves as 
the reason behind the success of the program since they invent the medicines (thus 
justifying patents and high prices) also floundered. In the end, they were forced to 
concede to government demands for price discounts and wanted to be seen as partners in 
the Brazil‘s flagship AIDS program.  
The particularities of AIDS cannot be over-emphasized for understanding Brazil‘s 
success. The stigma attached to the ―gay cancer‖ mobilized a group that achieved strong 
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internal group solidarity due to their identity within and across countries. Brazil‘s gay 
community combined identity politics with rights-based claims. Their middle- and upper-
class origins, urban location, and foreign networks made them both vital stakeholders in 
the programs‘ success as well as key promoters.  
As the sustainability of the program became intertwined with the technicalities of 
intellectual property law and pharmaceutical production, social movement organizations 
adapted. Hiring more professionals and developing denser networks to other Southern 
countries permitted them to share technical information with partners both inside and 




The case of Brazil provides a number of useful theoretical insights.  My first 
theoretical point is that globalization has resulted in a triple alliance consisting of the 
state, local bourgeoisie, and domestic grassroots organizations tied into transnational 
advocacy groups. This coalition is contrary to what theories of globalization and the state 
predict. Global capitalist theory envisions the increasing coherence of a ―transnational 
capitalist class‖ based on a common interest in global accumulation (Sklair 2001; 
Robinson 2004). Centralization of power in such institutions like the WTO, however, has 
reinvigorated national coalitions in defense of national projects and sovereignty.  
The triple alliance is the consequence of neoliberal reforms and global capitalist 
institutions. Neoliberal reforms in developing countries may represent an agenda of 
global accumulation, but a minimalist state also precludes strong alliances between the 
state and TNCs embodied in previous conceptions of development alliances (Evans 
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1979). With trade liberalization and intellectual property protection, global tech firms no 
longer have to negotiate with states to gain access to markets in exchange for transferring 
technology and investing capital.  
States, however, remain interested in ascending technological ladders and creating 
high income jobs. The local bourgeoisie in developing countries still requires state 
support to promote local skills, rebalance national markets, and assist in global insertion. 
In Brazil‘s experience supporting a domestic AIDS program, the unforeseen consequence 
of a formalized institution like the TRIPS accord is the weakening of the transnational 
alliance and strengthening of domestic coalitions. Evans‘ (1979) triple alliance pushing 
for industrialization consisting of state managers, TNCs, and domestic bourgeoisie has 
shifted—TNCs have exited as social movements have entered.  
The second theoretical point is that TRIPS has increased dependency in the Third 
World by strengthening the structural power of capital. Patent monopolies have 
undoubtedly increased the bargaining power of TNCs. On balance, foreign drug firms 
have profited handsomely from Brazil‘s universal AIDS program. Between 1996 and 
2007, the Brazilian government spent a total of $2.71 billion on ARVs. Of this amount, 
foreign firms received $1.85 billion
88
 or 68% of the total. ―I wish every disease could 
have a Henfil or Betinho,‖ stated Antonio Salles (2008), the Director of Corporate 
Relations at Bristol Meyers Squibb, referring to two famous Brazilians whose death from 
AIDS helped generate support for public policies. 
Brazil‘s experience with patent power codified by TRIPS follow the predictions 
of many theories about globalization. In the past, developing countries moved into 
advanced industries by copying technologies from the first world. As a result of the 
                                                 
88 In 2005 US dollars, based on data from Brazil‘s National AIDS Program. 
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Industrial Property Act of 1996, Brazilian firms no longer could quickly reverse engineer 
and market next generation ARVs. In this sense, global capitalist institutions constrain 
state actions (Wade 2003; Chang 2002). 
Even using the flexibilities outlined in TRIPS represents a structural advantage 
for TNCs. The process of developing patented medicines and using compulsory licenses 
has been embroiled in court injunctions, WTO panels, and threats from drug firms and 
US diplomats. With new intellectual property legislation, policy makers must engage in 
difficult price negotiations and follow a bureaucratic and politicized process when issuing 
a compulsory license. The power of TRIPS is ultimately expressed by the fact that Brazil 
never became an export platform in AIDS medicines. 
The structural power of capital, however, does not necessarily lead to the end of 
state autonomy as theories of globalization depict. If we understand the state as 
occupying a unique institutional ―arena‖ in modern society (Mann 1986), then 
globalization opens new spaces at the same time as it restricts others. The ―arena‖ grows 
as new actors‘ voice legitimate claims, and   state autonomy is renewed by the ability of 
state elites to play different societal forces against one another.  
Democratic reforms that have occurred in the Third World over the past twenty 
years represent the entrance of new actors with demands on states. The ensuing political 
struggles resulted in the creation of new state agencies responsible for managing social 
programs. Here, state construction is not as deterministic as the structuralist perspective 
of capitalist states leads us to believe, but instead can result from the scaling up of rights-
based social struggles and programs.  
The forging of state autonomy in the age of globalization goes beyond the mere 
balancing of forces, be they driven by rights-based claims and/or the interests of TNCs. A 
view of autonomy resulting from the mediation of different political and economic 
 189 
interests alone reduces our conception of the state to acting within territorial boundaries. 
This traditional view of the state views power projection that extends beyond national 
boundaries solely in geopolitical and military terms.  
Globalization, however, allows us to also include the symbolic elements of state 
autonomy in novel ways. This leads to my second theoretical point: states can increase 
their autonomy in the world system through successful exploitation of rights-based social 
policies and programs, or what I call ―reputational dividends.‖ This may occur when a 
state addresses any social issue, but is particularly acute with respect to AIDS. Where the 
disease is left unchecked, it devastates governments both materially in terms of personnel 
but also symbolically for failure to act. Those countries that successfully confront the 
pandemic become empowered. Seen as ―winners‖ in the fight against the pandemic, 
policy experts, activists, and even private companies rally to the cause. Consequently, as 
AIDS became more of an international concern and the success of Brazil became more 
apparent, Brazilian health officials positioned the country as a leader in the fight against 
the disease and victim to the interests of the transnational pharmaceutical industry. 
Social theory speaks of the ―reputational costs‖ that weak actors can impose on 
strong actors (Greenhill and Busby 2008). But equally important are the symbolic gains 
actors can obtain. Whereas ―costs‖ can be imposed on the misdeeds, hypocrisy, and 
violations (i.e. negative behavior) of states, ―dividends‖ can be reaped by exploiting 
achievements, moral appeal, and good deeds (i.e. positive behavior). In international 
relations, those countries best posed to take advantage of the latter are middle income 
countries. Low-income countries tend to have scarce resources either to carry out a 
successful program comparable to that of Brazil or the required skills to trump up their 
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case on the international scene. Rich countries, in the case of attacking intellectual 
property rights, tend to have most to lose in these zero-sum game situations.
89
 
Globalization theory predicts that to contest global capital, social movements 
would have to internationalize. The Brazil case demonstrates this point. Rights-based 
claims became a mobilizing factor for networking with various groups from gay activists, 
the access to medicines movement, and human rights defenders across the world. Equally 
important is that activists had a concrete program to defend, not an abstract ideal. 
Politicized coalitions can scale-up success from the local to the national and to the global 
levels. Social movements could not have achieved this success without state partners, and 
state actors could not have contested global power without outside help.  
Brazil‘s success in AIDS has strong implications at the international level. 
Kapstein and Busby (2010) draw important lessons from the construction of the first 
global entitlement scheme, which transformed ARVs from private goods to merit goods 
available to everyone. These lessons include permissive material conditions in the form 
of an inexpensive good or service, policy consensus about what needs to be done, and a 
broad political coalition built on adroit framing of the issue.  
My Brazil-centric perspective adds that middle-income countries need to be at the 
center of this process. Their limited resources but sufficient institutional capacity to 
universalize a good or service, combined with their position in the world system to craft 
moral claims, make them ideal candidates to develop ―reputational dividends.‖ 
Transnational advocacy networks when partnered with these states are able to distribute 
these ―dividends‖ to other developing countries.  
 
                                                 
89 This middle-income thesis is analogous to Eric Wolf‘s (1999) middle peasant thesis. 
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FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
 
Comparing Brazil‘s case to the experiences of Thailand, South Africa, and India 
could refine the theoretical conclusions of this dissertation. All these countries suffer 
from a severe AIDS epidemic, host locally owned pharmaceutical companies, and have 
incorporated TRIPS into local legislation, as a result of being under constant pressure 
from the US. These countries‘ integration into the global economic system places greater 
demands on them in terms of competitive development in the knowledge-based economy 
and upholding human rights obligations. 
Despite their commonalities, the four countries vary in terms of their approach to 
addressing the AIDS epidemic and commitment to providing universal public health. 
India and South Africa have denied (until recently) the seriousness of the disease within 
their countries. Both have an under-resourced public health system, but are home to 
strong generic drug companies. Indian firms, in particular, have spearheaded efforts to 
reduce the price of AIDS medicines and have become major suppliers to other countries 
suffering from the pandemic.  
Compared to India and South Africa, Brazilian and Thai public health authorities 
have overcome the stigma attached to the disease and enacted aggressive policies in 
partnership with civil society groups. These countries also are home to public (state-
owned) drug companies that produce AIDS medicines for their national treatment 
programs. These public labs not only promote the use of TRIPS humanitarian safeguards, 
but also engage in South-South networks to develop and disseminate public 
pharmaceutical technologies. South-South activist networks between Brazilian and Indian 
NGOs have also expanded. 
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These additional cross case comparisons should provide a number of insights for 
theory generation about social responses to the AIDS pandemic, globalization, and state 
autonomy. First, how do successful AIDS programs lead to state empowerment when 
developing countries confront transnational drug companies? How does the internal 
organization and embeddedness of these states affect coalition building? Does stigma 
attached to the disease and homosexuality affect coalition building between activists in 
the access to medicines movement, gay rights organizations, and industry associations 
representing domestic private firms? 
Another set of questions concerns the relationship between global capital and 
states and the chances of replicating the successes of rights-based social programs and 
policies. How do relations between states and TNCs on the international level affect 
relationships between states and social movements on the domestic scene? Why do some 
social programs become rallying points for social mobilization and others do not? And 
lastly, why do some domestic social struggles become scaled up to the global level while 
others are not? 
The AIDS crisis tests the ability for societies to respond to catastrophic challenges 
and uphold human rights obligations. Globalization presents new demands on developing 
countries, but also new opportunities. Comparing Brazil‘s experience in producing 
medicines locally in the brave new world of patents with those of other countries 
responding to the AIDS crisis, nonetheless, could provide insight into how different 
governments relate to social pressures coming from both civil society and industry. The 
analytic framework focusing on the interaction of committed bureaucracies and the 
globalizing dynamics of contention could help explain varied outcomes dealing with a 
variety of crises in the developing world, be they related to the economy, environment, or 
health.  
 193 
APPENDIX ONE: CHRONOLOGY OF POLICIES AND EVENTS CONCERNING BRAZIL‟S PRODUCTION OF ARVS, PATENTS AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
 




ARV Production Policies related to 
Patents 
Policies related to Public Labs and 
Industrial Policies 
1971     Dec- Industrial Property 
Act (CPI N.° 5.772): 
removes patents on 
pharmaceutical 
processes and products 
Central Medicines Agency (CEME) 
created.  
1983   First AIDS case diagnosed in Sao 
Paulo 
1985 Military Rule Ends. Start of Democratic 
Transition 




   New Constitution approved that enshrines health as a right for 
everyone and state’s duty to insure universal and equal access to 
health care. 




  SUS (Unified Public Health System) 




  Pharmaceutical imports liberalized 









 Public Procurement Law (Law 
8.666) approved  
1993 Labogen produces 





Lafepe begins to 
produce AZT  









Organization created and 





Lafepe produces AZT 
pediatric formulation 
May- Industrial 
Property Law (#9.279) 
passed that includes 
pharmaceuticals, 
processes and products 
Law passed insuring universal access 
to AIDS drugs (Sarney Law 9.113/96) 
1997  Industrial Property Law 
implemented 
CEME deactivated amidst allegations 
of corruptions and inefficiency.  
Far-Manguinhos mobilized by 
Ministry of Health to make copies of 
ARVs. 
1998 Jose Serra Scale-up of ARV 
production 
Labogen and MB 
launch D4T API 
 
Dec.-Phrma requests 
USTR to list Brazil as a 
Watch List country on its 
annual ―Special 301‖ 
Report and complains 









Decree # 3.201 
establishes criteria for 
compulsory licensing for 
national emergency and 
public interest  
Jan. National Health Surveillance 
Agency (ANVISA) (Law # 9.782/99) 
created to regulate pharmaceutical 
market. 
   Dec.-ANVISA Prior 




Generics Act (Act # 9.787/99) passed 
that stimulates production and use of 
generic medicines. 
   Price controls put into place 
2000 Nortec and Cristalia 
enter the ARV market 
Labogen launches 
NVP API 
May-USTR ranks Brazil 
among the Watch List 
countries of its ―Special 
301‖ Report. 
Congressional Investigation 
Commission (CPI) into Medicines 
2001  Feb.-ANVISA Pre- Law 10.332/01 CT-Saúde. Setorial 
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Approval passed into 
Law 
Fund for health technologies created 
  Serra threatens CL for 
Merck‘s efavirenz and 
Roche‘s nelfinavir but 
reaches accord with 
both. 
Nov.-Doha Declaration affirms the 
right to health over right to property at 
WTO 
  Jan.-June: WTO Trade 
spat between US and 









Dec.- Brazil launches 
the International 
Cooperation Program, 
which would provide 
about 10 countries 
with needed ARVs. 




provided by drug firms 












Program of Public 
Drug Production 
launched to invest 
US$26 million in 
public labs 
Decree # 4.830/03 
allows parallel importing 
of patent products under 
a compulsory license 
from countries in which 
product not patented.  
May-USTR elevates 
Brazil to the Priority 
Watch List of its 
―Special 301‖ Report. 
Medicines Regulation Body (Câmara 
de Regulação de Medicamentos) 
created to oversee price increases of 
medicines- 
Nov.-Guidelines drawn up for 
Industrial Policy for Technology and 
Foreign Trade (PITCE) and 
pharmaceuticals included. 
2004 Labogen ends 
production of ARV 
raw materials and 
later closers its doors 
May-USTR ranks Brazil 
among its ―Special 301‖ 
Report‘s Priority Watch 
List countries. 





NAP and FM sign 
accord to develop 
efavirenz, tenofovir, 
Costa issues ‗public 
interest‘ of Abbott‘s 
Kaletra. Saraiva Felipe 
Industrial policy Profarma 
implemented by state-owned 
investment bank BNDES to stimulate 
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Kaletra, atazanavir, 
and didanosine EC 
Ministerial Order nº 
2438/05 - Network of 




reaches an accord. 
US Congress members 
request USTR to impose 
economic sanctions on 
Brazil should it issue 
CLs. 
domestic pharmaceutical production. 





FM authorized to 















efavirenz API to 
national labs 
Cristalia, Nortec and 
Globe 
Apr.-Ministry of Health 
issues first compulsory 
license for Merck‘s 
efavirenz 
Apr.-USTR demotes 
Brazil to the Watch List 
on its annual ―Special 
301‖ Report; Phrma 
requests out-of-cycle 
review in lieu of the CL. 
May-Lula announces CL 
 
2008  Ministry of Health 
declares Gilead‘s 
tenofovir to be in the 
public interest in order to 
speed up INPI‘s patent 
evaluation of the 
product. INPI denies 
patent concession. 
Ministerial Order nº 374/08 – Program 
to Stimulate Public Production in 
Health Industrial Complex 
Ministerial Order nº 375/08 – Program 
to Qualify and Certify private sector 
producers of inputs for health sector 
Ministerial Order n 978/08 – List of 
Strategic Medicines  
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APPENDIX TWO: LIST OF INTERVIEWS, INSTITUTIONAL VISITS AND CONFERENCES  
Interviewee Professional Title or Relevance to Research Date(s) 
Interviewed 
   
NGOs/ Patient Advocates   
Jorge Beloqui Grupo de Incentivo À Vida 11 Jul 08 
Gabriela Chaves Pharmacist, ABIA/MSF Coordinator 27 Mar 08 
Michel Lowtroska Doctors without Borders, Representative of 
Access to Essential Medicines Campaign 
25 Mar 08 and 30 
Jun 05* 
Renata Reis ABIA Intellectual Property Coordinator 5 May 08 
Mario Scheffer Grupo Pella Vida/São Paulo 4 Apr 08 
Rodrigo de Souza Pinheiro Fórum de ONGs/Aids do Estado de São Paulo 2 Jun 09  
Veriano Terto ABIA, general coordinator 4 July 05* 
OUTSIDE EXPERTS   
Octavio Antunes Chemist, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 29 May 08 
Hayne Felipe Far-Manguinhos/Popular Pharmacy Program 17 Jun 05* and  
James Fitzgerald Pan-American Health Organization 20 Oct 08 
Lia Hasenclever Economist, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 16 Jul 08 
Luis Felipe M Lima Former ANVISA Director 12 Jul 05* and 28 
Nov 07 
Rosali Tardelia Editor, Agencia Aids News Service 8 Jul 08 
PUBLIC LABS   
Nubia Boechat Former Director, Far-Manguinhos (2002-2005) Jul 05* and 29 Mar 
08 
Josiana Gomes Chaves FUNED, Assistant to the President 30 Jul 05* 
Eduardo Costa Director, Far-Manguinhos (2006-2009) 15 June 09  
Jorge Costa Vice President of Research, Far-Manguinhos 
(2006-present) 
Questions Emailed 
/ Never returned 
Andre Daher Manager, Clinical Testing, Far-Manguinhos 
(2002-present) 
17 Jul 08 
Carlos Alberto Pereira 
Gomes 
Ministry of Health (1998-2001), Director of 
Funed, ALFOB 
25 Aug 08 
Ricardo Oliva Director FURP, and President of Public Labs 
Industry Association (ALFOB) 
17 Dec 08 
Eloan Pinheiro Director Far-Manguinhos (1994-2001) 25 May 06* 
Cida Rodrigues and Gleide 
Gloria Silva 
Head of Production and Assistant to the 
President, Iquego 
14 Dec 07 
Tuyoshi Ninomya FURP, Technical Assistant 17 Jul 05* 
Leduar Guedes Superintendente Director, Lafepe 23 Jul 08 




Vera Valente Director, Pro-Genericos 18 Aug 05 
Edson Lima Director, API Manufacturing Division, Cristalia 6 May 08 
Lelio Maçaira Former Director Microbiologica, 
Director Laborvida 
28 Nov 07 and 19 
May 09 
Otavio Pacheco President, Cristalia 8 Jul 08 
Jaime Rabi Director, Microbiologica 16 Mar 08 
Marcos Soalheiro Director of Development, Nortec 17 Jun 08 
Marcelo de Machado Former Director, Labogen 7 Jul 08 
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Campos Neto 
Ciro Mortella President, Brazilian Pharmaceutical Industry 
Federation (Febrafarma) 
3 Sep 08 
Nelson Brasil Vice President, Brazilian Association of the Fine 
Chemical Industry (Abifina) 




Agenor Alvares ANVISA Director, present; Minister of Health, 
2006-2007 
12 July 08 
Dirceu Barbano Head of Department of Pharmaceutical 
Assistance under Temporao 
Questions Sent / 
No reply 
Jarbas Barbosa Director, Health Surveillance, Ministry of Health 
under Costa;  
PAHO 
23 Oct 08 
Paulo Buss President, FioCruz (2001-present) Too Busy 
Pedro Chequer Director, National AIDS Program, 1996-2000, 
2004-2006 
12 Jul 08 
Fernando Cardenas Ministry of Health, 1999-2002; NAP, 2002-2003 10 Jul 08 
Norberto Rech Director, Pharmaceutical Assistance, under Costa 10 Sep 08 
Humberto Costa Minister of Health, 2002-2005 22 Jul 08 
Saraiva Felipe Minister of Health, 2005-2006 12 Dec 07 
Platão Fischer Head of Department of Pharmaceutical 
Assistance under Jose Serra 
Denied 
Moises Goldbaum Secretary for Science, Technology, and Strategic 
Resources, Ministry of Health (2003-2006) 
Questions Sent 
Alexander Grangeiro Director, National AIDS Program 2003-2004 7 May 08 
Reinaldo Guimaraes Secretary of Science, Technology and Strategic 
Inputs, Ministry of Health, 2007-present 
Too Busy 
Liane Lage Director, Drug Patent Review Office, National 
Intellectual Property Institute 
15 Jul 08 
Luiz Carlos Wanderley 
Lima 
ANVISA, Intellectual Property Coordination 
(COOPI) 
27 May 08 
Barjas Negri Minister of Health, 2002; Executive Secretary, 
1998-2001  
Denied 
Pedro Palmeiro and Luciana 
Xavier de Lemos Capanema 
BNDES, Manager and Engineer of Chemicals for 
Health Division 
14 Aug 05* 
Carlos Passarelli International Programs Coordinator, National 
AIDS Program 
13 Dec 07 
Andre Luiz de Abreu Porto General Coordination for the Development of 
Pharmaceutical Production and Inputs, Ministry 
of Health 
7 Aug 08 
Rubens Ricupero Brazilian Diplomat to GATT Negotiations and 
former President of UNCTAD 
15 Oct 07 
Paulo Teixeira Director, National AIDS Program, 2000-2003 7 May 08 
Ana Paula Telles General Coordination of Logistic Resources, 
Ministry of Health 
11 Dec 07 
Marco Antonio Vitoria Physician, National AIDS Program, World 
Health Organization 




João Domenech Commications Director, Glaxo Smith Kline Denied 
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Jorge Raimundo Former Director, Glaxo Smith Kline, Currently at 
Interfarma 
20 Jun 08 
Irapuan de Oliveira Director, Institutional Relations, Abbott Denied 
Antonio Salles Director of Government Corporate Relations, 
Bristol Myers Squibb 
8 May 08 
Paul Singer Vice President, Pharmaceutical Research 
Manufactures of America (PhRMA) 
5 Aug 07* 
Joao Sanches Merck Dohme & Sharp (MSD), Communications 
Director 
1 Mar 08 




Joao Carlos Ferreira Director, director of Institutional Relations and 
Legal Affairs, Roche 
11 Jul 08 
Felix Figols Director, Institutional Relations, Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
Denied 
US Officials   
Tim Hall US Diplomat, Economics Section, US Embassy 
in Brasilia 
11 Dec 07 
 * Pre-Dissertation Interview 
 
 
Institutions Visited Location 
Cristalia São Paulo 
Far-Manguinhos Rio de Janeiro 
Funed Belo Horizonte, Minas Gerais 
Furp São Paulo 
Hospital Emilio Ribas São Paulo 
Lafepe Recife, Pernambuco 
Ministry of Health Brasilia 
National AIDS Program Brasilia 




Conferences Attended Location Date 
1º ENI-FarMed - Encontro Nacional de 
Inovação em Fármacos e Medicamentos 
São Paulo 21 Nov 07 
Seminário sobre o Complexo Econômico-
Industrial da Saúde 
Rio de Janeiro 19-20 May 08 
Seminário International Patentes, Inovação e 
Desenvolvimento 
Rio de Janeiro 19-20 Jun 08 
VII Congresso da SBDST e III Congresso 
Brasileiro de Aids 
Goiania 7-10 Sep 08 
Seminário Ano da França no Brasil - O 
Acesso aos Anti-Retrovirais nos Países do 
Sul: 20 anos após a introdução da Terapia 
Anti-Retroviral 
Rio de Janeiro 11-12 May 09 
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APPENDIX THREE: PATENT SITUATION OF ARVS IN THE THERAPEUTIC CONSENSUS AND REGISTERED PRODUCERS IN 
BRAZIL 






















Public Labs with 
ANVISA 
Registration 
Private Labs with 
ANVISA Registration 
Nucleoside/Nucleotide Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitor (NRTI) 








1994 FM, Funed, Furp, 
LFM, Iquego, 
Lafepe, Lifal  













1998 FM, Iquego, IVB, 
Furp Lafepe, LFM, 
Lifal, Laqfa 






Blausiegel, De Mayo, 
Bergamo, BMS, 
Prodotti, Germed 
Didanosine enteric coated-DDL 












Pending               
Granted 




n/a - BMS 








1998 Iquego, Lafepe, FM Teuto, Prodotti 



























1998 Lafepe, Furp, 
Iquego,  





-   IVB, Funed, FM, 
Laqfa 
Cristalia, Eurofarma 
 PI9808060  Wellcome Pending Granted    Ranbaxy, Cellofarm, 
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Foundation (2008) Blausiegal 
Abacavir-ABC (Ziagen / Glaxo 
Smith Kline)** 






n/a - GSK 
 PI9809126  Glaxo Group Pending ?     
Tenofovir-TDF (Viread / Gilead 
Sciences) 






n/a*** FM, Funed*** United Medical 
Non-nucleoside Reverse Transcriptase Inhibitor (NNRTI) 






















1998 - - 
 PI9910481  Pharmacia & 
Upjohn 





Efavirenz-EFZ (Sustiva / Bristol 
Meyers Squibb  licensed to MSD 
in Brazil)** 






2009 Lafepe, FM Cristália, Cellofarm, 
MSD 
Protease Inhibitors (PI)         
Atazanavir-ATV (Reyatez / Bristol 
Meyers Squibb) 






n/a - BMS 
 PI9814736 Bristol Meyers 
Squibb 
Pending ?     
    Saquinavir Mesylate-SQV 
(Invirase / Roche) 




n/a - Merck S/A, União 
Química,  
Saquinavir-SQV (Fortovase / 
Hoffman-La  




NO n/a - Roche, Cristalia 
Roche) PI9915444  Roche Pending ?     
Ritonavir-RTV (Norvir / Abbott) PI1100661 Abbott Pending ? YES 
(1996) 
n/a Lafepe Abbott, Cristalia, 
Merck S/A, Neo 
Quimica 
 PI9912010 Abbott Pending Returned to 
INPI 
(2006) 
    










Nelfinavir-NFV (Viracept / 
Agouron licensed to  




n/a Iquego Roche, Medapi, 
Cristalia, Cellofarm 
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     Roche in Brazil)**         
Amprenavir-APV (Agenerase / 
Glaxo Smith Kline)** 




n/a - GSK 
Fosamprenavir-FPV (Telzir/Glaxo 
Smith Kline) 
? ? ? ? YES 
(2007) 
n/a - GSK 
 Darunavir-DRV (Previzta / 
Tibotec) 
PI0416187 University of 
Tulane 
Pending ? YES 
(2007) 
n/a - Janssen 
Entry Inhibitor (EI)         
 Enfuvirtide-T-20 (Fuzeon / 
Hoffman-La Roche) 
PI0314651 Trimeris Pending ? YES 
(2005) 
n/a - Roche 
 PI0314707 Trimeris Pending ?     
Integrase Inhibitor (II)         
 Raltegravir-RAL  
(Isentress/Merck) 
PI0508495 Merck Pending ? YES 
(2008) 
n/a - Merck 
Fixed Dose Combinations         
Lamivudine + Zidovudine- 
(Combivir /  






1999 FM, Lafepe União Química 
    Glaxo Smith Kline)         
Abacavir + Lamivudine + 
Zidovudine (Trizivir / Glaxo Smith 
Kline) 






NO n/a - - 
    Lopinavir + Ritonavir-LPV/r 
(Kaletra / Abbott) ** 




n/a - Abbott 
Other ARVs not included in the therapeutic consensus: Tipranavir- TPV (Aptivus/Boehringer-Ingelheim), Emtricitabine- FTC (Emtriva/Gilead), Maraviroc- (Celsentri/Pfizer), Abacavir 
+ Lamivudine + Zidovudine (Trizivir / GSK) and Emtricitabine + Tenofovir + Efavirenz- (Atripla/ Gilead and BMS).           
Note: *Patents refer to chemical entities, processes and formulations. Companies use different strategies for patenting. Therefore some active principals have more than one patent with 
different expiration dates.  **ARVs patented through the pipeline. ***FM and Funed chosen to develop and produce the ARV. 
Source: Hasenclever et al (2004) plus author, using websites of National Institute on Intellectual Property (Instituto Nacional de Propriedade Intelectual—INPI), National AIDS 
Program, and ANVISA. 
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APPENDIX FOUR: TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES AND RELATED BRAZILIAN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LEGISLATION 
TRIPS FLEXIBILITY BRAZILIAN IP 
LEGISLATION 
(1) Transition period: The deadline that member countries have 
for making domestic laws compliant with TRIPS varies depending 
on their level of development. High-income countries had until 
1996 to change their laws; middle-income countries, including 
Brazil and India, 2005; and least developed countries have until 
2016. (Art. 65 and 66) 
Brazil approved Industrial 
Property Law #9.279 in 1996 
and implemented it the 
following year, several years 
before the 2005 deadline 
(2) Experimental exception: The patent will not prohibit the 
experimental use of an invention by third parties for scientific 
purposes. 
Included in Industrial 
Property Law #9.279 
(3) “Bolar”/Early working exception: Third parties may carry out 
all the necessary tests and procedures required for the registration 
of generic versions before their patent expires. (Art. 30) 
Law # 10.196 passed in 2001 
amends articles 43 in Law 
#9.279 to provide for this 
exception 
(4) Parallel imports or Exhaustion of Rights: Without the 
consent of the patent holder on the domestic market, a product may 
be resold or imported from another country where the patent holder 
has authorized it to be placed on the market. (Art. 6) 
Decree # 4.830 of 2003 
amends Decree #3.201 to 
allow parallel importing of 
patented products when a 
compulsory license is issued 
(5) Prior use: If a person uses an invention before a patent is filed 
for the product, s/he may be granted the right to continue using the 
invention despite the granting of the patent. (Art. 30) 
Included in Industrial 
Property Law #9.279 
(6) Compulsory License: The main legal instrument for correcting 
abuses by patent holders is the compulsory license (CL), which 
allows for the exploitation of a patent by third-parties without the 
consent of the patent holder. Use of a CL is proscribed in six 
instances: a. refusal to deal; b. cases of emergency or extreme 
urgency; c. remedy anti-competitive practices; d. failure to obtain 
voluntary license under reasonable terms; e. public non-commercial 
use; and f. dependent patents for innovations requiring patented 
inputs. Before issuing a compulsory license, a government must 
first attempt to reach a negotiated settlement with the patent holder, 
who, in the case of the CL, still has the right to receive royalties. 
There are two exceptions. First, negotiating a voluntary license is 
not required in cases of a national emergency and public, non-
commercial use. Second, royalty payments may not be necessary 
when a CL is issued to correct anti-competitive practices. 
Industrial Property Law 
#9.279 states a CL can be 
issued for the following 
reasons: failure to exploit 
patent; public interest; 
national emergency; remedy 
for anti-competitive 
practices; and failure to 
produce locally and 
dependent patents 
 
Decree # 3.201 of 1999 
specifies the criteria for 
issuing a compulsory 
licensing in cases of national 
emergency and public 
interest 
 
Decree # 4.830 of 2003 
amends Decree #3.201 to 
allow parallel importing of 
patented products when a 
compulsory license is issued 
(7) Prior Consent and Pre-grant Opposition: Countries can 
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions 
of TRIPS within their legal system; consequently, domestic 
Law # 10.196 of 2001 
amends article 229 in Law 
#9.279 stating that National 
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legislation may allow other government agencies or members of 
society to participate in patent application process (Art. 1.1). 
Health Surveillance Agency 
(ANVISA) must give prior 
consent before patents are 
granted on all pharmaceutical 
products and processes. 
(Prior consent was first 
established by Presidential 
Directive in 1999). 
(8) Pipeline versus Mailbox: A pipeline patent is a form of 
retroactive protection for drugs already patented in other countries 
but not marketed at the time TRIPS comes into force. Otherwise, a 
mailbox system allows applications for patents for pharmaceutical 
product inventions to be filed but not examined until the end of the 
transition period (Art. 70.8). 
Industrial Property Law 
#9.279 of 1996 allows for 
pipeline patents.  
(9) Data Exclusivity: Grants protection for undisclosed data drug 
firms provide to regulatory officials in order to obtain marketing 
approval. Extending the timeframe for protecting undisclosed data, 
a TRIPS-plus measure, restricts competition from generic drugs 
markers that could lower prices (Art. 31). 
Law # 10.603 of 2002 
provides protection to up to 
10 years for drugs that 
include new chemical entities 
and 5 years for all other drug 
for undisclosed test data drug 
firms provide to ANVISA. 
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